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PREFACE

The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, is happy to present to the reading public the ninth volume of its journal, the *Indian Philosophical Annual*.

Part I of the Volume represents the proceedings of the 14th All-India Seminar on "The Concept of Being" held at the (then) Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy in December 1973 and Part II covers the proceedings of the 15th All-India Seminar on "Philosophy and Social Conflict" held in March 1974.

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I am thankful to my colleagues, Dr. P. K. Sundaram and Dr. S. Gopalan, for their help in editing the papers and for attending to the press-work. I am thankful to Avvai Achukkoodam for expeditiously executing the printing work.

Madras,
March 10, 1977.

V. A. Devasenapathi,
Editor.

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PART ONE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON THE CONCEPT OF BEING

C. T. K. Chari

SOME PHENOMENOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON OUR BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH

Many problems of Being are not unrelated to the problems of our own being. And our own being is a being bounded by death. For Hegel, logic and nature find their focus in a finitude of spirit (*Geist*) aware of its finitude and, therefore, of the limit (*die Grenze*). One of our limiting situations, Jaspers has taught, is death. Sigmund Freud combined some speculative and clinical reflections on man in his theory of two instincts (*the German Trieeb* has a somewhat wider connotation than the corresponding English term): an object-seeking instinct striving after higher units, the *Eros*, and a self-destructive 'death instinct' or *Thanatos*. Otto Fenichel attacked the theory on the ground that it is doubtful if aggressive tendencies stem from a turning outward of a more primary self-destructive drive. Keeping in view some recent Russian work on information-processing in living organisms, I must agree with Fenichel that a 'death instinct' is neither necessary nor useful as an explanation.

Heidegger distinguished carefully the contingent being of man, the 'There' of 'Being' (*das Da des Seins*), from other forms of being: *Vorhanden*, *Zuhanden*, *Bestehen*, *Heben*. Death is one of the possibilities of *Dasein*, in fact the supreme or central possibility which orders our whole life, for it is the possibility of not being there. It is the side of life turned away from us (as Rainer Maria Rilke said) of which we must become aware in guilt, anxiety and dread. It is worth noting that the German *Schuld* signifies 'debt' or 'obligation' as well as 'guilt' or 'sin'. The Being-towards-Death is characteristic anxiety (*das Sein zum Tode ist Wesenhaft Angst*). The authenticity of death lies in that I cannot share it with anybody else.

But are the actual states of the dying or the nearly dead characterized only by *Angst*? A related but somewhat different question is taken up in Indian philosophy. *Ought* the approach of death in man to be characterized by fear or anxiety? G. W. Allport, in his *Pattern and Growth in Personality*, praises the Hindu theory of stages in life or *āśramas*: closely knit with the four *puruṣārthas*: *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa*. The truly 'fulfilled men' greet death as their 'dearest guest' (*mṛtyum priyūm ivātithim*). What in them can be destroyed by death? Unfortunately this does not tell us how countless unfulfilled human beings look upon the approach of death. A more empirical and detailed treatment of man's Being-towards-Death is called for. Gerontology, the study of aging, has been described as a new and fast-developing science. But it seems to me more concerned with the care of the dying, consistently with the now popular governmental welfare schemes, than with the study of attitudes towards death. Some clinical studies are more instructive on the point. John Hinton, in his Pelican book *Dying*, describes a wide range of attitudes which he encountered in the dying, apart from the physical and emotional distress of the terminal illness. There may be struggle, acceptance or attempted denial in the face of death. Analysing his data, Hinton finds that a large percentage of the patients showed an awareness of the end and that religiosity, age, education, and occupation had no predictable effect on the awareness. Even more significant are the observations made a few years ago by Dr. Morton A Lieberman, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Chicago. He found that old people with no symptoms of serious ailment showed a distinct awareness of death which was tied up with definite, detectable psychological changes. The following sentence of Dr. Lieberman is relevant: "There was no evidence in these psychological changes that these people had any increased concern or fear, only that they were monitoring signs within themselves that became symbolized as death."

Clinical studies, however, emphasize the standpoint of the critical onlooker rather than the experiences of the dying. Thomas Mann, in his *Magic Mountain* (*Der Zauberberg*), describes the tempo of life in a tuberculosis sanatorium where the paradoxical relations between life and death alter the perspectives of all the inmates. One sentence in the novel is unforgettable: "There was no time up here to speak of, either long or short." Jaspers, in his *General Psychopathology*, refers to the personal experience of Albert Heim, a mountaineer, who suffered a nearly fatal fall. During the five or ten seconds of his fall, he became aware of his possible fate, the results for those he might leave behind, and countless pictures of his past life. It was all without pain or fear or anguish, peaceful and tranquil, until the fall ended with a thud.

For the purposes of my inquiry, I shall adopt the phenomenological approach of Snygg and Combs in their empirical and psychological sense. The 'phenomenal field', taken in a non-reductionistic sense, includes awareness of external objects and of one's own internal states. The person is organized round the 'phenomenal self' which may be changed by new roles and by trauma or sudden shock. In 'phenomenal introspection, the person reports what he is thinking and feeling and what it means to him. Snygg and Combs reject the reductionist concept of 'sensation' to which no meaning is attached. The phenomenological method in this psychological sense can be applied to two classes of data marshalled recently about the dying and the nearly dead.

Dr. Karlis Osis reported the death-bed observations of some 3,500 patients (part of a larger sample of 35,540) made by 5000 doctors and 5000 nurses, with follow-up questionnaires and a computer breakdown of the data and interaction of factors. An elevated mood, and no fear or anxiety, was reported by one in every twenty patients. The exaltation bore no marked relationship to sex, education, body temperature, medication or impaired awareness. Cerebral anoxia, euphoria and effects of suggestion were inadequate to account for the 'visions of another world' described as 'it is so beautiful there'. Many of the patients having the 'visions' were not mentally out of touch with the surroundings. A majority of these subjects perceived also 'apparitions' or 'phantasms' of the dead who were alleged to help the 'transition to the other life'. While the figures of the dead were hallucinated, physical objects and surroundings were perceived as normal. Two British surveys have shown that healthy, living people, as distinguished from the dying, tend to hallucinate for the most part living persons. The difference was statistically significant as shown by a chi^2—test ($chi^2 = 280.6$: 1 d.f.). It seems possible or even probable that the roots of death-bed hallucinations go far beyond the obvious physiological, educational, and religious differences between people.

Even more striking and puzzling, for my analysis, is the apparent experience of the 'I' leaving the 'bodily me', in an enhanced awareness, reported by the nearly dead and subsequently recovered, as studied by R. Crookall, a Doctor of Science and of Philosophy, and a Member of the Churches' Fellowship for Psychical Study in Britain. I refer but to a few of these impressive cases. Dr. Rose of Cheltanham was thrown from a horse and remained unconscious with closed eyes while the doctors frantically tried to revive him. Recovering after removal to the hospital, he described the men who had picked him up after the fall when he was unconscious, their horses, their dress, their gestures; they were complete strangers to the district, persons whom

he could never have seen before. He saw his own body lying on the ground. Sir Auckland Geddes (later Lord Geddes), Professor of Anatomy, related to the Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh the apparent experience of a medical friend who nearly died. The friend, in reporting his alleged experience, distinguished an 'ego-conscious -ness' from a 'body-consciousness'. With his 'ego-consciousness' he 'perceived' not only his inert body but also a person entering his bedroom and telephoning to the doctor. He described the doctor leaving his patients. The descriptions proved all correct. In my essay contributed to the *Festschrift* for W.E. Hocking of Harvard, I have referred to the case, reported by the philosopher, of the wife of a colleague who, nearly dying in a crisis of pneumonia, when she was presumed to be in a coma, became aware of the doings of a person in another room, under circumstances excluding completely normal perception. The 'physical body' perceived by the 'I', in some of these cases, seemed to be in the 'mirror-image' form.

What are we to make of these curious experiences? Gilbert Ryle and Norman Malcolm have questioned whether, in speaking of 'having images', we are saying anything more than that we are imagining or hallucinating. The 'telling' of a dream or a hallucination does not at all imply that an actual sequence of imaged events occurred in experience. D.M. Armstrong, in his *Perception and the Physical World*, argues that, in an alleged 'hallucinatory experience', there is no perception of a quasi-object but only a false belief that there is an ordinary perception of an object. To quote him: "The non-physical object of immediate apprehension is simply a ghost generated by the belief that I am seeing something." What kind of 'ghost' is it, I must ask, and how is it generated? The hallucinated figures in the survey of Dr. Osis seemed to have occurred in very normal surroundings. Qualitative and quantitative criteria showed that they were significantly different from drug-induced visions and also from hallucinations of healthy, living people. No significant correlation with the physiological variables could be detected.

Psychopathologists like Sollier and Lhermitte explain apparent 'out-of-the-body' experiences, *visions de soi*, *hallucinations autoscopiques*, in terms of a relative loss of sensibility and exteriorization, akin to what happens in persons with amputated limbs and organic brain diseases. Technically speaking, there is a transposition of the proprioceptive and other sensory inputs into the corresponding non-veridical visual images. The French novelist Maupassant, who was stricken with general paralysis in 1889, was sitting one afternoon at his desk when he heard the door open, saw his own self enter the room, sit down before him and dictate what he was writing.

I fear that the psychopathological theories do not account for the apparent paranormal perception of normally inaccessible objects in the nearly dead who distinguish the 'I' from the 'bodily me'. In the case of Maupassant, the 'observer' was passive ; in the dying, the 'observer' is active ; there is an apparent 'transfer of consciousness'. Extranormal theories have been proposed by Professors J. R. Smythies, Hornell Hart and H.H. Price. Smythies, who is a neuro-psychologist, holds that the 'space of mental images' is not identical with 3-dimensional physical space. 'Imagy spaces' fall within a general 'psychic space' containing a 'mind-stuff' part of which forms a 'signalling mechanism' interposed between the physical 'brain' and the 'observer'. Disturbances in the 'body-image' point to alterations in the dynamic-spatial relations between two sets of configurations or *Gestalten*. According to Smythies, it is quite possible for a person to experience, at one and the same time, a hallucinatory space and the space of ordinary sense-perception. The sociologist Hornell Hart proposed an even more ambitious hypothesis. He claims that one's life includes innumerable four-dimensional space-time structures exemplified in the buildings that one occupies as well as in certain lucid dreams. The material world, for him, is a special case of a five-dimensional manifold, since intersection of four-dimensional structures requires a higher space. Professor Price of Oxford has sketched a modest hypothesis of 'image-worlds' without commitment to a tidy geometry of n-dimensions. He suggests that groups or families of images may constitute quasi-objects of a sort. They would not bear the familiar spatial relations to sensory particulars and physical objects. They may have extensionality of a sort but no awareness in some obvious sense. On this theory, the 'I' could be associated with a cluster of appropriate 'body-images' different from the ordinary physiologically conditioned 'body-images'.

These paranormal hypotheses, I suspect, are more ingenious than plausible for the cases I have mentioned. On any of these suppositions, I find it difficult to understand how the hallucinated figures could seem to be in the ordinary perceptual space. I find it no less difficult to comprehend how an 'I' associated with a cluster of images in a 'psychic space' could literally 'inspect' its 'ordinary body', and sometimes in the 'mirror-image' form at that. And I find it well-nigh incredible that extra-sensorial cognition could be reduced to a series of 'exchanges' between the 'psychical' and the 'physical' components of an 'n-dimensional space'. J.H. Woodger, in his Tarner Lectures *Biology and Language,* characterizes the relation between a 'person' and a 'sensory object' (colour, sound or scent) as 'atopical' and not as 'spatio-temporal'.

There is a great deal that we have yet to learn about actual states of the Being-towards-Death. The metaphysical riddles about our own being are perhaps the hardest confronting us. Spinoza fashioned the well-known dictum that the Free Man thinks of nothing so little as death. What of the un-free, the Unamunos? Swami Vivekananda in one of his recorded conversations, broke in rudely: "Look here, we shall die; bear this in mind always and the spirit within will wake up." Kierkegaard testified in his *Concluding Unscientific Post-script to the Philosophical Scraps*: "When death thus becomes something to be related to the entire life of the subject, I must confess I am very far indeed from having understood it, even if it were to cost me my life to make this admission."

S. S. Raghavachar

THE CONCEPT OF BEING

I

The subject chosen for consideration in the Seminar has played a part in the history of philosophy at least from the time of Aristotle and the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Almost every system of metaphysical thought and antimetaphysical polemics has had to do something with it. A historical survey or a reflection on the historical vicissitudes of it is out of question, being impracticable. A more useful and manageable course would be to formulate one's own analysis of it with as much of the historical background in mind as feasible. In doing so one is thrown on his own resources in meeting criticisms and he cannot take shelter under any established school of thought. It is this risky line that I venture to adopt in this paper. No originality is presumed as the central ideas and the argument are inevitably conditioned by the Vedāntic point of view. But it is not a presentation of a historical approach but an outline of an attempt to think out the involved issues in comparative freedom.

II

It is worthwhile enquiring into the genesis of the category or concept of being. The trinity of being, non-being and becoming is not the primary question here. The epistemic emergence of the concept of being itself is more fundamental. When once that has been traced, one of the later and derivative problems is the consideration of the said trinity. The notion of being has an epistemic origin. It is the natural propensity of the cognitive aspect of human nature to project its content beyond itself and to invest it with existence beyond the bounds of mere thought. This may be named the realistic predicament of the human intellect. The intellect in so far as it can be true or false in its operations exhibits an element of self-transcendence and commits itself to a 'beyond', to a something claimed to be the original or the target of its own presentations or constructions. Thought,

by a necessity of its inherent nature, as it were, posits an object. The concept of being arises as descriptive of this realm of the objective. This primitive nature of thought can hardly be described without some degree of anachronism. But one would wish to see this realistic account of cognition cogently repudiated. An altogether subjectivistic account of thought would be one such attempt. Subjectivism is a revolutionary reinterpretation of the deliverance of experience. It is a sophisticated refutation of the naive realism of common-sense. It may subject the realistic habit of thought to a devastating critique but it presupposes that habit. To that extent it admits the prevalence of primitive realism. That admission would concede the derivation of the idea of being from a particular tendency natural to thought. Further, subjectivism has to apply some strict criterion of reality in order to disallow the claim of the common-sense world to reality. The employment of a criterion of reality involves the notion of being as such, though the world claimed *to be*, does not rise to the requirements of the criterion. Hence subjectivism by implication notes the existence of the realistic predilection of thought and does advance a notion of being by its own standards of criticism. It cannot wholly dismiss the notion of being, the objective correlate of thought. Scepticism is another philosophical attitude which can oppose the affirmation of being. There is no case for a simple unbelief. Dissent even as assent founded on no principle, no logical basis, can furnish no rejection of the natural acceptance of being. Unreasoning doubt is as feeble a method as unreasoning belief. Something by way of justification is needed for doubt also. The only admissible ground of rational and healthy doubt is the impossibility of deciding between two or more incompatible alternative propositions about the matter on hand. But such a rational doubt implies a good deal of affirmation. It implies the alternatives, it implies their incompatibility and also the impossibility of a joint affirmation of them. In short, it implies the law of contradiction and the law, in its turn, denies the objectivity of what is self-contradictory. In other words, there is a theory of being already at the foundation of rational scepticism. There can be no doubt, if the natural and spontaneous assent of the human mind is not thwarted by some contradictory possibility. That contradiction is the mark of falsity somewhere is a solid theory of being. It is logically necessary, therefore, to admit the concept of being, if the nature of the knowing activity is admitted. That concept has an epistemic genesis.

III

Now can there be an inquiry into being *qua* being? Is there a sense in discussing *being as such* apart from individual beings? It is

hardly possible to avoid investigating into what constitutes being in general. What conditions should anything fulfil in order to be regarded as 'a being'? We can run through several possible answers. Being, it may be said, must be something that falls within experience. This is no satisfactory definition. The purest hallucination, if there be such a thing, falls within human experience. It is experiential or presentational but does not get authenticated as being thereby. It lacks the requisite transcendence. Experience is a mode of access to being and is not constitutive of it. Nor can being be, as it is sometimes suggested, the location in time and space. Such a definition arbitrarily restricts being to the space-time order and also takes for granted the objective reality of space-time. The only tenable account of being in general seems to be that it is such that by positing it the presentations in our experience get integrated. Being is that which integrates experience: it is that by virtue of which experience gets unified. Being is the principle of unity of experience. Whatever in our experience contributes to the ordering of experience into a unified pattern is to that extent objective and constitutes a being. Unity and objectivity are two sides of the same principle. Discord is the mark of anti-being.

We cannot rest with this result. We have to go forward. To see order or system as the significance of being is to enter into the monistic phase of thought. Limited and several orders or unities and a plurality of beings cannot be ultimate. The several beings must themselves obtain authentication by assimilation into a single all-inclusive order. It is only that super-unity that is constitutive of being as such, being in the ultimate sense. Ordering experience in terms of a single unified pattern, one without a second, is the culmination of the standpoint of seeing in unity the characteristic of being.

IV

Perhaps a few words are necessary at this stage on the related ideas of being, non-being and becoming. Being is the inclusive category and in so far as non-being and becoming are intellectually necessary for integrating experience, they are constitutive elements in the inclusive category of being. The distinction between existence and reality is also comprehensible in so far as existence pertains to the experiential rendering of specific parts of being and by reality we are to understand the integral totality of being. Being in its eminent and full significance is reality.

These are formal and terminological clarifications. The characterization of being as an all-inclusive unity or order calls for a further

and more substantial indication of its nature. That the ultimate being cannot be merely an object for thought, not a mere non-self is the next consideration. What is just an object for a subject of consciousness, a non-self to be cognized by a self, cannot be the true nature of being. In the epistemic context, the object is just a part, needing supplementation by a subject. It is a fragment of being incapable of self-sufficiency in relation to the primary fact of consciousness. What is all-inclusive cannot be anything short of a subject of consciousness, distinguished by self-affirmation, subject and object rolled into one entity. The non-self is an abstraction, not equal to being a self-complete fact. This idealistic position is reached in the history of philosophy through several ways, varying in degrees of validity. The subjectivist procedure is one such. Panpsychism is another way. That the cosmic process must be grounded in a supreme will is yet another way. That whatever is one and is inclusive of diversity must be spiritual and not material is the Leibniz-Lotze argument on the matter. The logical impossibility of construing being, the inclusive order, as the mere object, as non-self, is the common basis of these positions. The more fundamental consideration would be that self-consciousness, the subject exercising self-awareness and thereby constituting its own object, is the only category that could fulfil the requirements of absolute being. This is the *pratyak-tattva* of Indian philosophy. The absolute being must be the absolute self. The *Sat* must be *cit* in order to be truly *Sat*. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* starts with *Sat* and ends with the *Ātman*. (*Sa Ātmā*). While subjectivism at the lower level of the finite ego would eliminate the objectivity of being, the infinite self is constitutive of the objective whole of being. This is, in general, the Vedāntic theory of being. The epistemology of Vedānta is realistic, while in metaphysics it propounds the ultimacy of spirit.

V

Being so conceived constitutes in itself an experience of value. Being, of the nature of consciousness, fulfilling that consciousness in the contemplative realization of the infinite expanse of being is the definition of *Ānanda*. Exercise of innate power is joy. The innate power of the self is consciousness. Consciousness realizes fullness of self-deployment in the apprehension of reality. Hence the absolute self, living out its consciousness of its own infinity of being, is the summit of value-experience.

There is yet another way of conceiving the value-nature of being. The finite subject, such as we are, is also of the nature of awareness and this awareness finds its unthwarted fulfilment in the apprehension

of absolute being. That apprehension, therefore, constitutes supreme value for the subject. Perhaps, it is some such conception that the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* adumbrates in its statement, "*Raso vai saḥ rasaṁ hyevyaṁ labdhvā ānandī bhavati.*" The comparatively mundane values such as truth, beauty and goodness acquire their value character in accordance with the measure of their approximation to this highest value. So the pure *Sat*, being *ekameva advitīyam*, is also *cit* and it constitutes *Ānanda* in more than one sense. The *Gītā* and the Vedāntic traditions do well in enshrining the adoration of being in the formula of "*Aum tat sat*".

VI

The drift of this line of thought hangs on several important propositions. The initial epistemological realism, the characterization of being as unity or order, the concept of all-inclusive being, interpretation of that being as self-aware spirit and the value-character of the experience of that spirit are the major links. Subjectivism, scepticism, the definition of being in terms other than unity or order, the refusal to entertain the notion of an absolute order, the interpretation of the order on the lines of materialism, vitalism or panpsychism and the rejection of the value-character of the experience of the absolute self are positions that would stultify the standpoint adopted.

Only one more point remains to be added. The position stated can be further evolved either in the Absolutistic or the Theistic direction. It is even likely that a fusion of these two types of philosophy is not an impossible consummation.

R. K. Tripathi

THE CONCEPT OF BEING

In this paper I would like to say more about what Being is not than about what it is. Probably that would be a better way of understanding Being or the concept of Being. The full implication of the idea of Being was better drawn out in Indian philosophy, especially in Vedānta than in the West. This is because in the West only becoming is considered to be opposed to being. But in India, the opposition is seen not only between being and becoming, but between being on the one hand and plurality (difference) and inertness on the other. Let us try to see what is meant when it is said that Being is not becoming, that being is not many and that being is not relative or dependent.

I

At the very outset it may be pointed out that it is as contradictory to deny being as it is to assert non-being. That there is nothing is a self-contradictory position ; the assertion is not possible without being, at least the being of the one who asserts. So being must be accepted and the enquiry that can be made is only regarding the nature of being and not whether it is.

It is said that Being cannot be becoming ; the two are opposed to each other. What does this opposition mean ? Some, for instance, the followers of the Sāṁkhya philosophy would say that one and the same thing cannot be both being and becoming and so they postulate two realities, the un-changing *Puruṣa* and the changing *Prakṛti*. In this way they accommodate the common sense view that there is both change and permanence. But the question is : how are the two related or rather can the two be related ? It is said that they are related but not really ; the relation is false. But then the problem would be : can there be a false relation between two reals ? Obviously not. Philosophers like Hegel would say that the opposition is between being and non-

being and it is the result of abstraction; reality which is concrete is a synthesis of the two. But the question is: Can the two be really synthesised? If being and non-being were friendly to each other there would be no dialectical movement; opposition or tension is necessary for the dialectic. For Hegel, therefore, there will be a dilemma. If there is no opposition, there can be no dialectic and, if so, there can be no synthesis. For Hegel opposition and synthesis are both real. This is what makes his position unintelligible.

So what does this opposition mean? Does it mean that Being can allow becoming to be there and becoming cannot allow being to be there (*Tamaḥ prakāśavat*). If it were, then how is it that we have an experience of both being and becoming? Both seem to be there. The only solution possible seems to be that though the two are opposed to each other, yet the one can permit the appearance of the other. The opposition means only that one and the same thing cannot be both. Buddhism would say that only becoming is real and being is an appearance while Vedānta would hold that only being is real and becoming is an appearance. How are we to choose between the two positions? To us it seems that even the knowledge of becoming is impossible without implicitly accepting being; change could not be even known as change unless there were being. One may say that the same might be said about being, namely, that being cannot be known as being without change. This may be accepted, knowledge of being is not possible without the knowledge of becoming. But from this does it follow that being is not possible without becoming? Here the Vedānta takes resort to the experience of sleep and of *nirvikalpa samādhi*. In these two states, there is being, but no becoming. So being is said to be independent of becoming. We have no experience which can suggest that there is becoming but no being. All becoming presupposes being. (*Abheda pūrvako bhedaḥ*).

II

The concept of being is opposed to the concept of plurality. If being is taken to be many, what is it that divides it? If being is divided by being, then there is really no division and if being is divided by non-being, then the division is false. So the concept of many beings seems to be self-contradictory. Being can be only one. When pluralists talk of many beings, they have to answer the question: What is it that is common to all the beings so that we call them all beings? If there is nothing common, we will not be justified in giving them one name, being, and if there is something common, why not call it the being of beings? Kant sometimes uses the expression, the things-in-themselves. To us the expression seems to be self-contradictory, because if the

thing-in-itself is beyond space, time and the categories, what is there to make it many? There can be no such thing as 'things-in-themselves': there can be only the thing-in-itself. Similarly when Sāṁkhya speaks of many *puruṣas* or pure consciousness, we are baffled. What is there which can introduce *bheda* or plurality in the *puruṣa* if *puruṣa* is beyond *prakṛti* or the principle of division? *Puruṣa* can therefore be only one.

There can be neither beings of different kinds nor many beings of the same kind. In either case there will have to be accepted something basic (or common) to all beings. Can there be internal (*svagata*) difference in being? This also has to be denied, because the question would be: What is it that introduces internal difference in being? To accept being with internal difference will be as good as saying that being is both being and non-being and that is self-contradictory.

III

Now let us see whether being can be dependent or related to anything. Dependence can be of two kinds, namely, epistemic and ontological. Is being dependent on any thing for being known? Is being dependent for its existence? Can we say that being is produced? That cannot be, because if being is produced, it is either by being or by non-being. It is meaningless to say that being is produced by being because it leads to infinite regress. It is equally absurd to say that being is produced by non-being. To talk of being as an effect is self-contradiction.

But how is being known? Is being revealed by something else? If so, by what? It may be said that being is revealed by knowledge. Obviously the implication is that being is other than knowledge or consciousness. If so, we will ask: "Is consciousness itself being or something other than being or is it non-being?" Evidently consciousness cannot be non-being. And if consciousness also is being, then there is no question of its being separate from or other than being. Being and consciousness must be one. And if being and consciousness are one, the question of the knowledge of being does not arise, because consciousness is self-luminous. Two objections may be anticipated here. Firstly it may be said that consciousness is not self-luminous. The Nyāya, for example, would say that one knowledge is known by another knowledge and is not self-luminous; knowledge is known by retrospection (*anuvyavasāya*). But this position is untenable. If knowledge does not reveal itself, how can it reveal the object? (*jagadandha prasaṅga*). Moreover, if knowledge is not known when it occurs, retrospection (*anuvyavasāya*) too will not be possible. It cannot be said that it is possible on the basis of memory, because memory presupposes cons-

cious experience. Again, if knowledge is not known when it occurs, how can you identify it and say that the object of *anuvyavasāya* is the same as the knowledge that occurred sometime back ? So it has got to be admitted that knowledge or consciousness is self-luminous.

The other objection that may be raised is : all consciousness of which we have experience is changing and so it will be wrong to identify it with being unless it is shown that there is such a thing as unchanging consciousness. Here again Vedānta refers to the experience of sleep and *nirvikalpa samādhi*. In the West, the experience of sleep has never been taken into account, much less the experience of *samādhi*. Ordinarily it is supposed that there is no consciousness in sleep. It is true that we have no particular form of consciousness in sleep, but does it mean that there is no consciousness at all in sleep? That cannot be said, because if it were so, how could we say after waking that we did not know anything? Absence of knowledge or particular knowledge also is to be known and it cannot be known when consciousness is not there. The absence of particular forms of knowledge has to be known at the very time when it occurs and not afterwards. Suppose when I am in my College at 1 p. m. I say that there was no tiger in my house at 10 a. m., it is not because I know the absence of the tiger at 1 p. m. At 1 p.m. I am able to say that there was no tiger in my house at 10 a.m. because the absence of the tiger was known at 10 a.m. (So also the absence of knowledge is to be known just at the time when it is there.) Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no consciousness in the state of sleep. Unless consciousness is there in deep sleep also, the absence of particular forms of consciousness cannot be known. The absence can be known only directly and cannot be a matter of inference or any other source of knowledge, because ultimately every *pramāṇa* has to refer to some direct experience. There can be no inference without *udāharaṇa* or example.

IV

So the conclusion at which we have arrived is that the idea of being is repulsive to the idea of non-being and becoming, repulsive to the idea of plurality (or finitude), repulsive also to the idea of dependence whether ontological or epistemological. In other words, being has to be infinite and universal, unchanging and also independent, specially epistemologically. The atom is unchanging but being many it is finite and has in it negation or non-being and so it cannot be called being. Space is infinite and unchanging and yet it cannot be called being as it is not independent; it is dependent at least epistemologically if not ontologically also. So epistemological independence is of great importance. The epistemological independence of being means

that it is self-luminous, that it is its own light. Epistemological dependence would mean duality and finitude which have already been shown to be repulsive to the idea of Being. In one word, Being is the absolute. Epistemological dependence would mean that the knowledge of being is like our knowledge of things, i.e., like the knowledge of content, and that would introduce dubitability regarding being. Because, every content is in principle dubitable. Being if it has to be indubitable has to be known not as a content (*idam*). It can be known only as the self which is never a content; all content belongs to the not-self. Pure consciousness alone can be pure being.

No other system appreciates and brings out the above points better than Advaita Vedānta. Brahman is infinite, universal, unchanging, non-dual and independent. It is free from all kinds of *bheda* (*svagat*, *svajātīya* and *vijātīya*). Brahman is also self-luminous and at the same time one with the self and there is no question of Brahman not being known; only it is not known in the same way as 'things' are known. We can have direct intuition (*aparokṣānubhūti*) of Brahman and that is possible here and now. But the fact that Brahman can be realised here and now cannot be demonstrated by reason; it is known from *Śruti* alone. At best its possibility can be pointed out by referring to the experience of sleep. Consciousness can be separated from forms of consciousness which are there only on the surface of the deeper consciousness which is pure, indivisible, unchanging and independent.

Herbert Herring

THE CONCEPT OF BEING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF G. W. LEIBNIZ

Glancing over the history of philosophy superficially, it seems to present to us an inconsistent, even abstruse, mixture of contradictory doctrines and theories, almost every single one of them claiming to express the absolute, indisputable truth. If one, however, tries to avoid to take the position of one of the great masters, thus submitting to one of their schools of thinking, rejecting all others as more or less inadequate, there seems to be only one alternative: either one takes all the great systems as true, as different revelations of the universal spirit, or one considers none of them as true, the only real truth being the existential compulsion of questioning of each individual thinker.

Whichever aspect one might choose, we seem to have good reasons to take the history of philosophy as the spectrum of the pondering over such original and fundamental problems ever anew, which—although at times hidden or forgotten—have always been the same and will always stay the same,—problems that have been and will be a perennial challenge to the human mind.

Without acknowledging this, neither an understanding of the history of philosophy nor historical understanding in general would be possible; then the history of philosophy would, indeed, appear as a mere variety of analogous or diverging ideas in chronological sequence.

The aspect of the coherence and continuity of philosophical thinking was familiar to all of the exemplary thinkers, especially to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz whose thinking developed from his interpretation of the great systems of the past and his correspondence or discussions

with outstanding contemporaries. Thus Leibniz writes on 26th August 1714, towards the end of his life, to Nicolas Rémond[1] :

"If I had the leisure, I would compare my doctrine with the doctrines of the ancient thinkers and other eminent men. The truth is more widely spread than one supposes; but very often it is painted, crippled, spoilt by accessories which do harm to it or diminish its advantage. If one would trace the truth in the ancient thinkers, one would dig gold out of the mud, the diamond out of its mine and the light out of the darkness: and this would be, indeed, perennial philosophy, so to speak."[2]

Now, the central problem philosophers of all times have been tackling continuously is *Being* in its substantial reality. This problem, however, has always been investigated by the great thinkers together with the problem of *Unity*. The question of the inter-relation of Being and Unity is also the core of the philosophy of Leibniz, from the first systematic presentation in the *Discours de Métaphysique* (Discourse on Metaphysics), 1686, upto its final formulations in *Monadologie* (Monadology), 1714. In this paper I shall undertake to show that Leibniz' statement in a letter of 30th April 1687 to the French thinker Antoine Arnauld[3] "Ce qui n'est pas veritablement *un* estre n'est pas non plus veritablement un *estre*" (Everything that is not really *one* being is thus not really a *being*) should be taken as the basic proposition of Leibniz' philosophy and the clue to its proper understanding.

Every real *being* is necessarily *one*, and only that being *one* can be considered as *being* truly and really. With this statement Leibniz obviously refers, though not literally, to the Aristotelian tradition. "Ens et unum convertuntur", "ens et unum sunt idem re", thus it reads in Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of the respective passages in book X of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Being and Unity are convertible, are the same, are identical in so far as they are transcendental distinctions, i.e., distinctions which are prior to every individual difference as well as to

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[1] Rémond, whom Leibniz got to know during his stay in Paris (1672—1676), must have impressed him greatly; it was specially for him and in remembrance of his learned colleagues Arnauld, Foucher, Huet, Huygens, Malebranche and Mariotte that Leibniz wrote the *Monadologie*.

[2] This and all following translations from Leibniz are the author's own original version.

[3] Leibniz' correspondence with Arnauld (who together with Pierre Nicole wrote the so-called Logic of Port-Royal, "Logique ou l'art de penser", 1662, the text book of Cartesianism) belongs to the most important testimonies of his thinking. The corresponednce lasted for twenty years, from 1671—1690.

differences of species, distinctions which transcend these particular differences, thus forming the fundamental ontical essence of everything real.

Every real being is one,—this fundamental proposition states furthermore that only the *real* being is one, which does, however, not mean that what is *not real*, e.g., the natural bodies and their qualities, is not, or is nothing. But it has to be noted that the natural bodies (such as minerals, plants or the animal organisms) *are* not one but are only a unified multiplicity of things which Leibniz calls compound substance (*substantia composita*) as against the original unity of the simple substance (*substantia simplex*),—compound substance meaning that which is governed by a simple substance, a teleological principle, and subject to the influence of other compound substances. Unity in the literal sense is only the incorporeal or spiritual being which Leibniz denotes by different terms such as individual substance, particular substance, substantial form, substantial centre, before its final nomenclature as Monad in 1697. Monad, however, is — as he defines in *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, fondés en Raison* (Principles of Nature and Grace, based on Reason), 1714, § 1, "a Greek word which signifies unity, or that which is one"; accordingly monads have no parts, cannot be composed or decomposed, cannot begin or end in the course of nature "and consequently last as long as the universe, which will be changed but will not be destroyed" (l.c. §2). Monad is thus defined as the essence of every being, its inherent spiritual principle.

Accordingly our proposition under investigation reads as follows: Every real being is a unity, and this means, since Leibniz calls the one being a unity individual substance, every real being is individual substance. Thus the inquiry into Being and Unity, into the Being of unity and the Unity of being, has become an inquiry into substance.

In discussing the problem of substance, I shall refer mainly to Leibniz' basic metaphysical writings already mentioned, namely the *Discours de Métaphysique*, the *Monadologie* and its more popular version the *Principles de la Nature et de la Gràce, fondés en Raison.*

Every simple substance or monad—thus we read in § 9 of the *Discours* and in several other places—is like a mirror of God or rather the entire universe[4], i.e., every simple substance or monad represents the entire universe in its particular way, from its specific point of view

[4] "toute substance est comme un monde entier et comme un miroir de Dieu ou bien de tout l'univers...". - Quotations from *Discours*, *Monadologie* and *Principes* after the author's French-German parallel editions, Hamburg 1958 & 1956, publ. Felix Meiner, vol. 260 & 253 of Philos. Bibliothek.

("point de vue"),—the term "to represent" used in its objective as well as in its subjective meaning. Such a representation of the universe *in toto* by and in the individual substance is possible only if we presuppose that everything being in the world has one and the same principle of origin which is commonly called God. All beings emanate from God as thoughts emanate from our minds.[5] All simple substances are thus creative thoughts or ideas of God and, since being related to a common origin, related to each other.

This is Leibniz' interpretation of a basic principle, at least in Western philosophy, namely the principle of *analogia entis* or *analogia entium* denoting the essential affinity of all beings in their ontical and ontological relation to a common origin.

This close inter-relation of the simple substances or monads, however, does not mean or indicate that they are subject to a mutual influxus physicus, an immediate physical or natural influence—a possibility which is completely ruled out by Leibniz. Monads or simple substances have no windows, so to speak, i. e., there is no direct or real influence between them but only an indirect or ideal interaction, inaugurated by God in His primeval act of world creation. Everything that occurs to a simple substance is but the consequence of its idea of its perfect conception. Thus Leibniz defines the essence of the simple substance, of a perfect being, as "being endowed with such a perfect concept which alone suffices to understand all attributes (qualities) of the being to which this concept is ascribed and to deduce them from this concept." (*Discours*, § 8)[6]

Here we have touched on another basic principle of Leibniz' metaphysics, the principle of a universal pre-established harmony. There can be no doubt that with this principle Leibniz means first and foremost the primeval metaphysical harmony of an indefinite number of different, even divergent substances and their qualities, brought about by God's will and wisdom and that the thesis of the pre-established harmony between body and soul, matter and mind in the living organism, i. e., the harmony between the realm of nature and the realm of grace or spirit, is but the consequence of this original unison of simple substances.

Returning to the starting point of our considerations, namely the simple substance or monad, which—as being essentially one—is the essential being, we find two fundamental metaphysical characteristics

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[5] *Discours*, §§ 14 & 32.

[6] " avoir une notion si accomplie, qu'elle soit suffisante à comprendre et à en faire deduire tous les predicats du sujet à qui cette notion est attribuèe."

ascribed to every simple substance: appetition and perception. Appetition means the spontaneous intentionality of the substance's striving after certain goals upto its final, natural and moral, perfection; and perception means all its acts of apprehension and comprehension, from simple sensations via sense-perceptions and rational-discursive reasoning to the non-rational awareness of its origin in God.

Monads are distinguished from one another by their respective clarity of perception; accordingly one distinguishes between the modes of material, vegetative, animalistic, human and divine Being, and every being is again distinguished from everything else of the same species by virtue of its unique individuality. Leibniz describes this universal structure of Being in a letter to Bierling,[7] dated 12th August 1711, thus:

"Monad or simple substance in general implies perception and appetition and is either primeval or God, in whom is the ultimate reason of things, or a derivated one, a created monad which, again, is endowed either—as mind—with reason or—as soul—only with sense organs, or even only with a certain minor grade of perception and appetition, a kind of soul which is content with the mere name of monad, for we do not know its gradations."[8]

Here two other basic concepts of Leibniz' philosophy enter the discussion which have gained great significance to Western philosophy and art from that time onwards: the concept of the affinity of human and divine spirit on the one hand and the concept of individuality on the other.

As to the affinity of human and divine spirit, it is Leibniz' thesis that the human spirit repeats and copies in a nutshell, so to say, the work of the universal Creator. Thus he writes, for instance, in *Monadologie*, § 83, that man's mind has the capacity "to understand the system of the universe and to copy something of it in examples of

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[7] Fr. Wilh. Bierling, since 1700 Reader in History, Politics, Eloquence and later in Theology at Rinteln University, Lower Saxony.

[8] "Monas seu substantia simplex in genere continet perceptionem et appetitum, estque vel primitiva seu Deus, in qua est ultima ratio rerum, vel est derivativa, nempe Monas Creata, eaque est vel ratione praedita, Mens, vel sensu praedita, nempe anima, vel inferiore quodam gradu perceptionis et appetitus praedita, seu animae analoga, quae nudo Monadis nomine contenta est, cum eius varios gradus non cognoscamus."

own rational architecture; for every human mind is some kind of a small deity in his particular realm."[9]

Following up this idea, it leads to Kant's and the German Idealists' doctrine that the totality of things (which is characterised by its original relation to the divine spirit) is represented in and by the human mind and its comprehensive faculties of a unified multiplicity of objects.

But of still greater importance in our context is the concept of individuality. Whereas in ancient and medieval philosophy the essence of every being was supposed to be manifest in the species or genus only. Leibniz puts forward the idea that a being could be understood only by its unique individuality. Everything exists as an individual, as a unique being, although it might have the same general qualities as other specimens of the same species or resemble them in its outer appearance upto the most subtle detail. This is the metaphysical meaning of the *Principium Identitatis Indiscernibilium* (Principle of the Identity of Indistinguishables) which plays an important part in Leibniz' metaphysics in general and in particular in his controversy with Isaac Newton and his natural philosophy. In his 5th letter to Clarke, Newton's confidant, who waged the dispute on Leibniz in the place of Newton himself, Leibniz restricts the realm wherein the principle of indistinguishables is valid exclusively to individuals, to real beings.

He had pointed out, thus he argues, that there were no indistinguishable things among the sensible ones; but the same would apply, in principle, to the nonsensible or metaphysical substances. The one who would oppose this conclusion and maintain that the sensible things were compound, their nonsensible elements, however, simple, should be reminded that there was nothing simple apart from monads and that therefore the assertion of nonsensible but material elements of the corporeal beings was based upon an insufficient analysis misleading us to the assumption that a corporeal being's substance was itself a corporeal element.

The statement that there are no indistinguishable things, in other words, that every single real being is distinguished from every other real being, does not only indicate diversity in number; for there are no things that are distinguished from one another by number alone. Diversity, to Leibniz, means being different or distinguished in a substantial way.

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[9] "de connoitre le Système de L'univers et d'en imiter quelque chose par des echantillons architectoniqũes; chaque Esprit étant comme une petite divinité dans son departement."

Finally Leibniz remarks that the principle of indistinguishables is only valid in the realm of actual or real things ; it is only applicable to the individual thing and not to its concept or species. For instance, all beings subsumed under the terms or concepts of "leaf" or "drop of water" are totally alike by definition and thus indistinguishable. But apart from the various kinds of leaves and the analogous use of the term, every single leaf—e. g., of a beech tree—is completely different and distinguishable from all the other leaves of the same tree (and, of course, of all the leaves of other beech trees, trees of a different kind, other plants and, in general, as a leaf different and distinguishable from all other natural beings), because it is substantially different and distinguished from them. This becomes even clearer with regard to man. According to the logical definition of man, for instance "Man is the rational living being", every living being to whom this definition applies is entirely identical with all the others thus defined, i. e., indistinguishable from these others. In reality, nevertheless, every single man is different from every other and thus distinguishable, at least in principle. He is distinguishable from all the others, not only under racial, national or religious aspects or with regard to his height, age or dress (these are mere contingent attributes) but with regard to his essential qualities: every one is unique as a person.

Since everything, being this (and only this) unique one, is at the same time the other to everything else, it is distinguishable from everything else; and every being's being distinguishable from everything else, is to Leibniz an indubitable criterion of the essential or metaphysical difference of all beings.

Referring to this, Hegel, who was certainly one of the best judges of the history of thinking, has stated in his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Lectures on the History of Philosophy), III, 449, that the basic principle of Leibniz was individuality.

That is to say, the unity of every real being is manifest its substantial uniqueness.

The unity of the being in toto, i.e., the unity of the world as such as the sum total of beings, is manifest in the relation of all beings to their common origin which is the source of the universal pre-established harmony.

And finally the common origin of the totality of beings is – as the first and ultimate reason of all beings' Being - the highest unity, from which every being emanates and into which it returns. According to Leibniz, the original source, this first and ultimate reason of every

being and world as such is more than a mere postulate of reasoning: it is the fundamental metaphysical truth which reveals itself to those who have reached the stage of true knowledge.

Those of you who have been following my explanation and interpretation of Leibniz' concept of being will easily realize that the parallel which has sometimes been drawn between Śaṁkara and Leibniz is to be regarded with utmost caution; it seems to me to be a rather hasty one. For, proclaiming such a parallel means overlooking the fact that for Śaṁkara the realm of natural beings is, no doubt, existent but is—with regard to the one and only reality which is Brahman—nonreal, i. e., epistemological and metaphysical illusion,[10] *avidyā* and *māyā*; whereas for Leibniz the natural objects and nature as such are definitely real, admittedly real in a different and less perfect way than the simple substances and their primeval principle which is God. Thus, if one wants to draw parallels, Śaṁkara is surely much nearer to Plato's monistic idealism which, as I have shown elsewhere,[11] implies an ontological dualism than to the spiritualistic realism of Leibniz. I would therefore say that a careful analysis of Leibniz' concept of individuality as formulated in the Principle of the Identity of Indistinguishables shows at least as strong or weak a similarity between his metaphysics and Śaṁkara's Advaita as to the Dvaitist theory of Madhva,—if one takes, for instance, Madhva's doctrine of the two general modes of reality, namely independent or autonomous and dependent or heteronomous reality, as expressed in his *Tattvasaṁkhyāna.*[12]

But why, after all, should we always try to state parallels and similarities between great thinkers? Should we not grant them what we are inclined to grant less eminent beings, viz., their unique individuality and originality?

In this short discourse I have tried to give a very brief outline of the main principles and doctrines of the philosophy of Leibniz, a system of thoughts that has greatly influenced the development of modern philosophy. In returning once again to the starting point of our considerations and in trying to answer the question of the genuine meaning of those fundamental inquiries which constitute the history of philosophy, I think we could do no better than to answer this question with a quotation from another letter of Leibniz to Arnauld (end of 1671) which reads thus: "Utique enim nos varietas delectat, sed reducta in unitatem", meaning: We are certainly delighted over the variety of beings, provided that this variety is traced back to unity.

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[10] This is not however, a psychological one or an illusion which is caused by some deception of our senses.

[11] "Plato, Śaṁkara and Kant on the Concept of Appearance" *in Indian Philosophical Annual* (Madras: University of Madras, 1971), Vol VIII, p. 19 ff.

[12] I refer to H. N. Ragavendrachar's *The Dvaita Philosophy and its Place in the Vedānta* and to the lucid interpretation of *Madhva's Concept of Being* by P. Nagaraja Rao.

S. Karunakaran

CONCEPT OF BEING ACCORDING TO ADVAITA VEDANTA

GENESIS :

In this paper I confine myself to the concept of Being according to Advaita-Vedānta. Being is absolute existence in a complete and perfect state. It is the fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness (*cit*), pure bliss (*ānanda*), and pure being (*sat*). It means both a state of being and, by conscious existence, bliss as well.

1. NOMENCLATURE :

This 'Being' is *Sat*, the Existent or the Real. Sadānanda uses the expression *vastu*[1] "*Saccidānandaṁ advayaṁ Brahma.*"[2] It is; it *exists* already and hence no other reality can be added to it. Being or *Sat*, or the term *Vastu* as used here, stands for Substance and everything else about it is an adjective and dependent upon it. Reality is something that exists independently of ideas concerning it. This state or fact of existence must attach itself to something. If it exists alone it should be distinguishable from non-being. Reality cannot be distinguished from nothing or non-being, because non-being is not an entity. No one doubts— 'Do I exist or do I not'[3]? The very fact of doubting proves the existence of the doubter. Śaṁkara argues that the self cannot be refuted for that which refutes is itself the self.[4]

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1. *Vedāntasāra*, p. 21.

2. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 126; Sarvajñātman *Saṅkṣepaśārīakam.* 1. 184 ; *Brahma-Sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1.1.4.

3. *Bhāmati*, 3.7.

4. *Brahma-Sūtra bhāṣya*, 1.1.4.

2. NATURE OF BEING:

All distinctions are within 'Being'[5] that is one. But deprived of all limiting adjuncts 'being' is common in all objects. 'Non-Being' can exercise no restriction or limitation on being.[6] One adjective can qualify or delimit another adjective but 'being' is unlimited because it is the one pervasive ground of all distinctions. It is one universal substance (*Vastu*), unlimited and infinite, transcending all restrictions and all plurality of the world in the form of jar etc., which can be distinguished from one another ; they are particularisations of the same being and therefore, can be spoken of as adjectival to it.[7]

2. (i) CHARACTER OF BEING:

Being cannot be 'known' empirically. It cannot be known on inspection. If it could be so known, an error about the 'being' of any thing would never occur. When we know a thing no amount of inspection or examination will lead us to a true picture. A cancelling knowledge alone can reveal the error. The process of cancellation can be continued and the limit is reached in a new species of knowledge which reveals that truth absolutely and is not open to cancellation.[8] It is because Reality or Brahman according to Advaita is of the nature of consciousness transcending the qualities of all mundane objects.[9] This absolute truth is *Sat*. The ultimate *Sat* or the 'being' is *abādhyam*, non-cancellable, in Advaita-Vedānta.

3. BEING AS THE SUBSTRATUM:

This substratum is common to all objects of all grades. How then does Brahman enjoy a status different from other objects ? Even before knowing or realising Brahman if everybody was Brahman and really identical, then why is there this state of multiplicity ?[10] The pseudo-realities that impinge on our sensory faculties are illusions. Their existence is interdependent and decaying. These pseudo-realities dissolve into their ' basic elements' like earth dissolving into and losing its apparent formal identity in water ; but these in their turn lose their identity and submerge into the Absolute. The nomen-

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5. *Iṣṭasiddhi*, I. i.
6. Sureśvara, *Pañcīkaraṇavārtikam*, 2.
7. *Ātmajñānopadeśasiddhi*, IV. 10.
8. *Advaita Siddhi* (Chowkhamba edn.), p. 354.
9. *Bhāmatī*, 1.2.12.
10. *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, *Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*, 14, 10.

clature potency lies here only as the energy, the basic ingredients emanate from here only.[11]

3 (i) PHENOMENAL EXISTENCE IMPOSED:

Now, what differentiates the phenomenal reality which gets its shape from this absolute? In cases where we say '*Kuṇḍalamidaṁ suvarṇaṁ*' we only adjectivally put the difference. We affirm the non-difference of the ear-ring from gold. The shape and material possess the same locus. If the ear-ring is non-different from gold then we should apprehend the gold. Even among themselves the ornaments should not differ because the ornaments, bracelets etc. show non-difference from gold and gold alone is real, not the form, since difference does not manifest.[12]

4. BEING IS THE ENTITY IN ITSELF:

Being or Reality is a substance-concept and not an adjective-concept. For the being is the substratum of all phenomena. When we say A exists we say nothing about A. We mean A is a substance and can possess certain qualities. The substance is the undifferentiated pure being, the only reality, the only thing-in-itself. Everything else is adjectival to it. The adjective is what we apprehend in the thing. It is part of our knowledge. The thing-in-itself is not part of our knowledge because it is uncreated.[13] It is self-luminous. It does not need any other organ or mediacy.[14]

4. (i) EPI-PHENOMENAL STATUS OF BEING:

The epiphenomenal status of being can easily be ruled out. This belongs to a class that is different from appearances. What are these appearances? When the eyes have a perception of a blue jar or a square table how is the quality of blueness or squareness perceived? For the Advaitin knowledge of an object arises in the self (which is consciousness) when such consciousness becomes progressively limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa*, *pramāṇa* and *viṣaya* and identity is established between all these. Therefore, knowledge is of the total object and not piecemeal. It is difficult to 'describe' the apparatus which 'measures' reciprocative reactions; it is equally difficult to visualize how the neural processes convey 'information' about sensory objects

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11. *Advaita Siddhi* (Nirnayasagar edn.), p. 927.
12. *Bhāmatī* 1.1.4.
13. *Advaita Siddhi* (Nirnayasagar edn.), p. 770.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 771.

and also how they convey other 'details' like depth. Unless the contact is in full, expressibility cannot be there, that is, unless full communicability of the psychosis and psychological environs are there and faculties that can competently transfer the adjuncts can function when the conditions, the shades etc. are also there. Then it is possible to know the object in its fullness and in its essence. Thus when we say self-luminosity or the direct knowledge without any aid of the sense-organs, what we mean is that the self externalises itself.[15]

5. BEING AS EXTERNALISED :

The author of *Tattavaśuddhi* says that perception apprehends neither jar nor cloth but bare Reality, the Being of clothness, which is constant in all the degree of existence of cloth as its substrate [16] and, the apparent reality is perceived because of nescience. And Brahman alone is self-luminous.[17]

Advaita considers five aspects of 'being'. They are existence, appearance, lovability, name and form. The first three are of the nature of Brahman and the rest are of the nature of the world.[18]

6. ADVAITIC CONCEPT OF BEING :

This 'Being' in Advaita is said to be reality, knowledge and infinitude.[19] These are not adjectives but are three ways of defining one and the same Brahman. These three are not interchangeable but imply the one, the unbounded and the absolutely undivided and indivisible. When Brahman is unbounded we say 'beyond all limitations of space, time and matter', (*deśakālavastu*). It is timeless and beyond time. Hence it can transform itself in any form and still remain the same because it is free and 'unbounded'. The objects that exist in the phenomenal and mundane order derive their terminable existence and relative reality from Brahman only. Brahman has no quality and no relation and is quite indistinguishable from pure Being. It is the most potent spiritual reality. There is no distinction between pure and pervasive being and the inmost Self. Advaita Vedānta has accepted two kinds of definition of Brahman.[20] The first is definition

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15. *Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha*, p. 649.
16. *Ibid.*, (University of Madras), Vol. II., p. 49.
17. *Ibid.*, Vol, II, p. 50; *Brahma-Sūtra bhāṣya*, 1.1.4
18. *Dṛkdṛśyaviveka*, V. 20.
19. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.7.
20. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Adyar Library edn.), p., 114.

with reference to essence (*Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*), and the other is definition with reference to accidence (*taṭastha lakṣaṇa*).[21]

SAT IS BRAHMAN

Nothing can break the continuity[22] of this Being which is all-pervasive and one. It is really great and nothing can be greater. It is Brahman and is referred to by the well-known 'formula' "*ekaṁ sat viprāḥ bahudhā vadanti*" (That which exists is *one* and sages call it variously).[23] The non-dual *Sat* is referred in the two hymns of the *Rg-Veda*, *Puruṣa-Sūkta*.[24] and *Nāsadīya Sūkta*.[25] The Vedic conception points to one Supreme Being, *Sat*. *Sat* is Brahman. In the definition of Brahman in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* each of these adjuncts viz., *Satyam*, *Jñānam* and *Anantam* denotes Brahman[26] and is itself an independent definition of Brahman. The unreal, viz., *Māyā* and its effects, being excluded by the word *Satyam* (real) there remains nothing but the indivisible consciousness, i.e., Brahman.[27] "Attributive reality" is thus a 'limitation' of the essential nature of Brahman[28] and is itself an effect of *māyā*; hence it is false, *mithyā*. Vedāntic passages define the essential nature of being as *Sat* : *Cit* and *Ānanda*. Prof. T. M. P. Mahadevan, the great teacher of Advaita-Vedānta states: "The three-fold nature of Brahman given by Vedānta passages is essential because it contributes to its essence and serves to distinguish it from the name and form world which is unreal (*anṛta*), non-intelligent (*'ada*), and of the nature of misery (*duhkha*). Being (*sat*), intelligence (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) are neither parts of Brahman nor its properties. The real is devoid of internal differentiations and external relations. Being, intelligence and bliss constitute the very nature of Brahman and not its attributes."[29]

Brahman is Ātman. The *ātman* is without sound, touch and without form, also undecaying; it is likewise without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great.[30] The Upani-

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21. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
22. Śaṁkara-bhāṣya on the *Bhagavad-Gitā*, 2.16.
23. *Ṛg-Veda*. I. 164. 46.
24. *Ibid.*, X. 9.
25. *Ibid.*, X. 129.
26. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.
27. *Advaita Siddhi*, p. 248.
28. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. 9.4.
29. *Philosophy of Advaita* (2nd edn.), p. 110-111.
30. *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III. 8.8

ṣads also describe Brahman as the infinite and as full of auspicious attributes and also as the attributeless. The infinite cannot be arrived at by adding up the attributes. It can be known by denying all other things as unreal. Some of the spiritual statements that describe Brahman in positive terms as the creator, sustainer, destroyer or bestower of grace etc., are stated *in extenso* as *anuvāda*. The attributeless nature of Brahman is asserted by negating personalistic descriptions of Brahman. This doctrine is known as *Adhyāropa apavāda*, super-imposition and negation.

Brahman is the measure of all. It is the reality and ground of all things. We cannot measure the measure itself. We can only describe Brahman as 'not this' and as 'not that'. Being the basis of all things it cannot be described. As the *Brahadāraṇyaka*, II. 1.7 has it : "By what should we know that by which all this is known, by what should one know the knower?" Brahman is above all the relational ways of knowledge. It is not existent like objects in time and space. It is existence itself. Reality exists but existence is not the real. It is neither a substance with a quality of consciousness nor is it an ever-changing stream of consciousness. It is pure consciousness. It is neither a subject nor an object, not even the unity of the subject and the object. It is an unchanging subject and objectless consciousness.

6. 1. NATURE OF BEING : *Brahman as Cit and Jnānā* :

Brahman is knowledge but never an object of knowledge. The three entities of knowledge are : the knower, the means and the object of knowledge. Brahman is not limited by any one of these. If it be the agent of the process of knowing or the knowable or the knowledge, it cannot be *Ānanda*. It is that infinite in which one does not know anything else and if one knows anything else he becomes limited.[31] But at the same time reality of knowledge-effect cannot be denied. At the time of self-realisation when one completely identifies himself with Brahman, consciousness and bliss must be recognised to exist. So it is said, 'the witness is the Absolute and also the aspectless.' Knowledge of a thing is not the thing in itself but from the knowledge of it we proceed to the thing. The object of knowledge cannot be the product of knowledge but if it is produced then the end-product can only be an intermediary product and shall not sustain either independence or Absolute character.

31. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VII. 29.

6. 2. ENTITY OF BEING :

Brahman as Knowledge : Having stated that Brahman is Being and is all-pervasive, I intend to deliberate on the point that Being is knowledge. The *Śruti* passage says : "where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, there is Brahman." Brahman is a metaphysical entity, *Īśvara* is the consciousness limited by totalling (*Samaṣṭi*) of limitations, while *jīva* is consciousness with individual limitations, *Vyaṣṭi.*

6. 3. BEING AS MANIFESTED :

Pleasure is not a positive quality since the Absolute Being is said to be free from all adjuncts. It is the sense of equanimity, aspectlessness of both positive and negative attributes—which is meant here. Śaṁkara states that the *ānandamaya* self in the highest self. After glorifying it, it has also been said that it possesses the quality of being *rasa.* "He verily is the quintessence."[32] He alone causes joy. He who knows the bliss of Brahman does not have fear of anything.[33] It gives the homely resort to the self (*jīva*) to be free from all fear as in one's own house. Brahman or *Sat* is the inmost of all the selves beginning from the physical sheath and ending in blissful sheath. But the pure 'Being' is the only eternal *Sat* apart fiom the five sheaths viz., *annamaya prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya* and *ānandamaya.*

The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* after enumerating the self as one having the structure of food, vital air, mind and understanding respectively, states : "the self which structurally is bliss and is the *ātman* (Self) is different from and is still 'inner' than the self which has the structure of understanding."[34] Vedānta establishes the non-dual *sat* which is beyond the body and the mind by using the conception of *jīva,* Īśvara and the world.[35] As the 'substratum', its nature is *sat* only. As it recognises insentient object, its nature is consciousness. As it is always the object of *prema* it is *Ānanda.*

The same reality is indicated by the *Śruti.*[36] What is invisible (Being) is the full, the visible (world) too is the full. From the full (Being) the full (visible) (Universe) has come. The full (Being) remains the same, when after the full the visible world has come out

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32. *Tattirīya Upaniṣad,* III. 27.
33. *Ibid.*, II, 8 9.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Iśa Upaniṣad,* 1.
36. *Pañcadaśī.*, VIII. 72.

of full (Being).[37] Swami Ranganathananda says : "All science is bound to come to this conclusion in the long run. Manifestation and not creation is the word of science today and the Hindu is only glad that what he has been cherishing in his bosom for ages is going to be taught in more forcible language and with further light from the latest conclusions of science."[38]

7. CONCLUSION :

'Being' in Advaita is the Highest, free from all changes and all qualities. When the world of appearances ceases the Being shines in all its true nature. The Being elevates itself from the empirical status to that of Brahman even from this world of appearance just as we find sounds coming out from unsounding letters of an alphabet, just as from unsounding letters of the alphabet sounds are manifested.

The central doctrines of the system are its conception of *nirguṇa Brahman* as the ultimate reality with the implied belief in the *māyā* doctrine, the identity of the individual soul with Brahman, the conception of *mokṣa* as the merging of the soul in Brahman and *jñāna* being considered as the sole means of realisation. The quietnessence is expressed in this half verse:

Brahma satyaṁ jagan mithyā

Jīvo Brahmaiva nāparaḥ.

The absolute spirit is the reality, the world of appearance is illusory, the so-called individual soul is the absolute Being.

37. Swami Ranganathananda, *The Message of the Upaniṣads*, p. 63.

38. Swami Vivekananda, *Complete Works*, Vol. I, p. 3.

V. Madhusudan Reddy

ANANDAMAYA BRAHMAN AND WORLD CREATION

" For who could live or breathe if there were not this delight of existence as the ether in which we dwell?

From Delight all these beings are born, by Delight they exists and grow, to Delight they return. "1

" World-existence is the ecstatic dance of Shiva which multiplies the body of the God numberlessly to the view : it leaves that white existence precisely where and what it was, ever is and ever will be ; its sole absolute object is the joy of the dancing "2

Brahman is Truth, says the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*,[3] Brahman is Knowledge, Brahman is the Infinite. The seeker finds Him hidden in the heart-cavern of his being; residing in the highest heaven of His creatures it is He who enjoys all desire and also abides with the Eternal. " In the beginning all this Universe was Non-Existent and Unmanifest from which this manifest Existence was born. Itself created itself: none other created it. Therefore they say of it the well and beautifully made. "[4] And this that is well and beautifully made is no other than the delight behind existence. This creation is a thing of bliss; for no one could have strength to draw in the breath or to breathe it out if there were not this Bliss in the heaven of his heart. " It is He that is the fountain of Bliss; for when the Spirit that is within us finds the Invisible, Bodiless, Undefinable and Unhoused Eternal his refuge and firm foundation, then he has passed beyond the reach of Fear. "[5] Again, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* in a famous passage makes for us an analysis of the conception, nature and measure of this immeasurable

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1. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. 7 ; III. 6
2. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Calcutta, 1943. Vol. I, pp. 94—95
3. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. I
4. *Ibid.*, II. 7. (Sri Aurobindo's trans.)
5. *Ibid.*

Bliss. "Behold this exposition of the Bliss to which ye shalil hearken. Let there be a young man, excellent and lovely in his youth, a great student; let him have fair manners, and a most firm heart and great strength of body, and let all this wide earth be full of wealth for his enjoying. That is the measure of bliss of one human being. Now a hundred and a hundredfold of the human measure of bliss is the one bliss of men that have become angels in heaven. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of angelic bliss is one bliss of Gods that are angels in heaven. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of divine angelic bliss is one bliss of the Fathers whose world of heaven is their world for ever. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of bliss of the Fathers whose worlds are for ever, is one bliss of the Gods who are born as Gods in heaven. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of bliss of the firstborn in heaven, is one bliss of the Gods of work who are Gods, for by the strength of their deeds they depart and are Gods in heaven. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of bliss of the Gods of work, is one bliss of the great Gods who are Gods for ever. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of divine bliss is one bliss of Indra, the king in Heaven. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of Indra's bliss is one bliss of Bṛhaspati, who taught the Gods in heaven. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of Brhaspati's bliss is one bliss of Prajāpati, the Almighty Father. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. A hundred and a hundredfold of this measure of Prajāpati's bliss, is one bliss of the Eternal Spirit. And this is the bliss of the Vedawise whose soul the blight of desire touches not. The Spirit who is here in a man and the Spirit who is there in the Sun, it is one Spirit and there no other. He who knows this, when he has gone away from this world, passes to this Self which is of food; he passes to this Self which is of Prāṇa; he passes to this Self which is of Knowledge; he passes to this Self which is of Bliss. Whereof this is the Scripture."[6] The one who knows this Bliss of the Eternal fears not for aught in this world or elsewhere,—"the Bliss of

6. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. 8 (Sri Aurobindo's trans.); Also *Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV. 3. 32-33.

the Eternal from which words turn back without attaining; and mind also returns baffled."[7]

The seer of the *Taittirīya* makes Bhṛgu approach his father Varuṇa and ask him about the nature of the Eternal. The father directs him to do askesis and by askesis realise the truth for himself. However he puts him on the road to this realisation by asking him to seek only that "from which all creatures are born, whereby being born they live and to which they go hence and enter again; for that is Eternal."[8] And Bhṛgu concentrated himself in thought and by the askesis of his brooding knew Food, *anna* for the Eternal. For from food, it appears that all creatures are born, and being born they live by food, and into food they depart and enter again. Obviously the father is not satisfied and he asks him to practise penance again. The son comes back with the realisation that Life, *Prāṇa*, is the Eternal, for from *Prāṇa* it seemed to him that all creatures are born and being born they live by *Prāṇa* and to *Prāṇa* they go hence and return. The father is again left unsatisfied and asks his son to know the Eternal further through askesis. He is not fully satisfied with the successive answers which Bhṛgu brings him, namely, that the ultimate reality, the Eternal is Mind—*Manas,* or Cosmic consciousness, *Vijñāna*, and when the son finally brings the answer that it is Bliss, beatific consciousness, *Ānanda*, which may be regarded as the source of all things whatsoever, as the one from which all creatures are born, and being born live in it and to it they go and return, the Upaniṣad breaks off, and we have ostensibly no means of verifying whether the father was fully satisfied by the final answer. Perhaps that is the highest and the most sublime experience that an individual soul can have of the Eternal. This is the love of Bhṛgu, — the love of Varuṇa, says the Upaniṣad, who has his firm base in the highest heaven, and this piece of knowledge shall forever be known after them as the *Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā*. The *Kena Upaniṣad* too extols the nature of the Eternal as pure Bliss, *Ānandamaya*: "The name of that is 'That Delight'; as that Delight one should follow after it. He who so knows That, towards him verily all existences yearn."[9]

The *Brahma-Sūtra* too speaks of the Self as consisting of bliss, *Ānandamaya* different from that which consists of knowledge, *Vijñānamaya* (*Brahma-Sūtra,* I.I.12.). The author of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* refers to Brahman as Bliss, as also vital energy and ether (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad,*

7. *Ibid.*, II. 9

8. *Ibid.*, III. I

9. *Kena Upaniṣad,* IV. 6

IV.10.). In the seventh chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Sanatkumāra teaches Nārada several truths. Beginning with *nāma-rūpa* he goes higher and higher till he reaches the highest truth which is Brahman whose nature is Bliss.[10] The *Brahma-Sūtra* again speaks of Bliss as the true nature of the one, indivisible and unconditioned *Brahman* (*Brahma-Sūtra*, III.3.11-13).

The one indivisible, that is pure existence[11] is also the Infinite. This indefinable, infinite, timeless, spaceless Existence is necessarily a pure absolute and in itself unknowable by our thought although it is possible to go back to it in a supreme identity that transcends the terms of knowledge. Whereas the movement is the field of the relative and by implication 'all things in the movement contain, are contained in and are the Absolute'. The emergence of the movement from the Immutable is an eternal phenomenon and cannot be conceived 'in that beginningless" endless, ever-new moment which is the eternity of the Timeless.' And therefore we are compelled to place it in a temporal eternity of successive duration. There are therefore "two fundamental facts of pure existence and of world-existence, a fact of being, a fact of becoming. To deny one or the other, says Sri Aurobindo, "is easy; to recognise the facts of consciousness and find out their relation is tha true and fruitful wisdom.........The Absolute is beyond stability and movement as it is beyond unity and multiplicity. But it takes its eternal poise in the one and the stable and whirls round itself infinitely, inconceivably, securely in the moving and multitudinous. World-existence is the ecstatic dance of Shiva which multiplies the body of the God numberlessly to the view : it leaves that white existence precisely where and what it was, ever is and ever will be ; its sole absolute object is the joy of the dancing."[12] But as it is impossible to describe or think out the Absolute in itself beyond unity and multiplicity, beyond stability and movement we must accept the double fact, emphasises Sri Aurobindo, admit both Shiva and Kāli and seek to know the nature and secret purpose of this measureless movement in Time and Space with regard to that timeless and spaceless pure Existence to which measure and measurelessness are inapplicable. Shiva and Kāli, Brahma and Shakti are one ; they are distinguishable but not separable. Force inherent in existence may be at rest or in motion, but when it is at rest, it exists none the less, and is not abolished, diminished or altered. Force, therefore, has the double potentiality of rest and movement, of

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10. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, 7.23 and 7.24. 1

11. *Ibid.*, 2. 1.

12. Sri Aurobindo. *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, 1943, pp. 94-95

self-concentration and self-diffusion. This pure Existence , this Brahman, this *Sat* which is the absolute beginning, end and contingent of things has thus an inherent self-consciousness inseparable from its being and throws itself out as a force of movement of consciousness which is itself creative of forces, forms and worlds. But Brahman is neither obliged, nor forced by its own potentiality to throw itself into forms or retain the potentiality of form in itself. If it has chosen to indulge its power of movement or formation it can only be for sheer delight. Absolute existence is absolutely devoid of nothingness, of inconscience, is free from suffering, vibrant with consciousness and pure joy. In the words of Sri Aurobindo, " Absoluteness of conscious existence is illimitable bliss of conscious existence; the two are only different phrases for the same thing. All illimitableness, all infinity, all absoluteness is pure delight."[13] For all dissatisfaction means limitation.

The self-delight of Brahman is not limited by the motionless possession of its absolute self-being. " Just as its force of consciousness is capable of throwing itself into forms infinitely and with an endless variation", Sri Aurobindo observes, " so also its self-delight is capable of movement, of variation, of revelling in that infinite flux and mutability of itself represented by numberless teeming universes. To loose forth and enjoy this infinite movement and variation of its self-delight is the object of its extensive or creative play of Force."[14] That is to say it is Satchidānanda which throws itself out into numberless forms, for its consciousness by its very nature is a creative and self-expressive Force capable of infinite variation as well as endlessly enjoying the delight of that variation. It follows thus that all things that exist are what they are as terms of that existence, consciousness-force and delight. Just as all things are mutable forms of one immutable being, finite modes of one infinite force, so also they are variable self-expression of one invariable and all-embracing delight of existence. As the consciousness-force dwells in everything that is and as everything that is exists and is what it is by virtue of that consciousness-force " so also in everything that is there is the delight of existence and it exists and what it is by virtue of that delight."[15]

As the universal consciousness is something different from, more essential and wider than the ordinary waking mental consciousness, so also the universal delight of existence is something different from, more essential and wider than the ordinary emotional and sensational

13. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 110
14. *Ibid.*
15. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 111

pleasures. Pleasure and joy as we use and know them are limited and occasional movements which depend upon certain habitual causes and emerge like their opposites, pain and grief, which are equally limited and occasional movements, from a background other than themselves. "Delight of being", says Sri Aurobindo, "is universal, illimitable and self-existent, not dependent on particular causes, the background of all backgrounds, from which pleasure, pain and other more neutral experiences emerge. When delight of being seeks to realise itself as delight of becoming, it moves in the movement of force and itself takes different forms of movement of which pleasure and pain are positive and negative currents. Subconscient in Matter, superconscient beyond Mind, this delight seeks in Mind and Life to realise itself by emergence in the becoming, in the increasing self-consciousness of the movement. Its first phenomena are dual and impure, move between the poles of pleasure and pain, but it aims at its self-revelation in the purity of a supreme delight of being which is self-existent and independent of objects and causes. Just as Sachchidānanda moves towards the realisation of the universal existence in the individual and of the form-exceeding consciousness in the form of body and mind, so it moves towards the realisation of universal, self-existent and objectless delight in the flux of particular experiences and objects. Those objects we now seek as stimulating causes of a transient pleasure and satisfaction; free, possessed of self, we shall not seek but shall possess them as reflectors rather than causes of a delight which eternally exists."[16] In the egoistic mental being delight of existence lies concealed and is in the shadow of the subconscious covered by desire. The mortal pleasures and desires are replaced by the Immortal's ecstasy only when the divine consciousness-force emerges on the surface with the transformation of the lower human nature.

Behind the apparent inconscience of Matter which is only a mode of self-conscious existence there is the infinite, immobile consciousness-force, and behind the apparent non-sensation of Matter is an infinite, imperturbable, all-embracing conscious Delight. The self of all things is an infinite, indivisible existence, an infinite imperishable force of self-conscious being and an infinite, inalienable delight of being. This Delight is the source of all existence, the secret of all creation. It is the root of birth, the cause of remaining in existence, also the end of birth and that into which creation ceases.[17] The *Ānandalaharī* of the great Śaṁkara as well as the *Kaula Āgamas* speak of the Lord as *Ānandabhairava* and his consort as *Ānandabhairavi*, the ever-blissful, who

16. *Ibid.*, p.p. 118-119

17. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, III. 6

by then union bring the universe into existence.[18] It is the *Chidānanda Ākāra* of Devi, sings Śaṁkara, that assumes the position of Śiva's mate for the purpose of manifesting Herself as the eight forms, — the Sun, the Moon, Mind, Ākāśa, Vāyu, Fire, Water and Earth.[19]

It is, then, the eternal and immutable delight of being that moves out into infinite and variable delight of becoming, the one indivisible conscious Being behind all experiences supporting them by its innate delight. In the depths of our existence we all are this All-consciousness and therefore the inalienable All-Bliss. In the words of Sri Aurobindo "there is an *Ānandamaya* behind the *Monomaya*, vast Bliss-self behind the limited mental self, and the latter is only a shadowy image and disturbed reflection of the former. The truth of ourselves lies within and not on the surface."[20] The triple vibration of pleasure, pain and indifference is superficial and has in it no absoluteness; it is only an arrangement and result of our imperfect evolution, an obligation of habit. And when the human mind becomes free and unegoistic and capable of remaining in full harmony with others and with the play of universal forces then the use and office of this triple vibration diminishes, its *raison d' etre* ceases to be.

Its eventual elimination is linked up with the destined subjugation of Matter and Mind by the soul, for pleasure and pain are but the imperfect and perverse currents of the same Delight of existence. The elimination of suffering itself comes about by the substitution of *titikṣā*, the facing, enduring and conquest of all shocks of existence for *jugupsā*, the shrinking and contraction.' By this is attained an equality either in the form of an equal indifference to all contacts or as an equal gladness in all contacts. Such equality can only proceed by the substitution af Sachchidānanda-consciousness which is all-Bliss for the ego-consciousness that enjoys and suffers. If the Sachchidānanda consciousness is merely transcendent of the universe, then the path is one of equal indifference, the ascetic path ; if it is at once transcendent and universal, then the path to its omnipresent and all-embracing Bliss is one of surrender and loss of the ego, — the path of the Vedic rishis. "Such then is the view of the universe", says Sri Aurobindo, "which arises out of the integral Vedantic affirmation." An infinite, indivisible existence all-blissful in its pure self-consciousness moves out of its fundamental purity into the varied play of Force that is consciousness, into the movement of Prakriti which is the play of Māyā. The delight of its existence is at first self-gathered, absorbed, subconscious

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18. *Ānandalaharī*, 34
19. *Ānandalaharī*, 35
20. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 126

in the basis of the physical universe; then emergent in a great mass of neutral movement which is not yet what we call sensation; then further emergent with the growth of mind and ego in the triple vibration of pain, pleasure and difference originating from the limitation of the force of consciousness in the form and from its exposure to shocks of the universal Force which it finds alien to it and out of harmony with its own measure and standard ; finally, the conscious emergence of the full Sachchidānanda in its creations by universality, by equality, by self-possession and conquest of Nature. This is the course and movement of the world."[21]

The One Existence takes delight in such a movement for in its infinity are inherent all possibilities, and the delight of existence lies precisely in the variable and multiple realisation of the endless possibilities that lie concealed in its mutable becoming. "And the possibility worked out here in the universe of which we are a part," as Sri Aurobindo says, "begins from the concealment of Sachchidānanda in that which seems to be its own oposite and its self-finding even amid the terms of that opposite. Infinite being loses itself in the appearance of non-being and emerges in the appearance of a finite Soul ; infinite consciousness loses itself in the appearance of a vast inde terminate inconscience and emerges in the appearance of a superficial limited consciousness; infinite self-sustaining Force loses itself in the appearance of a chaos of atoms and emerges in the appearance of the insecure balance of a world; infinite Delight loses itself in the appearance of an insensible Matter and emerges in the appearance of a discordant rhythm of varied pain, pleasure and neutral feeling, love, hatred and indifference; infinite unity loses itself in the appearance of a chaos of multiplicity and emerges in a discord of forces and beings which seek to recover unity by possessing, dissolving and devouring each other. In this creation the real Sachchidānanda has to emerge."[22] The individual man has therefore to grow into the consciousness and nature of a universal being; his limited mental consciousness has to widen to the superconscient all-embracing unity, his narrow heart has to replace lust and discord by universal love and the vital being become capable of universal delight and his whole nature has to manifest in it the unity, the harmony and the oneness-in-all of the supreme Existence-Consciousness-Bliss. This is the play of the One, the Lord, the All as it reveals itself to our liberated knowledge and through all this play the secret reality is always one and the same delight of existence, *Ānandamaya Brahman*.

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21. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 132

22. Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, pp. 132-133

All creation or becoming is only the self-manifestation of the Supreme. "Out of the seed there evolves that which is already in the seed, pre-existent in being, predestined in its will to become, prearranged in the delight of becoming."[23] It is the one existence-consciousness-bliss that concentrates at multiple points and works in them by a multiple play of self-force for a multiple play of self-formation for the manifestation of the manifold rhythm of its own existence, force of consciousness and delight of being. By the very nature of the world-play, it is a triple movement first of an involution and self-absorption of conscious being into the infinite divisibility of substance, next an emergence of the self-imprisoned force into a formal, living, thinking being, and finally a release of this being, into the free realisation of its self as the One and the Infinite at play in the world and by the release its recovery of the boundless existence-consciousness-bliss.' It is by Māyā, says Sri Aurobindo, that 'the static truth of essential being becomes ordered truth of active being', that is to say, "Out of the supreme being in which all is all without barrier of separative consciousness emerges the phenomenal being in which all is in each and each is in all for the play of existence with existence, consciousness with consciousness, force with force, delight with delight." This play of all in each and each in all is concealed at first from us by the mental play or the illusion of Māyā which persuades each that he is in all but not all in him and that he is in all as a separated being not as a being always inseparably one with the rest of existence. Afterwards we have to emerge from this error into the supramental play or the truth of Māyā where the "each" and the "all" coexist in the inseparable unity of the one truth and the multiple symbol. The lower, present and deluding mental Māyā has first to be embraced, then to be overcome; for it is God's play with division and darkness and limitation, desire and strife and suffering in which He subjects Himself to the Force that has come out of Himself and by her obscure suffers Himself to be obscured. That other Māyā concealed by this mental has to be overpassed, then embraced: for it is God's play of the infinities of existence, the splendours of knowledge, the glories of force mastered and the ecstasies of love illimitable where He emerges out of the hold of Force, holds her instead and fulfils in her illumined that for which she went out from Him at the first."[24]

Our limited mental consciousness is incapable of explaining universal existence. It needs an infinite faculty of knowledge to know and guide that existence. It is then a faculty of omniscience which has the whole truth, a principle of active will and knowledge and

23. *Ibid.*, p. 134

24. Sri Aurobindo, *Op. cit.*, pp. 138-139

creatrix of the worlds that mediates between the self-possession of the One and this flux of the Many. This consciousness according to Sri Aurobindo is not only a state of knowledge, but power of knowledge and a vast and infinite Will to power and works—*Satyam, Ṛtam, Bṛahat.* Between the indivisible consciousness of pure Sachchidānanda and the dividing nature of the mind is the all-comprehensive and creative consciousness, the all-pervading and comprehending faculty of knowledge, between the One eternally stable and immutable and the eternally mutable Many there is the *Ṛta-chit,* " the seat of all trinities, of all that is biune, of all that becomes Māyā-in-One and yet remains One-in-Many because it was orginally One that is always potentially Many. This intermediary term is therefore the beginning and end of all creation and arrangement, the Alpha and the Omega, the starting-point of all differentiation, the instrument of all unification, originative, executive and consummative of all realised or realisable harmonies. It has the knowledge of the One, but is able to draw out of the One its hidden multitudes; it manifests the Many, but does not lose itself in their differentiations."[25] It is this supramental Truth-consciousness, the vast self-extension of the Brahman that develops by the great Idea the triune principle of existence, consciousness and bliss out of their inalienable unity, differentiates them but does not separate them and by the differentiation creates the universe of multiplicity. In the language of the author of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* :

> "One seated in the sleep of Superconscience, a massed
> Intelligence, blissful and the enjoyer of Bliss.........
> This is the omnipotent, this is the omniscient, this is
> the inner control, this is the source of all."[26]

It is thus that the creative supermind in which all is one in being, consciousness, will and delight, with an infinite capacity of differentiation creates the universe but does not destroy the unity with the Supreme. " In a sense ", Sri Aurobindo observes that "the whole of creation may be said to be a movement between two involutions. Spirit in which all is involved and out of which all evolves downward to the other pole of Matter, Matter in which also all is involved and out of which all evolves upwards to the other pole of Spirit...........All Nature is simply, then, the Seer-Will, the Knowledge-Force of the Conscious-Being at work to evolve in force and form all the inevitable truth of the idea into which it has orginally thrown itself."[27]

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25. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151
26. *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 5-6
27. *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155

S. Rajagopalasastri

THE PROBLEM OF BEING

The problem of Being is the central theme of metaphysics and this was greatly responsible for bringing metaphysics and indirectly philosophy into disrepute. There have been several variations in the meaning of the term 'being' and since the common factor was not easily intelligible, the attack on metaphysics seemed justified. But we should note that this "being" is an interpretative concept, and hence we cannot avoid these apparent contradictions. This concept is as old as the beginnings of European philosophy when Eleatics concerned themselves with the question of 'being'. Ever since Parmenides expounded his thesis on the subject there have been innumerable systems of thought whose only apparent aim seemed to be to contradict themselves. Turning to Indian philosophy we see that the Upaniṣads systematically analysed this theory of being and arrived at certain conclusions which once again were interpreted by several thinkers in their own vein, agreeing with their own predilections and preconceived notions. The object of this paper is to analyse and evalute these interpretations and see whether any logically sustained system of exposition of Being is arrivable.

'Being' has been discussed from several standpoints, three of them being fundamental. When we discuss beings as such and then inquire into their beingness and the unity of what is more general in them, we branch into ontology. We may also synthesise this being into its totality and arrive at the principle of the Highest Being, and now we branch off into theology. When we try to specify the nature and method of such an inquiry, we have the logic of Being. Under each of these three heads there are innumerable theories and these have been elaborately discussed by modern philosophers. While these different approaches are not water-tight it is worthwhile to confine ourselves to one type of interpretation as this would effectively prevent us from getting immersed in the quick-sands of the dialectical method.

We may at the outset briefly enumerate the significant teaching of a few European thinkers like Spinoza and a few Existentialists. Spinoza takes the idea of substance and by working out its implications more logically arrives at the position that God is the substance which needs nothing other than itself in order to exist or to be conceived. God is *the* substance and every thing depends on Him. God is an absolutely independent Being and hence He is only ONE, for otherwise the Being would be limited by others and not be independent. This also implies that He is uncaused or self-caused. Being is also self-determined in that all its qualities and actions follow from its own nature as necessarily as the properties of a triangle follow from the nature of the triangle. Being is not a person for personality is the very negation of being and it implies "determination" and in the famous words of this philosopher, all determination is negation. Thus Being is single, eternal, self-caused and the necessary principle of things. It is God. Spinoza's cosmological view-point is very sound. He holds that God is not an external transcendent cause without the cosmos but He is in the world, the immanent principle of the cosmos. God and the world are one. God's creation is not to be construed as something external to Him, something that can exist apart from Him. The only Being who is God is the substratum or essence in all things. We are familiar with his scholastic term — *natura naturans* which describes God as the active principle of all reality ; He is *natura naturata* looked at as the plurality of objects. This infinite being has an infinite number of attributes. Every attribute is infinite and eternal in essence. We thus see that Spinoza's Being is the universe itself regarded as an eternal and necessary unity. The activities of this Being are not purposive but necessary as deductions from axioms. He has neither personality nor consciousness.

Among the existentialists we may take up Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger whose contribution to the concept of Being is pertinent. The former affirms that being is not the object with which we come into contact — the object that confronts us nor is it the subject. Objectively considered being is neither the perceived object nor that which is merely thought about. This being becomes a phenomenon for us when it is objectified into space and time as forms of sensibility or into categories as forms of thought. This phenomenon is for us only as we know it and not as it is in itself. Jaspers affirms that though this being is neither only subject nor only object, it is on both sides of the subject split. The phenomenon that we grasp through the media of sensibility is merely the appearance of this comprehensive being. Hence the world is merely the appearance of this real and authentic being. This implies that the nature of the individualised being gets in some way changed when it is perceived and also that *it is* twisted to

some extent when it is made to manifest itself through the media of the senses and thinking.

Heidegger is very clear that Being is the basic problem of ontology. This being is approached through consciousness and the question is asked : "What are the ontological implications of what consciousness directly presents ?" In his work *Being and Time*, he analyses the nature of being in its different manifestations in Time. He makes a distinction between ontology and science and argues that ontology should study being as such, being that transcends and underlies the object of experience as well as the experiencer. Science has to study the objective aspects of being which constitute the real experiences. We have to note that being is the basis of our experience and at the same time transcends it. Thus being is unconditioned and at the same time free from the polarities of being and non-being and the perceived and the perceiver.

These strands of thought find a place in the Vedānta philosophy and we may now discuss how this philosophy explains the nature of Being. In a comparative estimate, one should always be careful to avoid the fallacy of approximating one to the other or unconsciously reading the one into the other. Nations differ in their background of thought and the nuances of the meanings of terms have to be carefully noted and specified. Vedanta philosophy characterises this Being as *sat* and it is regarded as the absolute principle beyond which there is nothing. This absolute principle is termed Brahman and this is the unconditioned Absolute. This being is the ultimate reality. It is described as one without a second, without attributes or determinations and identical with the innermost self or soul of the individual. This ultimate being cannot be described more adequately. The seers of the Upaniṣads describe it as *saccidānanda*, which implies that it is *sat* or existence, *cit* or intelligence or consciousness and *ānanda* or bliss. It is also regarded as *ananta* or infinite. But immediately, the Upaniṣads hasten to add that these three terms should not be regarded as qualities or traits of Being, for such a Being does not possess any qualities as such. This description is only a help to understand what this 'being' really means. If 'being' were to possess these qualities, it would be just one more thing among others. It is not an object which can be perceived or understood intellectually. Nor is it the perceiving self. Even qualifying it as the highest self is not appropriate since it would just be the foremost thing among others. Even God regarded as a Person who may be characterised by superlative adjectives is not this ultimate Being since it is absolutely indeterminate. It is pure being not in the Hegelian sense, viz., as the equivalent of non-being but it is Being itself, pure consciousness itself and pure bliss. It is not one which has consciousness or one which has bliss. One cannot distinguish between

fire and its heat. In the same way we cannot distinguish between bliss, consciousness and existence. It is the very reality of existence and the ground of being. Any description of this being in words is out of place since words limit and make it related to other words and pure being is absolutely unrelated.

It is sometimes argued that the terms—*sat, cit and ānanda* or *satyam, jñānam* and *anantam* are really qualitative descriptions of the absolute Being and that merely saying that these three terms are not qualitative is not tenable. But the fundamental statement is that this being is indeterminate and hence indescribable as this or that. These adjuncts merely discriminate and distinguish the Being from other things having attributes. It is not corect to say that Brahman is distinguished from the rest of things by these additional qualifications. We usually distinguish an object from other objects by-stating its other attributes which distinguish it from these others. In the case of empirical things which may have many qualifications, this procedure of describing the object from among others is understandable but not in the case of Being which is only one having neither a genus nor species. There is only one Being since there is no other from which it can be distinguished. The three adjuncts of Brahman which is the Being merely define and do not qualify. It may further be argued that there is no difference between the defining adjuncts and the qualifying adjuncts and that their common purpose is mere specification. Sankara answers this point by saying that the qualifying adjuncts merely distinguish the qualified thing from all others of the same species while the defining adjuncts distinguish the defined object from the whole world. All these three terms, *sat, cit,* and *ānanda* are in themselves unconnected and each term is synonymous with the defined term, Brahman or Being. With these as foregoing, it is now clear that *sat* does not mean 'having existence" but only *existence*. *Cit* in the same way only mean consciousness and not that which possesses consciousness, and *ānanda* does not imply one having bliss but bliss itself. Being real and being conscious or having knowledge are inconsistent with existence and knowledge or consciousness and bliss. It is thus ascertained that this Supreme Being is pure bliss, pure existence or Reality and pure knowledge or consciousness.

This Being constitutes the reality of the phenomenal world, human existence and sustains all existence. This does not imply that Being causes or is the cause of anything. Nor is it the effect of anything. It is uncaused and not the cause of anything. It is not the effect of anything, nor does it create anything. An intellectual comprehension of Brahman is difficult because it is beyond the logical categories of thought.

The concept of Being is the legitimate subject-matter of ontology in European philosophy but when we begin to expound the concept from the Indian philosophical view-point, we see that the concept touches several allied disciplines like theology and metaphysics. Unlike ontology which is a purely intellectual comprehension of the real significance of the term which enables us to grasp the real meaning of the concept, Indian philosophy has a practical aim in all its discussions and hence the concept of Being is not discussed in isolation from the practical utility of its knowledge. Reason is both pure and practical and since the only ultimate necessity of knowing this Being is liberation or the attainment of *mukti*, the understanding of this pure being veers off to the practical goal of attaining freedom. It is this which lends a religious color to the teachings of the several thinkers of India, especially the ancient thinkers. Thus the background of this *Tattva Śāstra* being different from that of European philosophy, a mere enumeration of the several implications of Being is entirely inadequate. This is the basis of the common criticism of the Western thinkers that India has no philosophy as such.

Reverting to the several questions which border on Being, we may have to discuss several important questions like the relation between this Brahman and the finite individual, its relation to the cosmos, whether this Brahman is impersonal and qualityless or the otherway, how to comprehend and realise this Brahman and so on. It is not possible in the short compass of this paper to elaborately discusss all these questions, and hence we may note the final theses and how they differ from thinker to thinker. We may take as typical the more well-known Vedānta theories in this context and elucidate the implications of the concept of Being. All these schools of thought which centre round the concept of Brahman are called by the Vedānta schools and their more important conclusions vary from one to the other in startling ways. The first and probably the most important school of Vedānta is called the Advaita Vedānta and its conclusions are characterised by strict logic together with a very far-flung vision. All our statements made of Brahman earlier are the settled conclusions of this school. But how does this school answer the several questions raised previously? If Being is absolutely one and non-dual and if it postulates a *nirguṇa*—Brahman who is neither the creator nor the destroyer, how are we to account for the world of multiplicity and finiteness? How can such a Being be related to the finite and transcient world and finally how are we to account for the existence of finite beings like the human beings?

Before taking up these questions we may try to find out what the concept of Being is in the other systems of Vedānta. The school of thought known as the Dvaita or the dualistic school postulates that the

Being is a Person and not a metaphysically abstract being. Madhva also calls this personal being as Brahman. This Supreme Being is indefinable only in the sense that a full knowledge of Him is impossible for us. The reason is that he transcends all our perceptions. He has an infinite number of attributes which however do not in any way limit Him. He is absolute perfection. When we have a total grasp of Madhva's thesis we see it is more religious than philosophical. He regards this perfect and supreme being as creating and destroying the worlds. At the some time he is said to impart knowledge, manifest himself in several ways, raise some persons to a higher level and at the same time condemn others to eternal perdition.

The school of thought developed by Rāmānuja which is described as qualified monism substantially agrees with the above school of Vedānta. Rāmānuja regards the supreme Being as the Supreme Person and that He is endowed with an infinite number of good and auspicious qualities. He is eternal and changeless. At the same time He possesses the main attributes of existence, knowledge and bliss. This Being is called Puruṣottama. Rāmānuja denies that the Supreme Being is impersonal and is very emphatic that he is a Person. This personal being who is determinate and by no account is indeterminate creates, preserves and destroys the world. He is the efficient and the material cause and He is the inner guide and inner self of conscious souls and unconscious matter. The conscious souls and the unconscious matter constitute His body and He is their soul. It is thus clear that according to Rāmānuja, Being is a personal God of theology.

We may now revert to the subsidiary question raised previously : "What exactly is the relation between the One and the many ?" We have seen that the Absolute Being of Śaṁkara is the pure, trans-empirical, unconditioned, indeterminate, eternal consciousness without any subject-object relationship. Such a Being cannot naturally be related to the empirical many, the world of matter and beings. The existence of the world, in whatever way we may look at it, is an indisputable fact and hence has to be explained. If Brahman is eternal and changeless, immutable and pure consciousness, how could there be a relation between such a being and the empirical reality? Creation implies a subject-object difference and also a self-consciousness and at the same time a limitation seeing that non-personality is not compatible with any kind of dynamic activity. Brahman who is partless but a thoroughly homogeneous consciousness and knowledge cannot obviously fashion a multiplicity of phenomena. Many thinkers argue that the Absolute when looked at from the standpoint of the categories of thought and logic becomes a determinate Absolute possessing all kinds of perfect attributes and capable of becoming dynamic. Creation is

thus made possible. This explanation may be regarded as correct but only after creation when limited beings attempt to understand the Supreme. But what necessitated creation of the finite world and how was this made possible? When one identifies the Supreme Being with the Supreme Person possessing an infinite number of perfect attributes, there is no problem at all. Rāmānuja and Madhva have no difficulty at all in explaining creation. The solution that is suggested by Śaṁkara is partially pragmatic and at the same time is consistent with the other aspects of the problem. In one context, Śaṁkara argues that the question of the finite world coming from the infinite Brahman is futile and also is illegitimate. It is a question which obviously has no answer because human intellect cannot probe through such factors. A person who suffers from some disorder is not likely to waste his time over questions like the causes of his malady and so on. In the same way, nothing is served by trying to find out how the *nirguṇa* Brahman is related to the world of multiplicity. All thinkers may not agree with this type of answer. Śaṁkara has another solution. The world of plurality is in the *ultimate* sense unreal, though this is not equivalent to saying that it does not exist. Hence the unreal can never be the effect of the real. All explanations of the relationship between the infinite and the finite are unsatisfactory. The concept of cause and effect is unsuited in the transcendental sphere. Brahman then becomes one of the other things like the world. Hence we come to the view maintained in the Upaniṣads that Brahman did not in any sense create the world, though the world is no other than Brahman. The world has its basis in Brahman though it is wrong to say that Brahman is identical with the world. Brahman is real and the world is its appearance. As Radhakrishnan says "The finite is the infinite hidden from our view through certain barriers." When Brahman is intuited, the world disappears. The factors that inhibit the comprehending intellect from knowing how the infinite becomes the finite is described as *māyā*. As Gaudapāda maintained in his *Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the world is neither evolved nor produced but seems to be so because of our limited understanding. How this realm of appearances is bound up with Brahman has no intellectual explanation. Put briefly, it is only on the analogy of the rope appearing as the snake that we can explain the relation between the world and Brahman. Just as the rope is not in any way affected when it is perceived as the snake, so also Brahman is completely unaffected by the appearance of the world. Brahman is not in any way transformed as milk, e.g., changes into curd. Hence this is called *vivarta-vāda* as opposed to *pariṇāma-vāda* where the cause undergoes change.

A fuller comprehension of the above *vivarta* which gives us an explanation of the appearance of the finite world from Brahman will

take us into deeper layers like the theory of the *sattā-trayi* and the principle of *māyā* or *avidyā* along with the concomitant issues of the personal Being (*Īśvara*) and his creation of the empirical world. But as these do not seem to have much relevance to the main doctrine of Being, we need not pursue these issues. Enough has been said about the thoroughness of the discussion of the concept of Being by the Advaita system of Vedānta.

THE CONCEPT OF BEING FROM THE ESSENTIAL STANDPOINT

V. Narayan Karan Reddy

I wish to present in this brief paper only a few significant aspects of the concept of being. I have attempted to 'discover' the diverse interpretations of the concept from the point of view of modern philosophy. I am conscious of the fact that the concept of being has a long history and that the problem of Ontology has undergone several 'transformations' particularly during the last decade. The new Aeschatology has drawn a clear line of demarcation between the traditional concept of being on the one hand and the volitional, the aspirational and the essential concept of being on the other. The former represents the Western approach, whereas the latter symbolises the Eastern outlook. In fact Ontology can and should be a speculative field of enquiry. But such speculations and rationalisations lead to several complexities, particularly when we are asked to 'arrive at a concept of reality or being'. We do realise that "we could no more do away with Ontology as much as we could not dispense with the desire, needs of food or sex." (James K Feebleman, *Ontology* Baltimore : John Hopkins Press, 1951, p. 115.)

All complex philosophical problems continue to be evaluated and interpreted by philosophers down the ages ; difficulties have always remained not only in 'getting at' their concepts but also in regard to comprehending their meaning. The concept of Being points to one such problem, and though much work has been done both from the metaphysical and the ontological perspectives, the significance remains far from being understood.

The concept of *being* has been dealt with in detail in early Greek philosophy. Change or becoming has been juxtaposed alongside Being. According to Parmenides, one of the earliest Greek thinkers of the Eleatic school, everything real belongs to the category of Being. This is the case with the concept of non-material reality as well. Consequently, it was concluded by Parmenides that coming into being and passing

away constitute Change and Motion. Some material realists like Leucippus and Democritus, however, rejected this Eleatic Monism. In rejecting this, they asserted that the very existence of things, their corporeal nature, in so far as it is subject to change and motion, necessarily presuppose 'the other', viz., Non-being or Void.

Plato, the illustrious disciple of Socrates, projected his own concept of Being in terms of *Demiurge* or God, the active and the dynamic cause of the world. Plato, however, drew a distinction between the 'World Architect' and the 'World Creator'. According to Plato, *Demiurge* has created the world out of 'pre-existent matter' and not out of nothing. Being is the source and principle of all power, energy and actuality in nature and mind. Plato's Being is, however, responsible for the good of this world, and not its evil. Secondly, the Ontology of Plato clearly indicates such other allied concepts of Being as the pattern or the 'archetype of the world' which is the source of the eternal pre-existing model. The concept of Being is also rooted in his idea of the 'receptacle' that is the matrix of creation and finally the Form of the Good which is identical with God or Being. Plato's becoming, though an apparent characteristic of everything sensory, the true and ultimate reality (the ideas), is changeless and is of the nature of Being.

Aristotle, the successor to Plato, achieved a compromise and contended that though Being in the sense of things, is eternal in itself, nevertheless manifests itself only in change in so far as 'Ideas' or 'Forms' have no existence independent of the reality of things and minds. Aristotle's prime concept of the Eternal 'Unmoved Mover' 'pure Form', 'Final cause' and 'Thought-thinking thought', etc., all go to indicate this idea of self-sufficient Substance called the Being. Even otherwise, the concepts of Matter and Form, Potentiality and Actuality, etc. can be synonymously explained or interpreted in terms of Being and Becoming.

In Scholasticism *Ens* is sometimes synonymously used along with the concept of absolute being which has three different aspects to explain, viz., the particle of Being, the potential Being, and the actual Being. *Actus essendi* implies the reality or the essence of Being. The Scholastics isolated the mental being from the real or absolute being. The latter they called *ens rationais*. On the other hand *essentia* signifies the specific nature of some being or thing. *Ens* thus is the source of all first principles in Scholastic philosophy. Though the philosophy of Being as expounded by medieval thinkers is closely linked up with the Greek classical thought, we discover several strands of thought charactarizing the medieval approach. For example, St. Augustine considered

being as the 'ultimate ground of truth'. But these truths are presented to the mind of man. He differentiated the truth from the 'other truths'. The latter participate in the former. St. Augustine's ontology, however, presents a dualism. St. Thomas Aquinas, the other medieval, philosopher, considered Being as a 'pure actuality'. Being is governed by two intrinsic principles of 'Act' and 'Potency'. In fact the attributes or properties of Being are transcendantals. Being is described by Aquinas as "the one, true and good', and all other properties and attributes of objects are described as 'predicamentals'. The concept of Being and Becoming in St. Thomas Aquinas is one of parallelism and in Augustine it is in the nature of dualism; and in St. Thomas Aquinas there is a clear-cut transcendental approach to the concept of Being. According to St. Anselm, "we certainly believe that thou art a being such that a greater cannot be conceived."

Adverting our attention to the concept of Being in Indian thought: in the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, there is no explicit reference to the concept of Being, but the later *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* schools give us an elaborate theory of the concept of God or Being. The *Nyāya* arguments for proving the existence of God, its projection of God as the architect of the world and its emphasis on the same as the efficient cause of the world, etc., constitute the *lesser view* of Being. *Vijñāna-Bhikṣu* and some of the later writers consider God as the eternally perfect Spirit or Being who is the witness of the world and whose mere presence moves *Prakṛti* to act and create the world. Thus, *Puruṣa* becomes the 'unmoved mover'. (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 2.1.68; *Pravacana-bhāṣya*, 1. 92-95).

The Vedic seers seem to have been aware of the existence of an inner being who is known in later Upaniṣadic literature with the name of *Jīva*. This being does not perish with the body. This idea of the *Ṛg-Vedi ṛṣis* is quite evident from the funeral observances and gifts in honour of the manes (*Ṛg-Veda*, X.16.3.) The inner soul is distinguished from the outer body. The inner soul which is the energising principle in man is called *asu* and sometimes it is interpreted in some other Vedic passages as *manas*, the thinking and feeling principle in man. According to the *Tattirīyopaniṣad*, the Supreme Being has entered the world which was created by itself. (2-6-1.) The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* also describes how the Supreme Being enters into creation in the form of *Jīva*, in order to distinguish between Name and Form. (6-3-2.)

There are other statements in the *Upaniṣads* which explicate the complete identity between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul

and indicate that the individual soul is as eternal and imperishable as the Supreme Being : (*Brahadāraṇyaka*, 1.4.7.), "Thou art that", (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.7.), I am the Brahman (*Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.4.10.) etc., are the most common expressions.

Being identical with the Supreme consciousness, the individual Being also possesses eternal consciousness, nay, is consciousness itself. Quoting the *Upaniṣadic* statements like "*vijñānaṁ ānan daṁ brahma*" (*Brahadāraṇyāka* 3.9.28,), "*satyaṁ jnānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*" (*Taittirīya* 2,1,1,), *anantaraḥ abāhyah kṛtsnaḥ Prajñānaghana eva*" (*Brahadāraṇyaka* 5,5,130) etc, Śaṁkara establishes that *jīva* is pure consciousness itself (*jñātaeva*) in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra* (2-3.1.8.)

Being identical with the Supreme Being *jīva* is also *vibhu*, that is, omnipresent. Śaṁkara maintains that though the *jīva* appears to be otherwise on account of his being de-limited by the *buddhi* he is neither the agent of any action nor the enjoyer of any results. According to *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, the ultimate reality which is the Supreme Self (Being) is non-dual, *advaita* (I : XII, 56). The world of duality is an illusory appearance (1 : IV, 39) and the so-called individual self or soul is no other than the Supreme self or soul (1,XX, 1-2). The realisation of the final goal, i,e, Being, depends upon the release of the eternally attained self or soul (11, XVI, 20).

Taking up for consideration Islamic thought : the concept of Being in it is equally rich in its essence. For example, Ibn-Arabi (A.D. 1164) who is considered as one of the greatest mystics of his age was never free from the influence of Al Ghazali, his mystic predecessor. Ibn-Arabi's philosophy was in fact rooted in the "Idea of Unity of Bein g" (*Wahdatul-Wajood*). According to Arabi, no one except God knows about his real transcendent nature. None can comprehend his essential Being of Unity. Being, according to this philosopher, is independent of all predication and duality. Sometimes absolute being is differentiated from the necessary Being in Islamic thought. *Haqq*, the self-caused, the self-begotten reality,the essential truth, is different from *Khalq* the contingent, the created or the caused being, (Here is a parallelism between *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Śaṁkara and the absolute and the necessary Being of Ibn-Arabi). God as absolute being and also as a real being has also been discussed in Islamic philosophy (*Wujood*). This real being has two aspects, the transcendent and the immanent. (Here we can again compare the noumenal and the phenomenal reality of Kantian thought with this line of thinking which is explicitly present in Islamic thought. The "thing-in-itself" is identical with the "Idea of Being" of Arabian philosophers). The real absolute of Islamic thought is free from the common limita-

tions of the absoluteness (*Qayd-i - Itlaq*). The concept of Being in Islamic thought tends to display certain qualities or *sifaat* of "*wahdat* - the unity of being. The most common qualities which are discussed by the Arabian philosophers are *Ilm* i.e. knowledge, *Noor* i.e., light, *Wajood* i.e. existence, and *Shahahood* i.e, the comprehension of the above attributes. In Sufi literature we come across certain expressions like particular oneness or sameness of being (*Ah ad*) which is different from the universal oneness or sameness of being that is *Wahid.* Sometimes the expression *Araftu Rabbi bin Rabbi* initiates a spiritual *nisus* into Islamic thought. This is sometimes known as Gnosis or *Marifat.* This signifies "know God by God". (This concept of being is comparable to the ontological argument of St. Anselm.) Thus we have seen that Ibn-Al-Arabi's philosophic system can be considered as one of the most imposing "thought-structures" built by the Muslim mind. It is worth noting here that this thought-structure influenced even the song and verse forms as also the conduct of men and lives of saints in subsequent years. The concept of Being projected by him excels all other concepts within Islamic thought and has offered the potentiality to unite mankind. Some of the writers referred to him has one of the greatest scholars that the Arab world has produced (*Al-Shaik-ul-Akbar*). Like Spinoza he was a God-intoxicated man. He was popularly called the "Goddrunken Saint."

The Integral philosophy of Sri Aurobindo in modern times has indeed attempted to resolve all contradictions and antinomies in the domain of mystical or spiritual metaphysics. Though I am prepared to admit the abstract constructions of thought and my own limited understanding of them I may explain some of the basic postulates concerning the concept of being, particularly as seen in his *magnum opus, The Life Divine.* Negation of Being is altogether an impossibility in his integral philosophy as much as his affirmation of the statement that non-being is not a negation of being. Apart from this, his absolute and pure existence is timeless, spaceless and indeterminate. Sri Aurobindo's *logic of the Infinite,* is no other than the logic of the Divine or the Supreme Being. In fact, it is a reason, inherent in the consciousness of the Divine Being. The logic of the Infinite is the reflection of the divine acts in accordance with its own law of reason. The nature and working of this higher reason of infinite logic can be realised by man, only if he attains the supramental consciousness. The supramental consciousness is governed by the inner quest and aspiration followed by the Divine descent and Grace. The logic of the Infinite, as

the name suggests, is the logic of the Divine Being and not of the finite reason or mind. In this context, Sri Aurobindo tends to deny the validity of the laws of identity and contradiction altogether in his integral philosophy of Being. In Sri Aurobindo's Yoga, we come across the five aspects of Being, viz., the physical, the mental, the vital, the psychical and the spiritual.

The concept of Being has made a tremendous impact on creative writing in modern European literature as well. A new concept of time as an endless flux exercised a profound influence on British, French and American novels. The process of growth from Being to Becoming contributed a great deal of dynamism to the structure of creative writing. The growth of human consciousness from Being to Becoming characterizes the fiction of James Joyce, Virginia Wolf and Dorothy Richardson. The stream of "consciousness-novels" in France also reflects growth from Being to Becoming. This is one of the most crucial patterns of growth of creative writing in European literatures today.

The culmination of existential thinking is the knowledge of the eternal God in Soren Kierkegaard. The eternal being "aims from above at the existing individual who by existing is in the process of movement". God is "an absolute other" in Kierkegaard. There is a mediator for man's 'self-transcendence'. In this connection Christ is considered as the sole 'invitor'. The concept of being in Kierkegaard centres round "the doctrine of essential temporality of being."

According to Martin Heidegger man's existence is a "being for death". It centres round a tragic anxiety of the individual. The only solace is transcendence from the ordinary Being or worldly existence. Transcendence implies two things. One, an 'escape' and an 'aspiration' of the individual from three different levels or angles of existence. Transcendence with reference to the world implies the detachment of the being from the becoming. The second level of transcendence signifies the natural rapport of the individual with other individuals and lastly, the time-transcendence which he suggests in his existential philosophy is a transcendence of his present momentary existence.

Karl Jaspers' existential philosophy is the quest for one Being. His "all-enveloping absolute" has been well-conditioned by his famous method of 'philosophical orientation'. But his mode of metaphysics has given a new dimension to the concept of being in existential thought.

The philosophical absolute or Being, which is the goal of speculative philosophy cannot be reached by science nor even achieved by any existential thinking. On the other hand the metaphysical quest or search is the only way out to comprehend Being. Being can be comprehended, according to Jaspers only through 'imagination', 'symbolization', 'creative speculation', and 'higher intution'. This approach renders a free play to the natural feelings of 'anguish', 'love', 'guilt', etc. Apart from this, a sense of 'inner freedom' comes into play in knowing the reality of being.

Thus in conclusion we can state that the voluntaristic conception of being and its faithful attitude towards reality has given a new turn to the course of evolution of man in modern times. To begin with: the existential concept of being over-emphasises the reality of the 'individual being." The existential concept of being seems to be untenable from the point of view of certain axiological norms of life. For example, its philosophy of crisis, its idea of delusion and despair, its nihilism, has contributed to the one-sidedness of outlook on life. Moreover, its timely solutions of transcendence of being from becoming have also failed to solve the central problem of the fulfilment of human anguish.

For all practical purposes and from the ontological and metaphysical angles, it is rather difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between the so well-known and diverse concepts of Being and Absolute; Reality and Existence; Being, Non-being and Becoming; and even between Being and beings for the simple reason that Being is symbolic of the reality of becomings.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest an inter-disciplinary approach to the concept of Being and its possible 'application' to the practical problems facing man and society. I would like to refer to this approach as *essentialistic*. Essentialism is based on the concept of whole man and involves a doctrine of human good. 'Inner perfecting principle' of being and becoming gives us core-ideas of *essentialism*. Essentialistic epistemology implies an 'axiological orientation' of 'new needs' of man. Essentialistic stand-point views man in his total setting and inspires him to realise progressively "growing levels of consciousness". For this reason Essentialism may be referred to as a doctrine of human good which tends to break through all conventional modes of thought. This also implies the evaluational approach to the concept of being which automatically indicates an over-all comprehensive view-which is not necessarily linear but integral, axiological and essential. According to this view 'Ideal Man' is the Idea of man which I prefer

to call a 'natural transcendence' of the individual self into the ever-higher spheres (or levels) of consciousness which are always demanding a "new approach" on the part of the individual. This humble line of approach tends to believe that the mental and the physical 'worlds' are surcharged with the new consciousness of life. Our suggestion thus is that there is an endless scope for sentient beings of this world to share (with others) the progressive manifestations of thought and experience that are fast merging into the world of "becoming". The problem is to integrate the diverse concepts of being stated above into our own philosophy of *Essentialism*. We have suggested, however, (both in the presentation of the various philosophies of being and in our discerning an integrated pattern in them) that the concept of being is so basic and integral to man that it can well be referred to as the key-concept in the philosophy fo Essentialism we have proposed.

Dr. T. N. Ganapathy

THE APORIAS OF KANT'S THEORY OF BEING

Some disputes in philosophy have the reputation of being perennial. Even their logical annihilation does not ensure their elimination. Such problems not only survive but flourish, fostered by conflicting interests and partisan alignments. They are aggravated by the mutual unintelligibility of the parties, as each of them talks an esoteric language of its own. 'The problem of being' is one such issue in the history of philosophy. And on this issue, depending on exigencies, the various positions are occupied or not occupied, are embraced or abandoned. The reasons which lead one to embrace or abandon a position may be personal or social or may be due to loyalty to a thinker or perhaps due to sheer inertia. But one thing is sure, namely, that every philosopher is talking about the same issue sufficiently to keep the opposition alive. As Arthur O Lovejoy put it "Effective co-operation among philosophers consists ... primarily in disagreement ... The true procedure of philosophy ... is thus that of a Platonic dialogue on a grand scale, in which the theses, proposed proofs, objections, rejoinders of numerous interlocutors are focussed upon a given question and the argument generally shapes itself, through its own immanent dialectic to a conclusion." In this context it may be pointed out that our understanding is not going to improve by ruling out certain problems as meaningless. To treat problems, especially the metaphysical ones as meaningless entails a discussion between what a statement *means* and the fact of what it purports to *be*. This conflict is well illustrated by a story told during World War I about a detail of soldiers engaged in burying enemy casualties. Some of the casualties protested, "But we are not dead!" The work went on, however, as one of the soldiers said, "Bah! They are such liars.

Why should we believe them!" With this general preamble let me try to suggest a solution to the aporias of the Kantian theory of being—the distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon, the distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself.

Every philosopher inhales before he exhales. Kant, being no exception, got this legacy—the distinction between *mundus sensibilis* and *mundus intelligibilis*—from Newton and Leibniz. Newtons's physical analysis of nature was restricted to the mechanical principles of matter moving in space. Yet Newton assumed God. He assumed that God in creation had arbitrarily laid down the dimensions and the movements of the planets. Newton also assumed that God could at any time introduce new determinations into the course of nature. In fact he held that such interventions by God were necessary in order to restore the balance of energy in the solar system to compensate the loss due to friction. Although Newton spoke of God as the one who created the machine of nature, it became increasingly unnecessary to refer to God when explaining the phenomena of nature. Leibniz felt that such an assumption that God is the creator of the original motion, would contradict the very basic structure of Newtonian mechanics. Newtonian laws of nature to be called laws must be applicable to *all* things without exception. Otherwise they are not laws. To solve this problem in Newtonian physics, Leibniz posited the distinction between two kingdoms, the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace.[1] In the kingdom of nature things happen according to the laws of nature, whereas in the kingdom of grace we act freely according to moral laws. Through the pre-established harmony, the two kingdoms are combined in perfect correspondence, like two clocks set at the same time. In the philosophy of Leibniz the kingdom of nature is a closed kingdom, completely determined by the laws of nature. Kant replaced the distinction between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace by the distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself. But Kant gave up the pre-established harmony, since the noumenal was not in the strict sense accessible to our knowledge.

The further claim of Kant that we have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself seems to make the ultimate being a sort of static thing. He has shown that space and time are only forms of appearances and to think about them as 'things' lands us on the antinomies. So he holds that 'things as they are' must be non-temporal and non-spatial. This means that the things in themselves have the same static eternality as concepts and ideas. Concepts do not change, grow, develop or act. Similarly the thing-in-itself does not undergo change, growth or development as it lacks temporal sequence. Kant is here

following the rationalist tenet of the identity between ideas and being. This carryover of the rationalist attitude in Kant is suggested by the word 'noumenon' whose root 'nous' means the intellect. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant maintains that only the distinction between phenomena and noumena can resolve the puzzles presented by the antinomies. He says that the thesis and the antithesis in the antinomies refer to two different realms, the thesis to the noumena and the antithesis to the phenomena. But in Kant's philosophy this remedial distinction between phenomena and noumena has become worse than the disease (the antinomies). As Jacobi pointed out, without this distinction one cannot get into Kant's system of the *Critiqu e of Pure Reason* and with it one cannot remain in the system.

At the end of the 'Transcendental Analytic' Kant introduced a separate section under the title "The Ground of the Distinction of all objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena". Here he explains that the concept of noumenon is used in two senses, a negative and a positive. According to him, "If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is *not an object of our sensible intuition,* and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is noumenon in the *negative* sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be noumenon in the positive sense of the term."[2] This two-fold employment of the concept constitutes one of the fundamental puzzles in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* In the Aesthetic and in the Analytic the Critique limits itself to the noumenon in the negative sense, whereas in the Dialectic it appears in a positive sense and it becomes a theme only in the Critique of Practical Reason. Unfortunately Kant's interpreters have been sharply divided the issue whether it is a mere negative or has a determinate import too. Critics who say that the thing-in-itself is primarily a limiting concept and as such it has no positive or determinate meaning quote Kant's words: "If the objective reality of a concept cannot be in any way known, while yet the concept contains no contradiction and also at the same time is connected with other modes of knowledge that involve given concepts which it serves to limit, I entitle that concept problematic. The concept of a noumenon... is not in any way contradictory....The concept of a noumenon is... a mere limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention, it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility."

"The division of objects into phenomena and noumena .. is therefore quite inadmissible in the positive sense, although the distinction of concepts as sensible and intellectual is certainly legitimate."[3] So some critics say that in its *critical* meaning the concept of the thing-in-itself, is always negative and empty, a limiting concept. It can have a positive import only if it is *dogmatically* employed. They argue that its objective reality cannot be established in any way. Of course, it is true that Kant was always aware that noumenon could be given a negative meaning theoretically by 'pure' speculative reason and only a problematic existence. True, he used noumenon as a limiting concept in order to help us 'keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds'. What we know are phenomena, i.e., things as they appear to us under the rubrics of space and time and the twelve categories. But it does not follow from this that the noumena are not different. We set before ourselves the negative concept of noumenon only to prevent any temptation to engage in such subreption, i.e. such 'breaking through' the 'bounds of sense'. It is a warning signal to the pretensions of thought and not an actual entity for which any corroborative evidence could be mustered. These critics argue that Kant's own analysis of the concept of existence would negate the noumenon as an entity. For Kant insists that no concept can by itself promote our consciousness of the existence of anything. Kant himself, therefore, cannot give a privileged position to the noumenon. According to the 'postulates of empirical thought':

1. that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the conditions of intuition and of concepts, is *possible*.
2. that which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is *actual*.
3. that which in its connection with the actual is determined in accordance with universal conditions of experience, is (that is, exists as) *necessary*".[4]

If the 'possible-impossible' is one of the modal categories which apply only to phenomenal things, and as Kant developed it, 'possible can meaningfully apply only to that which can be given in experience' things-in-themselves are neither possible nor actual. Hence Jacobi says that with the concept noumenon one cannot remain in the system. This means that the concept 'noumenon' must always remain meaningless in the real sense. Thus the concept of noumenon is merely a limiting concept in that

(a) objective reality cannot be established in any way,

(b) it is free from contradiction and

(c) its function is to limit the validity of the categories.

Interpretations of the noumenon differ because Kant did not pursue his distinction between appearance and noumenon further. But he was sure that the existence of the noumenon could not be doubted. To substantiate this view we may quote Kant : "...the concept of a noumenon is necessary to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves."[5] So Kant did not think his own assumption of noumenon dogmatic ; it is only 'problematic' in the sense that we cannot say that it is either impossible or possible. How are we, then, to read a positive meaning into the noumenon ? We may solve this problem if we turn again to modal categories. It is true that the categories of the 'possible-impossible' could have no application to non-temporal things, for it would be impossible for such things to be given in experience. This is the meaning developed in the Transcendental Analytic. But this cannot be the *only* meaning of possibility. (There may be other *possible* meanings) : 'Possibility-impossibility' cannot mean that it is also impossible for noumenon to *be*. Noumenon *is*, if unknowable. Suppose we say that it is impossible for noumenon to be unknowable we will be guilty of subreption with regard to the category of the possible. One can get other meanings of possibility and actuality in the Transcedental Dialectic where Kant puts questions about the possibility of the concept of freedom. The thesis in the Dialectic is that freedom is possible.[6] In a remark about the solution of the antinomy of freedom Kant speaks of the possibility and actuality of freedom. "...causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature."[7] Kant writes : "freedom ought not, therefore, to be conceived only negatively as independence of empirical condition... It must also be described in positive terms as the power of originating a series of events."[8] Here freedom is conceived as a non-temporal, "intelligible" *ground* of phenomenal events in the world. Of course, Kant concedes that freedom cannot be conceived as their temporal cause. Freedom may be understood to be the ground of events in the world in the same manner as an idea may provide a ground or structure for a musical composition. The idea, of course, does not appear in the sequence of notes ; it is in and through all of them as their ground or basis. Thus in this sense it is their 'cause', though it is not itself a part of the temporal sequence in which they are played. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the example used is a lie.[9] Here we have an 'expanded' meaning of actuality, not the meaning as it is found in the 'Transcendental Analytic'. We can also

get the 'expanded' meaning of actuality in the following way. To Kant, the categories, to start with, are mere 'forms of thought', 'logical shells' or 'empty meanings'. They become filled concepts only in the schematism. If categories are to enter knowledge they must be schematized; and as schematized categories they are also restricted to appearances. From this we may read that if the categories are not schematized, they are not restricted to appearances. If this be the case there is the possibility of the categories being applied to noumenon. In this way noumenon can be thought, though not known. One can think of the possibility and actuality of freedom by applying this reasoning to modal categories, taking them to be pure categories. Kant speaks specifically of an actuality when he writes: "once we have allowed ourselves to assume a self-subsistent reality entirely outside the field of sensibility, appearances can only be viewed as contingent modes whereby beings that are themselves intelligences represent intelligible objects."

Therefore a wholly conclusive interpretation 'negative or positive' cannot be given for noumenon. But the relation between phenomenon and noumenon may throw new light on the correct interpretation. Three interpretations are indicated in Kant's critical corpus. Though none of them can be excluded, Kant prefers the third interpretation. The three interpretations are:

(i) phenomena and noumena are two worlds

(ii) phenomena are mere representations

(iii) phenomena and noumena are one and the same being regarded from different points of view.

Let us take the second interpretation first and then take the first and the third. The clearest expression of the second interpretation is found in the antinomies of pure reason where Kant writes: "We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that every thing intuited in space or time and therefore all objects of any experience possible to us are nothing but appearances, that is mere representations, which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended being, or as series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. This doctrine I entitle transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental meaning of this term, treats these modifications of sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats mere representations as things-in-themselves." (11) We find earlier expressions of this intrepretation in the Transcendental Aesthetic[12]". Now one is tempted to ask: What is the cause of these appearances in us? The thing-in-itself cannot be posited as

the cause because we would then be guilty of extending the category of causality beyond the realm of appearances. So, the first interpretation of the two-worlds theory cannot be the real solution. Hence, only the third interpretation makes Kant meaningful to us. Kant's position will be consistent and defensible only if the thing-in-itself is its appearance as well. Hence the distinction between appearance and the thing whose appearance it is not, is a distinction between things as objects of experience and those same things as such or as things-in-themselves. Hence the thing-in-itself is *not* a second object. It is given in its appearance. It is the object which appears-the object taken in a two-fold sense. The third interpretation is the central meaning of Kant's theory of appearances. He maintains that the "distinction when stated in ... quite general and abstract manner, is bound to appear extremely subtle and obscure but will become clear in the course of its application[13]". He writes: Man "is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action which cannot be ascribed to receptivity of sensibility, purely intelligible object[14]". And in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he writes: "if our critique is not in error in teaching that the object (e.g., a human being) is to be taken in a *two-fold* sense, namely as appearance and as a thing-in-itself .... then there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the appearance, that is, in visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature and so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing-in-itself, is not subject to that law, and is, therefore, *free*[15]". When we follow our natural inclinations, we are creatures of natural wants and needs; it is a state where we identify our interests with our apparent self. By contrast, to be moral is to identify our interests with our *true* self, the noumenal thing-in-itself, the true being. We may conclude our analysis of Kant's theory of being with the following passage, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* "Generation, in man as in non-rational creatures, is dependent upon opportunity, often indeed upon sufficiency of food, upon the moods and caprices of rulers, nay, even upon vice. And this makes it very difficult to suppose that a creature whose life has its first beginning in circumstances so trivial and so entirely dependent upon our own choice, should have an existence that extends to all eternity. As regards the continuance (here on earth) of the species as a whole, this difficulty is negligible since accident in the individual case is still subject to a general law, but as regards each individual it certainly seems highly questionable to expect so potent an effect from causes so insignificant. But to meet these objections we can propound a transcendental hypothesis, namely, that all life is, strictly speaking intelligible only, *is* not subject to changes of time, and neither begins in birth nor

ends in death; that this life is an appearance only, that is a sensible representation of the purely spiritual life, and that the whole sensible world is a mere picture which in our present mode of knowledge hovers before us, and like a dream has in itself no objective reality; that if we could intuit ourselves and things *as they are*, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual beings, our sole and true community with which has not begun through birth and will not cease through bodily death - both birth and death being mere appearances''.[16] On this view the phenomenal being is the translation, into space and time, of the noumenon which is the non-spatial, non-temporal thing-in-itself.

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1. Leibniz, *Monadology*, R. Latta, *trans.*, (78, 87).
2. Kant *'Critique of Pure Reason'*, N. K. Smith, *trans.*, B 307.
3. *Ibid*., B. 310-311.
4. *Ibid*., B. 266.
5. *Ibid*., B. 310.
6. *Ibid*., B. 585.
7. *Ibid*., B. 586.
8. *Ibid*., B. 582.
9. *Ibid*., B. 583.
10. *Ibid*., B. 594.
11. *Ibid*., B. 519.
12. *Ibid*., B. 52 & 59.
13. *Ibid*., B. 565.
14. *Ibid*., B. 575.
15. *Ibid*., B. xxvii.
16. *Ibid*., B. 808.

PART TWO

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR

ON

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

H. Herring

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

Having been invited to deliver the inaugural lecture of this 15th All India Seminar on "Philosophy and Social Conflict", an invitation which I consider a great honour to me, I feel myself also in a conflicting situation, if not in a dilemma : since how should I deal with this highly complicated and complex subject in about half an hour - a subject which will be tackled in the course of this Seminar in about fifteen to twenty papers by distinguished colleagues from various, historical and systematic points of view.

Should I talk on the role, the function of philosophy *in general* with regard to social conflict *in general* ? — an investigation of the socio-political task of philosophy which—when worked out in detail—would cover the realms of anthropology, ethics, sociology, philosophy of history and social philosophy.

Should I talk on the function of a *specific* philosophical system in a *specific* situation of social conflict ? — which would, by and large, mean to analyse interrelation of such a system and the conflict situation and to inquire into the possibilities of how to overcome a certain conflict situation with the help of such a system or set of propositions, principles and values.

Or should I ask for the role of a *particular philosopher* in a particular social conflict situation ? — a question which is by no means identical with that into the role of *philosophy* in a particular conflict situation, because of system, once composed and released by a thinker, can become very soon independent of its author and is open to any kind of interpretation and practical application, misinterpretation and abuse.

I could also examine our problem from the point of view of fundamental ontology, asking for the origin and meaning of the terms "philosophy" and "social conflict", (a) in a sense applying the methods of conceptual analysis and hermeneutics, and (b) in a sense applying the methods of ontology, — and such an examination would have to take into consideration the results of sciences such as psychology, ethology, human genetics and others as well.

I shall refrain from dealing with our subject under these and similar aspects because they will certainly come up for discussion in our Seminar. Instead I shall confine myself to a brief consideration of the meaning of the term "social conflict", then deal with the two main attitudes of the philosopher towards this basic phenomenon of mankind, and finally make a few remarks on what, in my personal opinion, a philosopher could do facing the problem of social conflict.

The Latin word *confligere* originally meant the clashing together, the collision of two things or people by chance; but very soon it was also used for designating a hostile encounter, an antagonism between people, their opinions and ideas and thus for designating the collision, the hostile encounter, the antagonism of systems of thoughts or ideologies. Thus, when we talk of social conflict, we have different levels of inter-personal relations in mind on which this conflict can take place:

1. The open or latent *antagonism between groups of people with different* socio-economic- political, or religious *interests*, as, for instance, landlords and peasants, employers and employees, totalitarians and democrats, believers and non-believers in a particular religious faith.

2. Social conflict can also mean the open or latent antagonism *of factual*, of existing *socio-political systems* as such e.g., liberal and conservative, monarchic and democratic, capitalistic and socialistic patterns of society.

3. Social conflict can mean the open or latent antagonism of socio political *theories*, systems of thought that lie at the bottom of such conflicts as mentioned under (1) and (2), e.g., Cosmopolitism and Nationalism or Open Society and Closed Society, which in themselves may be grounded in fundamental religious and philosophical world-views such as Theism or Atheism or Materialism.

Of course, not every struggle between men can be called a social conflict; a family quarrel is certainly no social conflict, nor is the

competition of two boxers or cricket teams. There are also other forms of our struggling to master difficulties, to overcome obstacles, to achieve ends which have nothing to do, originally, with social conflict, as — for instance — man's battle with the physical environment which can take place in the open field as well as in the scientist's laboratory. All this is not meant by the term social conflict, although it can be rooted *in* or *lead to* a social conflict.

We may thus call social conflict the temporal or permanent strife of groups of people with different motives, interests and aims in so far as it (the strife) affects society on a national, international or global scale.

Now, in asking how philosophers of all times have analysed, interpreted and evaluated this basic phenomenon, of mankind (and it is a basic phenomenon, not only with reference to our historical experience but also when we take for granted that man by his very nature and essence is bound to live in some kind of a social community), we meet the following two main theories :

1. There is one big group of thinkers who hold the opinion that just as improvement, development towards higher and better stages of Being takes place in uature, in the life of organisms, almost exclusively by means of a dialectic process of evolutional,-social life also develops along the lines of a perennial conflict of interests aad systems : and such a perennial conflict is considered to be necessary for the development of better conditions of social life. Under this aspect even wars or warlike actions are justifiable just as fights due to rivalry between animals for the possession of a particular territory or a berd. Thus, for instance, Hegel stated : "If states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war."

2. There is anothers group of thinkers, who consider social conflict as such an evil which has to be overcome in a most perfect order of state and government, thus aiming at a social status of harmony and perpetual peace.

The social philosophies of Hegel and Marx may serve as paradigms for either theory.

History, as Hegel sees it, is not a disconnected series of events in time. It has a distinct reasonable and purposeful pattern. The world has an aim, a destiny towards which it has always moved and will move perpetually. This destiny will only be revealed to man when the final stage of history has been reached and thus the universal will and the individual wills are reconciled. But at that stage world as

world will have been resolved in the oneness of the World Spirit. This is the meaning of Hegel's saying in the Preface to his *Philosophy of Right* that "The owl of Minerva (the ancient symbol of wisdom) spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk." This pattern of history which is the unfolding of the Idea, of absolute reason, of the "World Spirit", manifests itself not in a linear or circular process but in a dialectical one which is an antagonistic *progress* towards the final destiny of the universe *in toto*. It is a movement from one stage to another, a higher one, and the advance and improvement of each stage is the result of conflict in the preceding stages. In such a conflict, neither of the two clashing ideas, neither thesis nor antithesis, is wholly destroyed nor does either one stay un-affected. The result of such a clash of contradictory ideas is a fusion of the higher, the valuaable elements of both, thus forming a synthesis which is an improvement over both of them. The synthesis, in turn, represents a new thesis against which a new antithesis is sooner or later opposed, and the whole process starts again *ad infinitum.*

Now, it is in the nature of man that he wants to preserve a stage which seems to be most congenial to his wishes and ideas. But when man tries to preserve the *status quo* he inevitably sets in motion forces which are opposed to it. Progress occurs, whether consciously wanted and promoted or not, even in the face of opposition. There may be periods of quiescence and peaceful rest for a people, but even at those times contradictory ideas are generated and call for a change. Conflict is necessary, in nature as well as in history; it is bound to occur, and only by conflict the World Spirit will advance towards its final goal. Conflict is the key to progress. It need not be violent (although it often is); but violent or not, it is inevitable and as such the moving principle of the universe and thus of human society. A status of perpetual peace is, therefore, as unreasonable and undesirable as it is actually impossible because it would not only interrupt the progress of mankind towards final perfection but also be a self-contradiction of the World Spirit, the absolute Idea, the essence of which is defined as proceeding in perpetual progress.

Let us now turn to Karl Marx whose social theory I take as exemplary for those thinkers' stand-point who consider social conflict an evil which has to be overcome towards a most perfect social order in a conflictless human society.

Marx, like Hegel, developed a highly sophisticated philosophy of history and society. Much influenced and even fascinated by Hegel's dialectics, he was also convinced that progress basically results from the conflict of opposing forces; but he reversed Hegel's view that this conflict takes place in the realm of ideas and from there sets in

motion material forces. Marx says that in Hegel's theory the world is "standing on its head", upside down. Putting the world on its feet and thus into the right and natural position means for him to understand conflict in history as a conflict of material forces, mostly economic forces which form the substructure for the superstructure of ideas which are but the products of man's material conditions, of man's socio-economic environment. Thus Marx states in the Preface to his *Critique of Political Economy* (1859):

> "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence which determines their consciousness."

It is in the line of this basic idea of a materialistic interpretation of history that Marx considers the whole history of mankind as a history of class-struggles which can be defined as the continuous conflict between the exploiting and exploited, the ruling and the oppressed classes. This dialectical process of conflicting classes which runs as the red thread through history is now, as Marx thinks, about the middle of the 19th century, striving powerfully towards the final destiny of the history of mankind, i. e., the abandoning of this continuous process of class-struggles and the establishment of a classless communist society of freedom and equality where there will be no conflict whatsoever because the fundamental reason for social conflict, private property (which Rousseau in his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, 1755, had already called the "deathly sin" of mankind), would be abolished. Thus Friedrich Engels writes in the Preface to the English edition of the *Communist Manifesto*. (1888), about Marx' idea of the final aim of history:

> "... the history of these class-struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, nowadays, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class — the proletariat — cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class — the *bourgeoisie* — without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinction and class-struggles."

This then would mean the eradication of all social conflict, it would mean perpetual peace for mankind in a "brave new world", — wherein still minor conflicts would occur, but they would immediately be brought under control by the will of the majority; and this is an eschatological hope which is surely no less utopian than that of Hegel and his partisans.

What, now, is the role and function of philosophy and the philosopher in the face of social conflict? Should the philosopher go on only giving different *interpretations* of the world in general and principles of human society in particular or should he, as Marx demanded, try to alter the unsatisfactory social conditions by actively entering into the field of politics?

If it could be proved that any philosopher were in possession of the one and only truth, that he were able to produce a system of principles and rules for the thorough understanding of the history of mankind and an infallible interpretation of social life, the answer to this question would be easy, and it would be foolish not to follow his advice. One would only have to put his theory into practice and we would have a paradise on earth. But since every human being is involved in that process which we call world history, and since, therefore, no overall view of this process from outside the process is possible, a theory of universal validity concerning the meaning of world history cannot be hoped for. Thus if we cannot absolutely rely on any *system* of thought for solving our social problems we *can* rely on the *attitude* of the philosopher towards those problems, his critical and honest mind in analysing and interpreting these problems most conscientiously, without looking right or left, only following his *Eros* (desire) for knowledge and his consciousness of being responsible for the welfare of others.

This is the proper substance of Plato's ideal of the philosopher-kings which means the following: if justice is to be realised, incarnated in society, those who constantly concentrate on the essence and value of justice and its practical application should have the final say in social affairs, or else those who actually have power over others should at least lend their ears to the philosophers and heed their advice. The designation "philosopher" is, of course, not restricted to professional teachers of philosophy but defines the one who is constantly striving after the true and the good, after perfection, regardless of his profession.

But is there anything in the world and thus in social life which could be called true and good without restriction? And if there is, can any human being, limited, as it were in his thoughts and actions to spatio-temporal phenomena, and even there unable to experience these phenomena in their totality but only a very limited part of them, gain knowledge of the absolutely true and good? Let us remember what Kant said, in view of the practical implications of the position of critical or transcendental idealism, in the very first sentence of his *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals*: "It is impossible to conceive of anything in the world or even outside of it which

can be considered good without limitations excepting only a good will."

And in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Part I, book 2, chapter 1, A 194) he defines philosophy as "instruction in the concept wherein the highest good is to be placed and in the conduct by which it is to be obtained."

Thus philosophy consists rather in a method, an attitude, a conduct of thinking and conceiving things and events than in a system of thoughts and propositions *about* things and events; in its final practical purpose it aims at the conciliation of the desires and demands of the will of individuals with the general will and thus it aims at the welfare of mankind. Kant speaks elsewhere (in his essay *Idea of a General History with a Cosmopolitan Intention,* 1784, 4th proposition) of "the unsocial sociability of men, that is their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up." By means of this antagonism he expects progressive development to be brought about in the sense of intellectual and moral improvement. This reminds us of Gandhi's dealing with the problem of social conflict, based upon his conviction that, although there is obviously diversity and conflict in human life, man like everything in nature strives after unity. This unity in social life can only be achieved in a socio-economic order "which minimises social conflict and, even when it cannot eliminate it, provides non-violent means of conflict-solution" (B. N. Ganguli: *Gandhi's Social Philosophy,* Delhi; 1973, p. 437).

In defining man as an unsocial sociable being, Kant has implicitly made a point which deserves our attention when investigating essence, significance and meaning of social conflict, namely the relation or even the correlation of co-operation and conflict in social life. As in the physical world the forces of attraction and repulsion are simultaneously operative, determining the position and movement of bodies in space, so in the social world co-operation and conflict are simultaneously at work. Thus R. M. McIver and Charles H. Page state in their joint study *Society: An Introductory Analysis,* London, 1969, p. 65:

> "Indeed there is no form of social conflict, whether face-to-face struggle like duelling or debating ... or whether more complex group forms as between economic or ethnic or political or religious groups, that does not involve co-operative activity ... Conversely, there are no examples of co-operative enterprises in society within which conflict in some form is absent."

C. H. Cooley in his book *Social Process* (New York, 1918) states the same fact in a more poetic language as follows: "It seems that there must always be an element of conflict in our relations with others, as well as one of mutual aid; the whole planof life calls for it; our very physiognomy reflects it and, love and strife sit side by side upon the brow of man." (p. 56)

The one who takes into consideration what we have sketched in this brief outline of the topic of our Seminar should no longer speculate about the universal principles of history; he should no longer ponder over the necessity or the contingency of conflict in society. He will realize that there has been, there is and, most probably always will be, social conflict which should be utilized for the well-being of man; he will thus justify and promote conflict where it seems to aim at social improvement, and he will reject and try to remove conflict where it seems to lead to social deterioration. And in doing so, he will not claim to have found the philosopher's stone for explaining the meaning of social conflict as such, he will not proclaim to have found once and for all *the* best form of government, *the* most just principle for the distribution of property, *the* only remedy for the avoidance of war. If he is a true philosopher, he will be modest and honest enough to confess that all he has to offer is a solution which he considers probably the best under present circumstances. Such a man, however, will most probably not be acknowledged as a philosopher by those who are used to measuring the greatness of a thinker by the profundity of his systematic outline of the principles of life and world and by the universal validity and absoluteness of his statements; and admitting that the investigation of actual and possible cases of social conflict, an inquiry into their causes and effects, is definitely not the only task the philosopher can carry out, it is certainly what he *can* and *should* do where, what is at stake is not physical matter but the fate of man and mankind at large in the face of a rapidly changing world, where with the tremendous increase of the human race and the equally rapid decrease of our natural food and energy sources and, where—furthermore—due to the great discoveries and inventions in the natural sciences and in industrial technique, the once remotest strangers have now become our neighbours, where in the face of these undeniable facts more resaons and causes for social conflict have come to light than ever before.

In conclusion of this inaugural address, those of you who would have expected a more positive, a more substantial, a more constructive contribution to this Seminar on *Philosophy and Social Conflict* or even a clearcut solution of some of the basic problems involved, may be reminded of what Sigmund Freud with his most valuable

analysis of man's social behaviour expressed in the concluding sentences of the last of his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, where he said:

> "Those of our fellow-men who are dissatisfied with this state of things and who desire something more for their ... peace of mind may look for it where they can find it. We shall not blame them for doing so; but we cannot help them and cannot change our own way of thinking on their account."

S. S. Raghavachar

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

I

There is a conception of philosophical life to which the phenomenon of social conflict is altogether immaterial. Philosophy on this view is a matter of pure ideation, the more philosophical one's temper is, the more detached he is from social concern and, as such, he does not generate, or participate in social conflict or even endeavour to liberate society from its conflicts. Luckily this notion of philosophy died its natural death at the hands of Plato. For that philosopher, whatever be his exaltation of reason and the abstract character of reality as he pictured it, the philosopher who descends to the cave of human society from his height of vision charged thereby with a humanitarian mission, is a superior specimen of his category. In Eastern philosophy, the unique message of the *Gītā* happens to be the same. It is a sustained plea for work in the world and no renunciation of life, though it lays down in no uncertain terms the renunciation of ego. The philosopher of the *Gītā* is a saviour and no mere sage. It is only this character that makes him conform to the paradoxical nature of the *puruṣottama*, whose perfection overflows into ceaseless creative involvement in the cosmic process. Thus the *Gītā* and Plato, not to mention other philosophical forces, rescue philosophy from its sterile aloofness. The philosopher brings his vision to the field of action and burns himself out, as it were, in working out his truth of spirit in the realm of social realities.

II

There is a level or pattern of life which the social philosopher, Sorokin, names 'Sensate'. It is life lived in terms of matter. A man

or society pursuing this mode of life conceives of life in utterly naturalistic terms, negates the supra-mundane altogether and endeavours after values strictly materialistic in the axiological sense. It admits moral consideration on grounds of empirical expediency and spurns the transcendent in every conceivable sense. The old Cārvāka philosophy seems to have propounded this concept of human life and the *Gītā* characterises this mode of life as *āsuric* and offers brilliant descriptions of this life, which can be hardly improved upon. The cardinal points of *Āsurī Saṁpat* are its metaphysics of matter as the complete reality, its epistemology of sense-empiricism and its axiology of bodily gratification and social power as a means therefor. Thought and feeling are utilized as instrumental to the fulness of the life of the senses.

What happens to a society run on these sensate lines? Plato had drawn for us the terrifying picture of a sensate society in his accounts of so-called Democracy and Tyranny in his *Republic*. The sensate man is a paralytic condemned to life-long combat. The sensate values are such that they can be appropriated only by expropriating fellowmen. This is a life of struggle and warfare, where the mighty have victories as long as their might lasts. Conflict is inherent in this scheme of life. Neither peace nor victory can be lasting and the only eternal law is the law of the jungle. The *Bhāgavatam* puts the case in brutal words: "*jīvo jīvasya jīvanam*". It is a curious phenomenon that the sensate groups or individuals cover themselves up with ideological rationalisations and pay thereby a left-handed compliment to humanitarian values. It is well-known how nations and individuals in the grip of bitter struggles labour to project ideological hallos round themselves and condemn their adversaries as lacking such justification.

It is this law of self-contradiction at the very heart of sensate culture that Swami Vivekananda characterised as *māyā*. He drew a series of vivid pictures of self-contradiction as constituting the core of mundane life and declared triumphantly that this was a revelation of the māyic character of life. Self-contradiction is a symptom of an inadequate scheme of values and the only way in which the inadequate shows itself to be such is by way of contradiction. This position of Swami Vivekananda is anticipated somewhat in the speculative logic of Hegel, which, in its turn, is inaugurated in the *Dialectic* of Kant. While the German philosophers content themselves with the proof of the phenomenal character of the self-contradictory, Swami Vivekananda makes the demonstration of *māyā* a more living process and applies the logic of contradiction to the issues of life as a whole. The moral of this philosophical judgment is clear. Sensate life is infested with conflict in its fundamental nature. *Kāma*, as the *Gītā* puts it, inescapably leads to *krodha*. It is an open secret that hedonism even

at the hands of its best advocates failed to provide for altruism an intrinsic value. The finite is destined to destroy itself through its internal dissensions. Philosophy contemplating this situation on the canvas of world-history can offer only one saving prescription. It is only emancipation from the sensate life that could produce conditions of peace and harmony. It is in this sense that all religions and all schools of Indian philosophy have spoken of salvation, *mokṣa*. There is no solution to the conflicts on the level of life which originates them. A supreme ascent beyond the sensate is the philosopher's scheme of the education of mankind.

III

From these two positions of an ideational philosophy lacking social dynamism and a sensate view of life incapable of generating an ethics of the common good, we move on to a conception and pattern of life which Sorokin characterises as Idealistic. This is idealistic in the sense of conceiving the final values of life as 'transcendent' of the merely empirical and sensual and of also conceiving those values as demanding translation in the space-time order of actuality constitutive of human society. It is both vision and social action. It combines contemplation and the creative effort for transforming life into the pattern of ideal values. There is no bifurcation between ideation and restful endeavour.

How does this mode of life enter into the realm of conflicts in societies. There are possibly four ways in which idealism understood in this integral sense functions in relation to conflicts. (a) It converts philosophical ideation from its exclusive inwardness into active concern with the concrete affairs of social life and imparts into the philosopher the obligation to endeavour after the solution of social conflicts. (b) When society labours under the dominance of the sensate spirit, idealism works for the education of man out of that spirit and works for his liberation from the confinement in the lower order of values generative of the conflicts in question. (c) When a social system ostensibly dedicated to the goal of the common good and the creative development of the constituent members in the corporate pursuit of universal values, fails to be true to its fundamental aims, the social philosopher of the idealistic type must institute the corrective process of criticism and even resistance. This is generating a conflict but it aims at elevating societies to the truer realisation of their fundamental ends. In this process there is a live danger that the idealistic revolutionary may degenerate in his choice of means and techniques of revolt and may adopt the seemingly easier and more efficient methods of sensate revolutions. This is a remedy worse than the disease. It is in this context that Gandhiji's concept of *Satyāgraha* acquires its philosophical significance.

The methods of attack to be adopted by the rebel who seeks to take the social system nearer to its own declared ideals, must be consistent with the higher goal. A true *Satyāgrahi* confronting the *status quo* with nothing but truth and non-violence triumphs ultimately because he activates the higher elements in his opponents to full operation.

It is this philosophy of non-violent non-cooperation with evil that was illustrated in the lives of Socrates and Jesus, received its theoretical formulation at the hands of Tolstoy and the leading seer of American Transcendentalism and was cultivated in all its amplitude by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Revolution without destruction is a new type of revolution and merits full philosophical appreciation. (d) There is yet another manner in which the idealistic philosopher comes into the scene of social conflict. If a social system really fostering the higher social values is opposed by subversive forces destructive of its just ends, how does the philosopher face the crisis ? He must attempt a reclamation of the erring individuals and groups, in a way consistent with the order of the ideals he represents. He must, to speak in the language of religion, destroy the sin and save the sinner. This is no doubt a delicate operation, but the true social idealist sees no sordid limits to the perfectibility of man. He combines *opposition with humanitv* in his treatment of crime against society. He rescues the human, rather the divine, element in the criminal imprisoned in his sensate encrustations. How can we be sure that it is an impossible feat? Human values, as against the brute in man, can be released from this debasing alliance and when once they are rendered operative they can march to final victory. This is the ageless vision of philosophers. This, perhaps is one of the significant meanings of the Upaniṣadic dictum: "*satyameva jayate*".

The philosopher, therefore, does concern himself with social conflicts, does not seek their solution in the narrow limits, which are themselves responsible for them, does engage in perfecting the social system through a technique appropriate to his final designs and defends the morally sound structures of society against subversive forces. Does he succeed? He ought to, in so far as he is true to his calling and in so far as his reading of a divine element in human nature is authentic. The hopes of humanity are bound up with his prospects. There is not much in society that an inspired and energetic minority cannot accomplish. A seemingly insignificant group or even an individual, wholly controlled by the vision of justice, can immobilise its antithesis by liberating whatever is allied to itself in it and isolating evil and throwing it on its own resources. Even a band of robbers, as Plato said, perishes if it sheds its code of honour.

We may, perhaps, conclude with the great saying of Whitehead "The great conquerors from Alexander to Caesar, from Caesar to Napoleon, influenced profoundly the lives of subsequent generations. But the total effect of this influence shrinks to insignificance if compared to the entire transformation of human habits and mentality produced by the long line of men from Thales to the present day, men individually powerless, but ultimately the rulers of the World."

N. Subrahmanian

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

I shall begin this paper with two clarifications: one, as to what I mean by philosophy and two, as to what I mean by social conflict. Philosophy to me is a generalised theory about attitudes towards any problem (personal or social) and philosopher, a person who holds such a theory. By social conflict I mean the kind of conflicts which is evident in society among groups or influential individuals, and which is not productive or constructive but generates frustrations and pains. These assumptions will be evident in the course of the paper.

A discussion about the relevance of philosophy to an understanding and possible resolution of social conflicts can be meaningful only if philosophy is defined. If philosophy were to be religio-spiritual in its epistemological frame, it will be unconcerned with secular social conflicts except to the extent of having to save man from them. If philosophy were to be a discussion of man's *post-mortem* fate or his spiritual relations with his Maker, it will, when it succeeds, segregate (or rescue) man from his secular environment (or entanglement) effectively, and fit him for his ultra-temporal concerns. But in such an eventuality philosophy takes man out of his social moorings as, for instance, the severely ascetic attitude of a recluse towards life can be. If one wants to be an effective part of society, one will be subject to the conflicts which arise naturally in social contexts. Whether the arrangements in a society are democratic and free or totalitarian and controlled, the secularity of the context will create tensions and conflicts; in the former case between individual and individual or between individual and state and in either case overt in its manifestation; and in the latter case the conflicts will be between dissatisfied elements among the citizenry on the one hand and the state

on the other, but always covert. Whether open and uninhibited or surreptitious and restrained, the situation being secular, conflicts will exist. Philosophy of religious nature can be helpful in this context: i) in educating the citizens in civilized ways of resolving, if not avoiding, conflicts and ii) braving conflicts with dignity and refusing to be coerced into pugnacious reactions. But if social experience, which we shall for short call history, is any guidance in this matter, even the most effective philosophical doctrines propounded and propagated by prophets and saints and men of godly disposition like the Christ and the Buddha, have had, if at all, peripheral impact on the conscience of mankind which, while paying surface loyalty to them to keep up the veneer of culture, quietly reverts to its barbaric ways in its diurnal functioning.

In so far as what has been stated above goes, if philosophy is to be defined as an other-worldly or life-negating attitude of mind, it will be seen that its relevance to social conflicts will be minimal. But then we are not obliged to be content with this delimited definition of philosophy. We shall turn to this aspect of the question later.

Now, social conflict needs to be understood. Civil society is a collection of persons who have come together to minimise, if not obviate, dangers natural to and inherent in a condition of isolation and to maximise the benefits due to cohesion and unity. There are two sources of conflict in that civil society : (1) the natural difference which exists not only in the abilities of men but their preferments and desires ; these differences, if unresolved either by consent or by force, will remain causes of tension and conflict. The conflict will be caused by men, made differently by nature, to abolish that difference. Those who benefit by the difference will resist its abolition and those who suffer by it will ask for a change, even an artificial and unjust change. This difference in attitude towards nature's intentions and performance is a fruitful source of social tensions. The other is, what men create. Because some benefit by the conflicts, they create them while others suffer the conflicts in society. Anyway conflicts exist.

It will be not only a philosopher but a more mundane type of person i.e., the common man who will be interested to know whether a conflict-free society can exist.

The conflictless society will have to be more than a classless society; it has to be egoless also (in fact a mindless one) in which everybody will be looking after everybody and harsh reactions will be avoided by self-sacrifice, martyrdom, an attitude of give and take and the golden rule,

and everyone will be praising and avoiding blaming any one else to obviate irritations and cut conflict at its root. This could be best achieved by the killing of desires as mankind has been told so often. But it would be interesting for a psychologist to measure the amount of psychological damage such repression can cause to individuals and socities.

Imagining that conflicts of one kind or another in a society as at present organised is inevitable, what role philosophy can play to mitigate it is the issue on hand. It is here that a definition of philosophy becomes necessary. Any generalised attitude towards a problem, human can be termed philosophy. If so the Marxian panacea to secular human or divine, conflicts is a philosophical answer and every society has, according to its lights, tried to destroy social conflicts by creating a set of laws, according to a philosophy of law (jurisprudence), which are intended to regulate the conduct of man in society. An unequal society held fast by rigid laws of a violent nature, or the greater effectiveness of ontinuous brain-washing of intellectually vulnerable segments of society, or an egalitarian social order in which the myth of equality is treated as a remedy for the ills of social injustices—can all in their respective ways contain social conflicts. In fact, historians know that what are today considered to be causes for social conflict were once invented to prevent such conflicts, like feudalism and the caste system. That the remedy for a disease in one age can become the cause of a deadlier disease in another is a measure of the mutability of human understanding, wishes and ideals. In different ages, however, different philosophies test different systems by different yardsticks and naturally different results follow. That is how the caste system, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, imperialism and other symbols of inequality now deemed sources of conflict were once philosophically justified. Thus is the assistance of philosophy invoked to justify or condemn any social system.

Apart from these causes of social conflicts turning to philosophy for justification or otherwise, different philosophies concurrently competing for man's approval and practice become ideologies which are themselves very fruitful sources of human conflict. Whether the temperature of the ensuing war is going to be cold or hot, the atmosphere of conflict will prevail and seat mankind perpetually on tops of live volcanoes. The normal human desire that everyone should voluntarily agree with on most public issues and act accordingly and that otherwise the non-onformists could in their interest as well be compelled to agree and that there would be nothing morally wrong in this—has marked their thinking; we note this in politics as well as in religion. Coercive processes adopted in proseletysation, reminding one of the Inquisition, are areas of socio-religious conflicts of an intensely ugly nature. Inspite of

protensions most religions have behaved arrogantly (obvious or subdued as circumstances permitted) and the upshot had been considerable human misery. Political ideologies and religious conviction thus equally tend to stifle the free conscience of man either by brain-washing or by physical compulsion. That law could be an instrument of coercion does not however add to its legitimacy ultimately. Law which is intended to check social conflicts can itself create many new conflicts.

Individuals and groups comprising likeminded persons are often torn between one loyalty and another or among number of loyalties so that conflicts come in. The most important case of conflict in loyalty in medieval world history is seen in the necessity to choose between the different loyalties which the Church and the State demanded. With the emergence of the sovereign state the conflict has subsided but not died out. A more basic conflict in loyalty between the endearing family and the enforcing state is older and still lingers in ancient societies like ours.

Political theorists and anthropologists speak of a 'nasty brutish' state of nature in which violent conflict characterised human relations and out of which mankind emerged by a contract according to the former and the natural process of civilization according to the latter. Both the theories agree in supposing that man is capable of overcoming conflict and moving on to areas of agreement and peace. That is, law which by definition reflects public opinion takes the place of unimpeded individual caprice and conflicts can at least take on less violent and more civilized aspects. Metahistorians like Arnold Toynbee have imagined that in the vaster arena of rise and fall of civilizations there is a constant conflict going on, summarised in the expression 'challenge and response'. Challenge is a call to agree and where disagreement follows conflict results; and the defeat of the one or the absorption of the one in the other leads to the next stage in the history of civilizations. These theories at least show that historical speculation of a certain order deems conflicts as nearly inevitable and that being so the question of its desirability becomes irrelevant.

The problem of philosophical containment of the forces of violent conflict in society assumes two aspects. In the first place the less sophisticated, learned, sensitive and educated a person the more will be the chances of his quick submission to external forces of compulsion; the more learned, sensitive and reactive a person — such persons are by definition to be found in centres of higher learning — the less will be the chances of his meekly bending to opposing external authority. By the same token, however, it can be noticed that the less sophisticated will be more prone to physical and grass-root violence which is,

however, easier to control; while the mentally well-armed, equipped with a vast arsenal of logic and reason will fight subtle intellectual battles and be nearly invincible. They will be the certain worry of men anxious only to maintain order. To convert the Islamic prophet to the *ahimsā* of Buddhism or bend a Bertrand Russell to support war efforts would be equally difficult. On the other hand some of these intellectuals have themselves brought to surface latent social conflicts and in the process created new ones as in the case of a Rousseau or a Marx. After all in a world full of different convictions, to say that one is right and the others are wrong or at least partially so and, to start acting on that statement will be the sure way to create and sustain conflicts. *Conflict in society can cease only when life ends*; and it is worth investigating whether conflictlessness is under all circumstances a blessing. Conflicts arise largely because of an alleged sense of right, righteousness, justice etc. The makers of conflicts will justify them that way. A difficult moral situation can arise when one has to face the question of pacifically compromising with evil or having to fight it out. Passive resistance to evil involving suffering to the resister is only transference of suffering from others to oneself and not its abolition, i. e., the total quantum of suffering in society could remain constant though the methodology of battling with evil might be changed. The notion of a clearcut dichotomy between right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and evil, is a ready instrument for social conflict. If it could be agreed that there are intermediate standards of morality marked by unsuspected areas of variation and if one could generously concede the right of others to hold their convictions and act accordingly, there can be less of avoidable conflicts. But the nice balance between cultured gestures of agreements and stubborn resistance to difference is naturally known to a good conscience. Formal education and dissemination of philosophical knowledge may not be able to create what inherent character alone can.

What can ultimately be the justification for objecting to violence and oppression? The objection can be to avoidable physical pain among all and mental agony among a few and a sense of frustration among a still smaller number of persons. The latter two are as much the product of one's own voluntary stubbornness which should take into account natural and uncompromising reactions, as of imposed pig-headedness. The former must be mitigated and this could be done by common consent in a civilized society.

But it can be contended that a certain order of pain and suffering born of conflict is a law of nature like birthpangs in the physical world and the Hegelian triad in the metaphysical. If these are considered welcome inevitabilities in individual as well as social situations, there is

a case for being less concerned about social conflicts; and if that is done it might be a classical attitude of philosophical aloofness. But if philosophers could also be men of religion, hope of divine intervention to resolve human conflicts could be cherished. If on the other hand man is convinced about his autonomy he might start by reforming himself and the eschewing of violence in his social dealings, instead of preaching it to unwilling audiences. But each man, in the vast sea of humanity, is an individual, being endowed with the germs of good and evil and when his innermost self is attempted to be disciplined into an external category, coercion of the spirit follows. Acquiescence in such a situation entails mental agony and resistance results in physical pain.

Since the social situation is fraught with such delicate nuances as these, philosophy might ponder whether it will not be wiser to content itself with coming to terms with nature's realities remembering the limits of education. These limits will be decided by factors like how selfish and wicked man basically is and how far, example and precept can influence him for the better. In short the quantum of good that can accrue to society as a result of man's 'enlightened self-interest' has to be measured and channelised. The former can be done by a philosophers but the latter rests in the hands of statesmen. If the total achievement is to be gained by a single agency in society, it can only be the Platonic philosopher-king who has till now remained only within the pages of Plato's works.

C. P. M. Namboodiry

VALUATIONAL CONFLICTS

The value of conflict as a determining factor of existence had been recognised very early in the history of philosophy. One need only cite the Heracletean conception of *war* as the "king and father of all things" and the Sāṁkhya view of evolution as proceeding from the disequilibrium (*viṣamāvasthā*) of *guṇas* as examples of this. Though this vision was partially lost sight of by the later Greek philosophers in their exclusive adherence to justice and by the Scholastics through their embarassment when faced with the problem of evil, it never completely disappeared from the European philosophical consciousness. Manichaeism and the way it continued to haunt the theologian and the philosopher alike long after its condemnation provide evidence for this.[1]

And finally in the dialectic of Hegel it assumes overwhelming dimensions as the sole determining factor of history understood as the process through which the Spirit unfolds itself.

However, the analysis of conflict as a typical human predicament and prerogative is of comparatively recent origin. Like so much else in modern philosophy this too was initiated by the subjectivist revolution that was begun with Descartes. The conflict in the Cartesian doubt is a conflict in self-consciousness; it is individual, personal and reflexive; in other words, it is a human conflict. That Descartes himself and Cartesians in general were not aware of the full implications of this discovery only shows how fundamental the departure was that was hereby launched. This discovery of Descartes was shrouded and overwhelmed by the dogmatism of the Cartesian metaphysics and even the transcendentalism of Kant failed to grasp the essential

subjectivity but instead erected in its place the "disembodied thinker". It was left to Husserl and the phenomenological movement to discover the *ego* that was only faintly discernible in the *cogito*.[2] This ego is not merely the epistemological subject, nor the metaphysical spirit, nor even the synthetic unity of pure apperception; it is what is inserted and involved in the complex drama of human life; it is "life-experiencing-the-world" (*Welterfahrendesleben*).

Nowhere else is this "activity" of the man-in-the-world more evident than in human conflicts. Conflict is the prize man pays for his freedom. At the same time it is also the ultimate guarantee of his freedom. If man were a completely "natural" being, there would not be any occasion for conflict. But at every moment in his life, in every step that he takes, it stares him in the face. He cannot also afford to remain neutral here for in this his *being* is threatened. Nor can any power deliver him from the situation nor absolve him from the necessity of resolving the conflict one way or other. It is here that man discovers his true being, that he becomes aware of his freedom, however painful to him that awareness and discovery may turn out to be. If there were no conflicts to be contended with, if there were no such once-for-all situations, man would have remained just another freak of nature. He would have been nothing more than a thing among other things pushed and pulled by the inevitable causal processes of nature. Hence the irresoluble dilemma in the human situation: conflicts are what everyone wishes to avoid but only through conflicts is freedom possible.

Fortunately, conflicts abound in every human situation; man is perpetually in conflict, with himself, with other persons, with society. Hence there are psychological conflicts, aesthetic conflicts, even metaphysical conflicts. What is commonly termed social conflict may be either due to one of these or to a combination of them. What all these kinds of conflicts have in common is that all of them arise in a decisional situation; they demand a choice on the part of man. The alternatives before him may be goods or situations. They may demand either to be appropriated or to be realised. In any case, a choice has to be made whether it is between two existents, as happens in the case of a conflict between goods, or between two possibilities as in the case of a conflict between situations. On a still higher level is the conflict in what used to be called virtues. Here the alternatives are neither existents nor possibilities but are rather dispositions which demand to be actualised in oneself. These different realms of conflicts are not however isolated from each other. Conflicts in goods create situational conflicts which in their turn generate conflicts among virtues. Moreover, there may arise conflicts between constituents of different

realms cutting through the levels of stratification. Such are the conflicts between goods and situations or between goods and dispositions. What is common to all these conflicts is the claim, often antinomical in nature, that the alternatives exercise over man.

The alternatives in these cases have a sort of compulsion which is not in his power to resist. There is a demand in them before which man becomes utterly helpless and has to submit tremblingly. This demand is in the nature of an "ought"; it issues forth in the form of a directive to him. It is an imperative to transform the "is" into the "ought-to-be"; or better, to transform the "ought-to-be" into the "is". If there were no compulsion, demand and claim in the ought, no conflicts would have arisen. The ought here becomes irresistible because man sees in it the possibility of the fulfilment of his being. Whether this vision is in fact true or not and whether such fulfilment is at all possible it is irrelevant for our purpose here. What is important for us is only the fact that man feels, believes and is gripped by this certainly. He views the ought as something worthwhile, as something valuable. It is a value for him. We must be on our guard against a possible misrepresentation of man's position here. Though man recognises and discerns values it does not seem that he creates them. In this respect values seem to be as independent of man as are the objects in which they inhere. Man can neither create them nor destroy them. This is all the more evident in the case of moral values. These, unlike the goods-values and the situational values, inhere in the person; they are actualised in the conduct of a person. But even here the values are only actualised, not created. The truthful man, for instance, is not one who creates truthfulness in him but rather one who through his conduct actualises the ideal of truthfulness. Values in every case are ideals and man's function is limited to their actualisation.[5]

So then, most conflicts can ultimately be traced to conflicts in value or valuational conflicts. But this is only one half of the story. That there is opposition, at times even antinomical, among values cannot in itself be the explanation of human conflict. Values, as ideals, might very well be in conflict with each other; this need not in itself have any effect on the human situation. The conflict becomes a human conflict only when these values are sought to be realised by man. For the values themselves their actualisation or otherwise is of no matter; it is only for man that this is important. On the contrary, if the values in themselves were necessarily to be

realised, if there were some built-in teleology in them, then too there would be no occasion for conflicts.[4] Man, in that case, would be a mere tool, albeit a necessary one, in this process. That, however, is not the case. In the context of the realisation of these values man performs a pre-eminent function. Moral values have as their carrier man, the person, through whom alone is their realisation possible. Ontologically, man may be just another thing but axiologically man is supreme, for he has the power to determine the realisation of these values, the power to determine his future and through it the future of others too. Providence and fore-ordination, understood by the Scholastics as attributes of Divinity are no less so of man in so far as he too is a person. His alone is the prerogative to be " a colleague of the demiurge in the creation of the world."

This prerogative has its reverse side in man's responsibility, accountability and guilt. The conflict in values is not his creation nor is its annulment within his power. And yet his moral being is determined by this conflict and he alone is answerable for it. Faced with such conflicting values, each of which demands to be actualised through him, man becomes acutely aware of his predicament. The well-known instance of the "necessary life" is highly instructive here. Should the physician tell the truth thereby endangering the life of his patient that he ought to save ? Should one betray one's friend by divulging the information given in strict confidence ?[5] In these cases, of course, the values themselves do not conflict with each other ; rather the conflict arises from the situation. But there could be other conflicts which refer to the values themselves. Such, for instance, are those between justice and brotherly love or between nobility and modesty. Within each of these groups are compressed separate series of values amongst which also conflicts do occur.

Precisely how man should act when faced with such conflicts cannot be decided theoretically. The decision must be left to every individual and it must proceed from his valuational sense. No table of values fixed *apriori* can be of help here. Nor is a reference to conscience the answer, for, this turns out in the final analysis to be nothing more than a primal consciousness of value. In all conscience is presupposed a gradation of value and this can only be the outcome of the individual's valuational sense. Kant with his prejudice for intellectualism formalised this into the moral law thus overlooking the "matter" of moral consciousness.[6] He was justified in his insistence that the moral consciousness cannot be derived empirically ; this however does

not prove that it is empty of content.[7] The confusion here was between the empirical and the objective. For Kant whatever that is not at the same time presented to the senses is not objective and in this he included the ideal forms of values as well. It goes to the credit of Max Scheler to have exposed this confusion and called our attention to a "material ethic of values."[8] Just as there is a cognitive *a priori* there might well be an ethical *a priori*; while the former may be derived from "reason" the latter is derived from the valuational sense of man.[9] Every law, every commandment and all systems of morality are to be derived from this primary sense of value. They do not determine value; rather the values are what makes them significant. At the same time little do the events and situations of life determine the valuational sense; on the contrary, values are what impart meaning and life to them. In most cases this valuational sense does not manifest on the conscious level; yet no one is totally unconscious of it either. Moral conflicts would have been impossible without this underlying valuational sense.

The situation would have been different if there were a single concrete "supreme value". In that case there would be no occasion for valuational conflicts, for every value would then automatically fall into a fixed gradational structure thus providing a synthesis of values. But our valuational sense does not manifest the presence of any such supreme value. It is not very helpful to point to the "good" in this connection for, as is well known, this defies definition.[10] The content of the good is never something fixed; it varies from situation to situation. The good expresses only the direction of the moral consciousness and this is precisely what is to be determined. If, on the other hand, we turn to evolution of morality we find that a variety of supreme values have been recognised. The ethics of pleasure, happiness, wisdom, justice, brotherly love, purity and power are among the most well-known. The search for monism is a deep-seated human prejudice and every sector of human life has had to pay for it in the form of wild speculative constructions. But the hollowness of such constructions is nowhere more evident than in ethics.

Ultimately then man has to face these conflicts alone; the guidance can only come from one's own valuational sense. As conflicts in value constitute a constant phenomenon in man's life he gradually comes to acquire a fine sense of value. In this he is, to a large extent, helped by the morality of the society in which he lives. For it is a historical fact that every society has had its own peculiar moral sense. Of course, in a strict sense one should not speak of the

morality of a society. Morality and valuational sense can properly inhere only in persons; societies, on the contrary, are not persons, not even "persons of a higher order", for personality is grounded in the knowing and willing subject which society as such can never be. But on the other hand, the individual person as such is an abstraction. One is a person only in a situation and situations happen only within a social complex. This interdependence manifested in the solidarity, finds its most potent expression in social morality. In this sense and, in this sense alone, one may speak of the moral sense of a group like the family, union, community and so on. Like the moral sense of the individual this too is founded on and is derived from valuational discernment. Every society has had its distinctive morality and in all these can be found an exclusive adherance to certain values. All current morality attempt to achieve a synthesis by picking out one clearly discerned value and subordinating everything else to it. This monistic tendency is again the explanation for the narrowness, in-to lerance and dogmatism that is characteristic of most social morals.

The question why a certain society, or even particular groups within the same society, thus seizes a particular value in preferance to others, though interesting as a further elaboration of the valuational process, is one that cannot be settled with reference to our valuational sense alone. Marx found the explanation in the theory of "surplus value" and in the control of the means of production that results from it. But even this, though thoroughgoing and supported by some very persuasive historical credentials as it is, is still a "theory" and hence a construction. A phenomenological analysis cannot afford such luxuries. It can only point attention to the fact and must leave its "explanation" to metaphysicians for whatever they are worth. For all we know there amy be such determining factors at work within the social complex but as long as we do not evolve a precise methodological framework for their elaboration, the question must be left open.

If human society were completely determined by some such causal factors, the task for ethics would have been considerably light-ened. For then, like a well-constructed machine all the components would be working in complete unison. There would then be not any occasion for conflicts; the pre-established harmony would be a suffi-cient guarantee against their occurrence. Here again man's freedom proves to be the spanner that destroys the work. The morality of the individual is never completely determined by that of society; the phenomenon of the social rebel is neither rare nor always condemned in history. Every great leader has something of the rebel in him and almost invariably the rebellion is against the prevalent social norms. The fact is that even in the most coherent societies the individual

achieves only a kind of compromise with social morality; he never surrenders himself wholly to it. This compromise is not to be understood in an opportunistic sense as it is a necessity in man's moral situation. Yet, being compromises, they cease to have any inexorability about them. Moreover, there could also be a variety of such adjustments; between the two extremes of the individual and society there appear, a variety of intermediate units like the family, association, guild, union party, state and so on. All these represent their own different valuational trends within the collective unit and the individual is further obliged to interlace these with his own. Similarly the lower groups themselves have to be interlaced with the higher. With all these interconnections is born the "society" and it is this which makes it so complex and interesting. The valuational trend of a single individual must therefore cross at many points with other trends and it is no surprise that at times tensions do develop.

If these relationships were in some way teleologically determined there might still be room for conflicts. Only then the conflicts would be within a "system" and the inner dialectic of it would take care of their resolution as well. But here too it is the freedom of man that refuses to be so systematised. Into the causal determinism of nature he imports another determining factor — the teleology of freedom. A strict teleology of nature, if there were one, would still be only a pseudo-teleology; a teleology which is "rigid" becomes hardly distinguishable from causal determinism. The only significant teleology is the teleology of man and this is nothing other than man's freedom. This was the great discovery of Kant: the one obstacle to man's freedom is not causal determinism but the finalistic determinism, for this is what nullifies man's freedom, thereby rendering him superfluous.[11]

Thus the resolution of these conflicts does not lie within the domain of theory: freedom is the one factor that resists all theorising. All those "high-flying theories of world-improvement", those Utopian visions of social harmony, turn out to be merely visionary because of their total disregard for the determining power of human conflicts. In these, conflicts are branded evil and dimissed as a regrettable blot on the divine image of man. If all the conflicts were between the moral and the immoral, between the sense of value and the natural instinct, such a dismissal would have been justified, to some extent at any rate. But the specifically moral conflict is of a positivekind, between moral and moral, between one value and another, and no theory can dismiss it without at the same time de-humanising man, whether in an upward direction or in a downward one. The other extreme is represented by those philosophies where conflict is made

into a kind of supreme value. These equate man with the conflict itself and hold before him the ideal of anarchism in one form or another. Here man suffers a metamorphosis, one in the opposite direction to that at the hands of the purist. But what is forgotten here again is the freedom of man. Man is not merely the being who faces the conflict but also the one who resolves it; his humanity, his freedom, lies nowhere else than in such resolutions. Without conflicts freedom would remain an abstraction ; but conflicts are not what make man, it is freedom.

Philosophy, or in any case ethics, must be on its guard against such falsifications of the human situation. It must resist the temptation to idealise man in some favoured hue. It must stick to the phenomenon which in this case is man with all his virtues and vices. The other task, that of improving man and society, it must humbly be left to other disciplines with their better-suited methodology and equipment. It must content itself with the infinitely more complex task of "understanding" man and his situation. The pre-Socratic conception of philosophy as the "openness to Being" or the ancient Indian conception of *darśana* (looking at)[12] can still serve as pointers here. To this extent the Marxian thesis calling upon philosophers to "stop talking about the world" is to be welcomed. But the other half of this thesis is much misunderstood, What the philosopher ought to do is a "doing" of an entirely different kind ; it is not the doing of the social scientists, nor that of the catechising moralist, nor that of the metaphysical visionary. On the contrary what is to be done is to let the world speak *to* the philosopher and make him listen to it attentively.[13] This is how we may save philosophy from being a mere construction, ethics from being mere casuistry. For ethics, as Hartmann points out, "in itself is not at all normative, but only its subject-matter, the principle, of rather the realm or principles which it is to uncover."[14]

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. St. Augustine, for instance, was not only influenced by it in his youth as recounted by him in his *Confessions* but even his later writings show considerable influence of it. See Gordon Leff, *Medieval Thought*, Penguin Books, 1958, p. 34.

2. Husserl often refersto of Descartes as his predecessor, especially refers to *Cartesian Meditations*.

3. I do not enter into the question as to the precise nature of these values. Nicolai Hartmann takes them to be Platonic Ideas. (See *Ethics*, London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., Eng. trans., 1932.) One of the earliest

criticisms of this view was by Sidney Hook who alleged that behind Hartmann's apparently "natural" description of values lies a very question able metaphysics. (See "A Critique of Ethical Realism", *International Journal of Ethics*, XL, 1929-30) More recently Marvin Farber has argued that this view of Hartmann completely ignores the naturalistic and temporal origin of values. (See *Phenomenology and Existence*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p. 174.) The controversy here is between ethical realism (in the case of Hartmann, of the Platonic variety) and ethical naturalism. It seems to me that both these views are extreme positions. Values may not constitute a separate realm of essences but to view them as nothing more than another kind of natural product is to miss the uniqueness of man's ethical situation. Phenomenology as understood by Husserl consists in the rejection of such naturalism and psychologism. See Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Harper Torchbooks, Eng. trans, 1965, p. 79ff. From the standpoint of Platonism J. N. Mohanty finds much in common between the conceptions of the "ideal being" in Hartmann and Whitehead. (See *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead*, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1957.)

4. *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 228.

5. Among moral philosophers, perhaps only Kant gives a categorical answer to this question. (See his essay "On a Supposed Right to lie from Altruistic Motives", *Critique of Practical Reason and other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, Chicago, 1949.)

6. As Kant formulates it: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." H. J. Paton, trans., *The Moral Law*, London: Hutchinson, 1962, p. 88.

7. "The ethical *a priori* must be just as much rational and just as much in the form of a judgment as the theoretical *a priori*; for Kant it is inconceivable that a real *a priori* could exist in any other way." Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 175.

8. Especially in his *Der Formalismus in der Ethic und die materiale Wertethic*, Bern, 1954.

9. In the words of Scheler: "Even the emotional aspect of mind — feeling, preference, love, hate, volition — possesses an original character which it does not borrow from thought, and which ethics has to accept quite independently of logic. There is an inborn aprioristic *ordre du coeur, logiqe du coevr* as Blaise Pascal happily expresses it". Quoted in Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 177.

10. As is well-known, G. E. Moore demonstrated this conclusively by exposing what he termed the "naturalistic fallacy" inherent in all attempted definitions. See *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge University, 1962, chap. I. Hartmann too comes to the same conclusion by showing how the content of "good" forever remains inaccessible making it an empty concept. *Ethics*, Vol. II. pp. 66 and 171ff.

11. "What Kant's contemporaries felt as a deliverance in his theory of freedom was indeed a deliverance from determinism, not, however, from causal determinism, as is generally supposed but from finalistic determinism." Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. III, p. 72. Compare Neitzsche's outcry

in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, ii, 2. "What would there be to create, if gods existed!" Quoted in R. J. Hollingdale, *Neitzsche: The Man and his Philosophy*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.

12. To me this seems to be a much better translation than the usual "vision" with its rationalistic and mystic overtones. Etymologically too it seems to be more correct.

13. "... one might describe the underlying unity of the phenomenological procedures as the unusually obstinate attempt to look at the phenomena and to remain faithful to them before even thinking about them." Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, Vol. II, p. 700.

14. *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 63.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT : A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

H. M. Sadasivaiah

Great seers and philosophers in all ages have shown deep interest in the welfare of man. Great thinkers like the Buddha, Plato, Śaṁkara and Gandhi have expressed their deep concern at the disruptive forces in society. Philosophers have expressed their joy at events heralding new periods of peace and extension of human freedom. Kant hailed the French revolution with tears of joy. He hoped for a time when every man in every country would be "respected as an absolute end in himself." Hegel, in a burst of exuberance, planted a "liberty tree" in a public square as a salute to the new Republic of France, as heralding the "reign of Reason".

The purpose of this paper is to sociologically analyse conflict which is pervading in almost every field of modern social life. Further, it is proposed to indicate some sensitive points of conflict in our society and consider the possibility of philosophy offering suggestions in the direction of evolving solutions.

The 19th century sociologists paid much attention to social conflict. It was the theory of social Darwinism in many forms. This "conflict school" had various shades. At one extreme there was Ludwig Gumplowiz (1838—1909) who offered a bald parallelism between biological and social evolution. He asserted that the struggle of races, states and social groups must continue without termination. He denied the importance of the individual. He observed : "The individual plays the part of the prism which receives the rays, dissolves them according to fixed laws and lets them pass out again

in a predetermined direction and with a predetermined colour." Conflict constituted the central principle in his explaining political activity. For him the state was an inevitable product of "blunt natural laws" operating upon heterogenous social groups. For him, the state has no more relation to ethical consideration than an earthquake or a tornado. Further he refused to admit human progress. Conflict was the key explanatory variable for Marx. Max Weber considered that it could not be excluded from social life. He said "peace is nothing more than a change in the form of conflict or in the antagonists or in the objectives of conflict or finally in the chances of selection." However there was a remarkable change in the orientations of other propounders of the so called "conflict school". Vaccaro, Novicow, and Ratzenhofer contended that conflict is gradually transformed from the crude physical plane to a higher level of competition. They maintained that conflict ultimately ends in adaptation and cooperation. For most of them the transformation of conflict into alliance and cooperation is the outcome of social evolution. In American sociology Robert Parks reflects this opinion thus: "only where there is conflict is behaviour conscious and self-conscious; only here are the conditions of rational conduct." Later the study of conflict was not given importance due to its disassociative aspects. On the other hand there was a great stress on the need of common values and harmony. Modern sociologists like Talcott Parsons consider conflict as a kind of sickness in the body social. After the nuclear holocaust once again sociologists have been showing interest in the analysis of conflict. We may take Lewis A. Coser as a representative of this trend.

Broadly speaking conflict refers to a situation in which a person or a group is motivated to engage in two or more mutually exclusive activities. Conflicts may occur either at the behaviour level or at the verbal level or at the symbolic level. Coser defines social conflict as "a struggle over values or claims to status, power or scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals." Conflicts may be between individuals or between individuals and groups or between groups.

Conflict is an important element of social interaction. It does not always "tear apart". In fact social conflict may contribute in many ways to the maintenance of groups. It may cement inter-personal relations.

In this connection we have to separate the subjective and objective bases of conflict, in order to avoid excessive psychological

explanation of the situation. From the sociological point of view what is important is the structure of the conflict and the situation that gives rise to it.

Conflicts arise over the distribution of a great variety of scarce values and goods such as income, status and power, and domination over territory. Such occasions have to be analysed separately from dispositions like hostility, aggression and hatred. We may note, however, that conflicts and hostile sentiments are often associated. In fact they are different phenomena. In management conflicts, least hostile sentiments are present.

Coser makes a valuable distinction between Realistic and Non-Realistic conflicts. A realistic conflict arises when people clash in the pursuit of claims and expectation of gains. Here conflict is viewed as a means to achieving a set goal. There is scope for the choice of means. Non-realistic conflict arises from aggressive impulses that seek expression, no matter what the object. Non-realistic conflicts do not allow functional alternatives to means. They do not aim at concrete results. Thus for example in scapegoating, the object of attack is secondary to the dispositional need of the attack. In concrete instances, however, both are mixed. In many of the present day conflicts, the conflicts tend to be non-realistic, though they begin "realistically".

There is another point to be noted here. We have to consider the way in which men define a situation rather than merely the objective features of the situation. People may avoid conflict on account of the consequences or they may believe in the justice of the situation, i.e., distribution of the valued object. People believed in the justice of the *Varṇa* scheme for centuries. Further, a conflict may be intense, but it may not necessarily be violent. Violence refers to the choice of the means for carrying on the conflict. Thus intensity and violence may vary independently.

There is a close relationship between social structure and conflict. In loosely structured and open pluralistic societies, conflicts that aim at a resolution of tension have stabilizing functions. Direct expressions may serve to eliminate the causes for dissociation and reestablish unity. Further in flexible pluralistic structures, multiple affiliations of individuals make them participate in a variety of conflicts. There is a distinct possibility that the antagonists in one conflict may be allies in another. In the words of Coser "Segmental participation in a multiplicity of conflicts constitutes a balancing mechanism within the structure. In this way conflict may be said to sew pluralistic societies."

A rigidly structured closed group tends to absorb the total personality of the members and monopolises the loyalty of the members. The group denies legitimate outlets to hostility. When conflicts break out in such a group, they are likely to be intense. Marx's description of the historical process as a clash is in societies of rigid structure. Though he professed to draw the inspiration from the Hegelian historical processes of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis, he failed to see that the synthesis was the result of a certain common base in the parties to the conflict. Conflicts may arise from the pursuits of the interests of the various types of collectives: class—caste—labourers. "Intellectuals when they function as ideologists tend to strip such conflicts of their merely personal or merely interested aspects and transform them in the struggle over eternal truths." In pluralistic socities the role of the ideologists is likely to be less. It is in this field of providing a common basis, in providing a principle to achieve societal consensus that the philosophers have to play a significant role. They have to guide the statesmen to evolve a consensus which covers the various segments of society. Each society contains some elements of strain and potential conflict. Analysis of social change needs to focus attention on social systems, to check the growth of vested interests and to encourage creative reaction to changed circumstances. Such constructive functions can operate in a society with "consensus". "Consensus exists when a large portion of the adult members of a society, more particularly a large proportion of these concerned with decisions regarding allocations of authority, status, right, wealth and income and other important and scarce values about which conflict might occur, are in approximate agreement in their beliefs, about decisions to be made and have something of unity with each other and society as a whole." Such a consensus was achieved through the formulation of the principles of *dharma*, *svadharma* and *varṇa dharma*. Hindu society was harmonious when these principles permeated the life of the people both in letter and in spirit. When the vested interests crept in, the *varṇa* system, it degenerated into the caste system. The *varṇa* system, moreover, was eminently suited to simple, small homogenous human groups living in the rural setting.

Great philosophers and seers have pleaded for simplicity of life. Their philosophy is very well suited to a society which is not a mass society. The present urban mass society must be taken as a fact and the possibility of returning to small homogenous societes is very dim, as it would amount to putting back the clock of a dynamic society. It is in the light of this that the slogans like "Go back to the villages", "Start the industries in the villages" are not practicable. Apart from being uneconomic, when an industry is started in a village, it becomes an urban unit in a short time. It is not my purpose to highlight either

the defects of urban living or the excellence of rural life. We must take the urban setting as a historical fact and try to evolve a philosophy of life which should make the urban way of life harmonise with what man considers to be decent social existence.

Another aspect of industrialization requires our attention. Industrialization with the help of machines is an uninterrupted way of development in production. If not directly, at least as a concomitant of it, we have an "explosion of expectations" in the common man. In fact it is stated that hedonism is the inevitable result of industrialized mass production. The moral forces of the West expressed in the protestant ethic of "worldly asceticism" and "calling" could help only to produce more, but not to be unattached to the worldly wealth, and help the wealth for common welfare. Will our principle of 'non-possession' (*aparigraha*) be in a position to harmonise our zest for life and avoid the evil consequences of modern mass production? In other words, can we interpret or reorient the principle of non-possession in the light of modern conditions?

Village studies have shown that the prevalent quest for status in the rural areas is very intense and it is an impetus to hard work. But unfortunately the fruits of hard labour are spent in litigation and conspicuous consumption. It is true that their social calculations may be in accordance with their *mileu*. It is the task of the intelligentsia to make them aware of the wastefulness of their traditional pomp. A new way of life has to be envisaged whereby conspicuous consumption is not made an integral part of the status of the family or the group. This leads us to the necessity of understanding the dynamic forces in the rural area. We may take the example of caste to illustrate the point. It has been repeatedly stated that caste is the greatest hindrance to social justice and greater prosperity. We cannot solve the problem by a simple slogan "kill the caste". In this connection we have to bear in mind that specialization leads to some degree of stratification and ranking. Social and cultural diversities have to be articulated in all societies. It is true that strong rhetoric is needed to jolt an entrenched social system. But rhetoric may cloud the social perceptions of the people in authority who are subjected to ideological pressures for quick results. By simply arguing for the abolition of a social system they condemn, they are not solving the problem. One has to understand the actual working of the system and the points at which it possessses the functions which have gained it a following. Thus we have to understand the dynamic forces and evolve means to channel best those forces in the rural society. A new system of relations has to be evolved which provides advantages for all in society. Rural people have a desire to extend their previous ways rather than to take up to

totally new ways. There is a considerable cultural continuity in our changing society. What is required is a new philosophy of life suited to the entire society—rural as well as urban. The philosophical learning and wisdom which evolved the principles of *dharma, svadharma, etc.* and calling has to strive to shed new light on the path of human progress.

It was George Simmel who traced the evolution of political institutions through stages culminating in the rule of an impersonal objective principle. One of the main causes of subordination to an objective principle is the rule of law. It is the rule of law that secures the rights of man and makes democracy meaningful. The rule of law is an integral part of our social order. It is to secure greater integration of society that our state was proclaimed as a secular state. It allows greater liberty of religion. In a pluralistic society like ours, the concept of a secular state should help us for greater integration. The secular state divorces law from religion, so that law may become more comprehensive in its application. Philosophers may examine the implications and express their views on the necessity of a uniform legislation on personal laws.

In conclusion I wish to state that economic development should be in consonance with social structure. The values on which the social structure has to evolve have to be the result of the wisdom of the philosophers who are in a position to judge dispassionately the various elements involved in social conflict for the possession of scarce values. I am not pleading for the determination of any one factor in social life. A society has to achieve a consensus and harmony in social life by comprehending the various forces that operate in society and evolve a synthesis. It is in this vital evaluation of values that philosophers have to play a significant role.

K. Ramakrishna Rao

SOCIAL CONFLICT: SOME CRUCIAL ISSUES

Societies, like individuals, have personalities. The personality of a society consists of the various facets of social life which include the idea systems, values and norms implied in cultural roles, the institutional and organizational structures, the shared motives of its members and its characteristic way of life. Societies have problems which are much like the personality problems of individuals and a proper organization and balancing of the divergent values and the conflicting goals prevalent in a society are as important and necessary for the progress of a society as are the harmony and cohesiveness in the attitudes and motives of an individual for his psychological well-being. Societies too go through stresses and strains, experience conflicts and convulsions. Some of them degenerate and become delinquent in much the same way as individuals, even though the understanding of these in the case of a society is much more complicated.

Social conflict arises in the face of such incompatibilities as those between goals sought and instrumentalities available, between values cherished and programmes planned, and between values themselves. When such incompatibilities exist, society, like an individual experiencing psychological conflicts, dissipates its energy and resources and becomes unhealthy, breaks down and even disintegrates. The mental health of a nation like that of an individual depends on the stability born out of a resolution of the incompatibilities and inconsistencies. But, then, in all dynamic societies incompatibilites of various magnitudes exist. Without them a society becomes stagnant and sterile. Therefore, there is a need for adaptation - mechanisms that transform conflicts into constructive activities.

Problems arise when these adaptation processes fail. A failure is indicated not only when open conflicts such as between tradition and innovation, religion and science are manifest; but also when attempts are made to suppress divergent points of view and when irrational trends gain public acceptance and popular support. These are signs of social delinquency, and delinquency is maladaptation. Suppression sometimes will succeed in putting an end to a conflict but it is fraught with the danger of violent upheaval which results again in the failure of the adaptation process. When this happens society becomes less fit to adapt itself healthily to changing situations.

Modernization is an essential social process which makes it possible to resolve conflicts within a society without disturbing its stability and this in a way is similar to the way a stable individual gets over his psychological conflicts. Therefore, modernization should be something that is built into the very fabric of our societal structures and organisations. When this is not done progress instead of being balanced and evolutionary becomes uneven and unpredictable.

Communication is the main instrument of a healthy adaptation process. There can be no adaptation without understanding; and understanding is best promoted through rational persuasiveness. Therefore, no society can hope for healthy adaptive mechanisms without the necessary built-in communication systems.

Modernisation as an adaptation process is highly creative and requires the best of our minds to plan its strategies. It is unfortunate that we have paid little attention to this endeavour in spite of our awareness of it for a long time. As it is often pointed out, man has always known his surroundings better than himself. Our knowledge of and control over the forces outside of man are dangerously far ahead of those within. This pernicious imbalance poses the most serious threat to the adaptation process. Nothing is more urgent and vital to man's interests than bringing about national and international effort to bear on these issues. These are first and foremost academic issues and the intellectuals above all have the responsibility to evolve concepts and methods for their prognostication and resolution.

We tended to consider science as the saviour of man and yet found ourselves left with attitudes and behaviour patterns which antedate the advent of science. The incompatibility here is a two-tiered one. First of all, there is the incompatibility between the attitudes that govern our behaviour and the habits of mind necessary for the progress of science. This is further aggravated by the fact that our scientific understanding of man and society is dangerously behind our understanding of the natural forces.

This imbalance between our enormous grasp of and control over natural forces and the lamentable lack of a comparable understanding of human and societal forces is the cause of disturbing double-existences we often seem to lead. It is not uncommon to find a scientist working in his laboratory with a set of assumptions quite contrary to the beliefs underlying his behaviour at home. For example, as a biologist he accepts the theory of evolution, but at home does things that assume man's creation. Seldom does it occur to him that there is a basic incompatibility in his faith in creation and his belief in evolution. These two belief - systems exist side by side as two tightly insulated compartments. It is not uncommon to find such intellectual schizophrenics even among university men.

I suggest that the reason why people lead such double existences is to be found in our failure to think straight and scientifically when it comes to an understanding of our own selves and our problems. We scarcely attempt to apply even the knowledge we have of human nature in our daily lives. For example, those of us who have a role in electing our representatives to govern us hardly ever attempt a scientific evaluation of these men. We are mostly governed by our impressions and are swayed by emotions which we know are not reliable leads to decision - making. We do not attempt to understand the fears, the frustrations, the inhibitions and insecurities of men before we elect them as our leaders. We know what sort of steel is required to make a knife, build an engine or construct a bridge but we are loath to pay any attention to the type of men required to lead us. We know the innermost secrets of nature but little do we know what a man has inside of his mind. Today we have kept, at the disposal of a few men, frightening powers that could destroy nearly all life on this planet. Yet, we hardly have any control to ensure that these powers are never misused. Our confidence that these destructive capabilities will never be exercised is the confidence of the one who is too frightened to think otherwise.

The greatest problem that confronts man today is the potential threat to his survival. Men and governments living and labouring under such a fear and stress cannot be expected to act rationally. If the present trend continues it is only a matter of time before the fatal mistake is made and a mass suicide committed. What can we do to prevent this oncoming catastrophe? What old values and attitudes do we need to discard and which new ones should we develop and cherish so that man continues to survive happily on this earth? How can we bring about a conflict-free society where individuals work together for the common good without sacrificing their freedom and

individuality? I believe there is only one way; and that is working toward the evolution of a new generation which embraces cooperation as a pervasive value.

When men were few and resources plenty, success depended almost entirely on one's ability to bring forth all the energy he has. If this was done by motivating him through a spirit of competition it could not have done a great deal of harm. Considered as a virtue, competition had brought out the courage, the grit and the martial qualities in man which were at one time so essential to the taming of nature. But today when men are many and resources limited and when together they can achieve far more than what they can do individually, competition loses its instrumental value to promote man's welfare. More than that, competition often leads to exploitation and results in conflict which the contemporary society can afford only at its own peril. The unlimited destructive potentialities made available by modern science and technology makes any theory that regards competition central to progress not only obsolete but dangerous. Such a doctrine is intellectually indefensible and morally retrograde.

If competition is ruled out, cooperation should become central to all interpersonal relations. Radical changes in the way we bring up our children and educate them are called for. New values are to be created and new institutions developed to sustain them. There will be numerous hurdles that will hold us back. But, when scientific thinking replaces nostalgic reminiscences and when the drive to save man from the abyss into which he had fallen stirs him out of the satisfaction for the *status quo*, no hurdles would be hard to cross.

A lot of research would be required to learn how intelligent and purposeful cooperation can be promoted and sustained. This research by its very nature will be interdisciplinary covering most of the social sciences. This is because cooperation as a way of life encompasses the whole range of man and his activities. Cooperation as a way of life should be distinguished from cooperation forced on people by economic and political circumstances. The motive behind the latter kind of cooperation is not welfare in general but profit. Profit motive encourages only competition which is in itself the antithesis of cooperation. If members of a group cooperate among themselves in order to effectively compete with other groups it would not be cooperation but only an accentuation of competition. Therefore, the awareness of principles and a philosophy of cooperation for common good, and the cultivation of values consistent with such awareness should go along with cooperative activity.

As I said, cooperation is much more than economic cooperation. As a way of life, cooperation is an intrinsic and pervasive value. Irving Laucks has been saying, "Change human nature and save the world." The basic change Laucks advocates is from competition to cooperation. Competition has no place in a world of potential plenty. To quote Laucks, "Man's intelligence before long will succeed in providing sufficient food for as many persons as the space of Earth's surface will permit and to end starvation. The component elements of human food, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen are present in great abundance. It remains for the chemist to combine them to form suitable food." "Do unto others as what you would have them do to you", says Laucks, "comes pretty close to providing a practical basic policy for the behaviour of all humanity from individuals to nations."

There are in our societies built-in hurdles that stand in the way of purposeful cooperation. These hurdles are many and varied. We find them at the psychological, sociological, economic and political levels. These need to be identified and appropriate counter-measures need to be taken not only to neutralize them but also to promote those that foster cooperation. There are some fairly obvious ones. At the economic level, for instance, we find that private property and amassing of personal wealth are inconsistent with cooperation as a way of life. I wonder whether the reason why our cooperative institutions like the consumer cooperatives have not been able to function the way they should, is not that those who manage them have grown within a value-structure that accorded personal wealth a place of pride at the expense of honesty and truthfulness. When there is an opportunity, these managers have not hesitated to use the cooperatives for their personal and pecuniary gains rather than for the benefit of members. The fact that many of us who are intellectually convinced of the undesirability of private property have not missed many opportunities to acquire property clearly illustrates how social values tend to determine our life-patterns.

The reason why we hoard and accumulate personal wealth may be found in the fears and insecurities that men entertain concerning their future and also in the desire of parents to save for the children. Here the psychological and sociological factors converge. At the sociological level, the age-old institution of family deserves to be examined in the light of such developments as fertility control, artificial insemination and the possibilities for genetic control through molecular engineering.

The psychological anchor to which both the notion of private property and family are firmly hooked is the self. William James

defined self as the "sum-total of all that he can call his." The notions of "me" and "mine" as they grow in opposition to "he" and "his" might be after all the innocent - looking villains. The saving feature is that there is no inevitability about them as they are mostly culture-born. There is good empirical evidence in support of the contention of Charles Cooley and George Mead that the notion of self arises out of one's interaction with other people. Mead argues that a social process is the logical and biological precondition of the appearance of the selves of the individual organisms. He points out that mind develops and has its being only in and by virtue of the social process of experience and activity. If such is the case we cannot over-emphasize the importance of controlling the social environment in which the self-concept develops and the significance of the studies concerning child-rearing practices.

No less important are the development of methods and techniques that help achieve self-transcendence states. There is experimental evidence to show that meditation, for example, causes in the practitioner loosening of the ego boundaries. There is also evidence that certain drugs produce self-transcending states. More research into these is timely and could be very important in evolving the future universe of the cooperators.

Of equal importance is a philosophy of life and an ethical order that would encourage self-transcendence. While we have lamented that the so-called "other - worldly" philosophies so popular in India in the past stood squarely in the way of our economic and material progress, the concept of *vairāgya* and the *Gītā* ideal of *niṣkāma - karma* might become central to a philosophy of life that would move the adaptation wheels of the future society.

Here then is the role of religion. If religion should mean something more than superstition and dogma, it should be purposive and actional. Its purposes should be consistent with the ultimate goal of mankind and its practices, commensurate with the changing circumstances. This is possible when a religion is regarded not as embodying changeless essence but an attitude toward life, an outlook that facilitates the adaptation process. Religion as an outook would help to create and sustain an atmosphere in which men retain their responsibility of conserving, transmitting and expanding the heritage of their values. It was no accident that most religions gave a place of pride to asceticism. The need for ego-transcendence has been recognized by the religious leaders all over the world. Such a transcendence of immediate wants, egocentric utility, and temporal opportunism is necessary for the liberation of man from the existential impasse so

that he may be elevated to new heights from where new perspectives can be had.

Our views have implications for political institutions as well. The operation of cooperation as a pervasive value requires certain institutional changes. The forms of government practised today cannot provide the necessary structural and political base for the practice and promotion of cooperation. None of them seems capable of guaranteeing a world free from conflict. Capitalism is competition-based and is therefore conflict-prone rather than conflict-free. The signs of cracks that forewarn the collapse of capitalistic societal structures are clear and unmistakable. The hippy culture and the drug cults among the young and the educated are the maladaptive escape-mechanisms of people who are tired and sick of a competitive society. Healthy competition is at best an euphemism. It can be argued that healthy competition is a contradiction in terms on the ground that all competition is unhealthy.

Communism, as practised today, has become a victim of capitalistic value-orientation. Competition has been moved up to group and state levels from the individual levels. This could be even more dangerous, because groups are more powerful than individuals. Further, it results in a value-split and co-operation-competition ambivalence. Cooperation under pressure from a powerful authority is unintelligent and mechanical and cannot bring out the best in man. Thus, while capitalism will in future be buried under its own weight, communism may explode by its own pressure.

Socialism, conceived of as an intelligent and purposive cooperative activity, it seems to me, could conceivably be a workable alternative to capitalism and communism. But socialism will work within a system that ensures individual freedom. If this can be achieved through a democratic system, it should be vastly different from those forms of democracy which we see in operation today. There is nothing in the idea of democracy itself that would guarantee equality, freedom and fraternity. Have we not seen how some of the democratic countries of the West spread their colonial rule in Asia and Africa?

If by democracy is meant a political organisation where the attainment of freedom for the individual in ever-increasing measure is the objective, one must admit, the multi-party democracies of the capitalist and socialist types have failed us. They have degenerated into a scramble for power. The individual lost his identity and was burdened under the heavy weight of the institutions that he had helped to build. His freedoms are stifled by these very institutions which were

meant to safeguard them. Men have become masses, to our bitter realization, swayed one way or another by demagogy. The sovereign individual has become a legal fiction.

The single-party democracies practised by communist countries fared no better. They brought about new kinds of tyranny. The supremacy of the individual is sacrificed. The state instead of withering away became more powerful. In both the multi-party and single-party democracies, the distance between the decision-makers and the individual citizens is on the increase. We seem to need a new form of democracy which is not party-based, but one that promotes individual freedom, freedom defined as the removal of restrictions on the unfolding of man's potentialities. Neither a competitive society nor a totalitarian society can guarantee such freedom. Only a humanistic society where individual freedom is not merely a legal sanction but a living experience can be a solution. Humanistic socialism, then, may provide the necessary politico-economic climate for the successful implementation of cooperation as a pervasive value.

M. A. Faroqi

CONFLICT AND CONTROL: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPRAISAL

Three statements can be made without offending too many of the eminent scholars assembled here regarding social conflict. One, it has existed in human society at most periods of recorded history. Two, it is known to take varied forms. Three, man has always tried to combat social conflict. A clear understanding of the phenomenon requires a thorough analysis of our concepts of social conflict and also a more thorough analysis of our motivations and intentions in this regard. In my opinion, many efforts so far have not met with high degree of success because of the failure to clear the conceptual and motivational decks. Imprecise terminology or the over-inclusive and ambiguous usage of words, in my opinion, have been a source of much confusion and wasted mental effort. We might learn a lot about conflict if we could identify the type or types of situations to which the term shall apply. What I am referring to is not a mere semantic refinement, important as this is. We have a lot to gain by more precise conceptual formulations.

It seems to me, the term *conflict* is used in at least three distinguishable ways. (1) It is used to refer to incompatibility of systems of behaviour or to incompatibility of elements in a system of behaviour, as for example, when one's needs are incompatible with one's values or when two needs are incompatible in the sense that they lead to behaviour which are at a given moment exclusive. Of course the inconsistency may be between the needs of one person and values of another person; or two persons may have the same needs but the environment cannot satisfy them both at the same time.

(2) The second usage seems to refer to behaviour on the part of a person or group of persons incompatible with the satisfaction or

health and happiness of another person or group. This is what most psychologists call aggressive behaviour. When we isolate behaviour of one person or group, the term *aggression* is used. When both parties show mutual aggression the term *conflict* is used. Whether aggression necessarily leads to conflicts is an empirical question that need not concern us for the time being. Further, whether incompatibility of values, needs, etc. leads to aggression is a question worth asking —without mixing up one with the other.

(3) The third usage of the term conflict is to refer to a *social or societal condition* that produces incompatible needs and values. This is an important aspect no doubt, but I see a big gap here between a potentially conflict-producing condition and the actual generation of conflict. Especially, I am thinking here of the many mechanisms which nature has bestowed upon human mind to get round, avoid or evade conflict (Festugir, Freud).

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Cognitive Mental
Dissonance Mechanism

Please permit me to use the second meaning of the term, namely, conflict in its aggressional connotation. The choice is due to my personal preference.

However, if we did a certain amount of introspection, we would notice that much of our concern with conflict has to do with its direct or indirect potential for violence and aggressive behaviour in society. This is good justification for our social concern. But I submit, however, that there is no justification for mixing up the plausible cause with the observable phenomenon.

At a certain level of abstraction we can classify instances of social conflict as *overt* and *covert*. Each of these could be further subdivided into individual and group manifestations. This kind of analysis does not really take us much farther because questions regarding interrelationships arise. These are important questions.

Postponing for the time being an analysis of their inter-relationship, we can discuss the patterns of conflict in society in terms of the above four-fold classification. In more conventional usage, the covert individual aspect of conflict refers to prejudice. Covert conflict at the group level refers to the shared perceptions and emotions. These are covert only in the sense that they do not manifest themselves overtly. Or more precisely, their manifestation remains too indirect or subtle.

Social conflict may manifest overtly in diverse forms. At the individual level there is withdrawal from interaction or negative pattern of interaction. At the group level, the manifestation may be

more violent and dramatic. It may be more or less shared and organised.

As many of you are aware, one of the most fertile areas of research on the causation of social behaviour has been the study of factors associated with group prejudices. I shall not attempt the impossible task of summarising this vast literature or of bringing out every nuance and shade of the findings. There is general agreement among psychologists that roots of prejudice lie deep in the dynamics of the individual personality. Different dimensions of personality, in particular those that make up the complex called authoritarianism, are most frequently associated with *ethnocentrism* (Adomo etc., 1950). The effect of such factors is that a person who shows prejudice against one group, often has latent or expressed prejudice against many other groups.

The relationship in reality is much more complex but this pattern of data has led to the formulation of what is very disparagingly called the scapegoat theory. In a study of racial prejudice among American war veterans, those whose social status had deteriorated after war were more prejudiced compared to those who had improved or remained at the same level. (Bettelhien & Janowitz, 1950). Psychologists have also demonstrated the relationship between experimentally created frustration and increase in prejudice-like behaviour (Miller and Bugelski, 1948).

It should be expected that we can learn a lot about the dynamics of social conflict by a close study of the formation of social attitudes among children. Many studies, both in India and elsewhere have approached this problem from this point of view. We have learnt a lot from these studies. But I shall point to only a few of these findings. Children learn to express verbally many prejudices and intergroup rejections—even before they learn to identify correctly the members of the group against whom the statements are being made. In other words, the child learns prejudice-statements much earlier; the emotional content and the cognitive reference comes much later.

The second important finding we have, from a study done in Madras city, is that at the very early age of eight years, children have

a pattern of prejudices, i.e., recognisably similar to the patterns prevalent among the adults in the community (Vyas, 1972). The third important conclusion has to do with the relation between overt and covert prejudice at the individual level. The relationship — never perfect — is a growing and emerging one.

Overt conflict: Overt manifestation of social conflict at the individual level may take the form of either withdrawal from association or more frequently aggressive behaviour. The relationship between covert and overt conflict at the individual level is not direct i.e., one who has a prejudiced attitude does not always show aggressive behaviour. Certain conditions have to be present before underlying attitudes show themselves in the form of overt social hostility. We can think of certain factors as *inhibiting* social aggression. (Berkovitz, 1962).

We can move on to the covert forms of conflict at the group level. When a certain pattern of prejudice is widespread, when certain groups arouse similar cognition reactions from large segments of the population we begin to feel that there may be something more than repeated manifestation of individual prejudice; we begin to call it the group-reaction; Hartley to whose investigation of social distance, I referred to earlier, found that the overall social distance for different ethnic groups and nationalities was similar in different types of American colleges and universities. Other investigators too find considerable agreement regarding the stereotyped ways of evaluating various communities. The remarkable thing is that most persons are ready to make these judgments and equally remarkable is the large amount of agreement they show. At this stage it is a moot point whether individual perceptions ead to the prevalent stereotypes or the stereotypes predispose a person to see certain groups in a certain light.

Finally we can go on to social conflict in its overt group manifestations. Often this is what most of us mean by social conflict. It ranges from social isolation to mob violence and lynching, from rupture of diplomatic relation between two nations to murderous wars between them. Certain social-cultural conditions that enhance social conflict in these forms have been isolated and I shall analyse them later. To anticipate, we find that differences between two groups — differences in

values, norms and in characteristics are a primary but not sufficient condition for conflict. Often differences lead to or accompany social isolation. Differences do not necessarily lead to active conflict. On the other hand, friction is produced when the two parties have psychological communality with reference to some aspects of their life and when differences in some other aspects frustrate the cherished goals of one or both groups. For those who are interested in the analytical study of inter-group conflict, one of the best sources remains in the study of Sheriff and Sheriff (1953). In a field experiment with adolescent boys they demonstrated that established friendships could turn into indifference but not so easily into hostility by the simple expedient of dividing the groups into two insulated units. Even simple competition did not generate hostility. However, when the competition was carried on over a long period and when games were won by each sub-group repeatedly outsmarting or deceiving the other, hostility was produced. These authors have designated such competition, as *frustrating competitions*. The climax of their experiment came when the authors devised ways and means of reestablishing the lost attraction between the boys.

Interrelationships: One of the most difficult problems in the psychology of social conflict has been the interrelationships between the four forms of social conflict. Do negative perception lead to negative behaviour? Can perception be changed by actual experience? Does overt - conflict come - first perceptions acting as rationalizations? Or do negative stereotypes lead to eventual hostility?

These are questions of fundamental significance — both theoretically and from a practical point of view. Some of them resemble the legendary *fowl vs egg* question.

The biggest *fowl vs egg* question has to do with the relative contribution of the needs, motivations and frustrations to overt group manifestations. I have already quoted the type of evidence on which the "pure drive" theory of conflict thrives. There is also a "pure stimulus" conception of group conflict which I have not examined in any detail. Neither the pure "drive" nor the pure "stimulus" conception survives under close scrutiny. Motivational factors acting on the individuals—sometimes acting in common on fairly large numbers of the population provide the energy. But rejection and conflict do not occur at random

in a group (Faroqui, 1960). Certain characteristics of the target object vis-a-vis the motivated person, determine both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of the conflict between them. A person or a group, will bear the brunt of attack in proportion to its being seen as a source of the group's frustration. From this point of view it is irrelevant whether in fact the group is in any measure responsible for the frustration. As I already said strangeness and difference in themselves do not lead to conflict. But when holding a different opinion is seen as an actual or potential negation of one's own values, difference implies frustration and the one holding the different opinion is the agent of one's frustration. The contribution of visible signs of difference, such as difference in appearance, in practice, in language etc., must be seen in this light. Those who are prejudiced are more sensitive to the difference. For example, in American studies, antisemetic subjects are more accurate in judging the religion of a person from a photograph. They are more apt to attribute to an ambiguous stimulus the characteristics which they are prejudiced against (Berkonwitz, 1962, p. 149.)

The above discussion permits us to conclude that psychological and situational factors interact with one another and that in producing the pattern of social conflict one encounter takes place at given time and place.

Solution of Conflict : Attempts to reduce conflict have been made from time to time by social psychologists as well as others. We have learnt a lot about the dynamics of conflicts from these efforts.

Some of the least effective measures have tried to alter individual prejudices by argument, by sermons and by other appeals. Prejudice has defence-mechanisms of its own. The person accepts the appeals and puts them in a mental compartment that enables him to retain the new information as well as the prejudice. There is doubt not whether information is useful but rather about the degree of utility.

(2) Stereotyping — the tendency to collectivise our perception of people—has been singled out for attack. During and after the second world war, American press and mass media resolved to minimize the the caricatured treatment of ethnic minorities. By its nature it is difficult to say how effective this has been in reducing prejudice.

(3) Attempts to alter prejudices by personal contacts too have not been too successful. The opinion among psychologists seems to be that mere exposure or familiarity does not help. Interaction of a satisfying kind, of a kind that reduces frustration and threat of frustration is needed here. Otherwise, contact could be more harmful than isolation.

(4) From the work of Sheriff and Sheriff (1953) and the work of Deutsch (1948) we conclude that individuals and groups in *promotive interdependence* are likely to avoid an international conflict. We can call this cooperation; sometimes this is called the technique of superordinate goals.

(5) One special instance of superordinate goal is an external threat or danger common to the parties in conflict. However, external threat does not always eliminate international dissent and conflict—though it may change the manner of its manifestation or even suppress it temporarily.

(6) We saw that differences in values and goals themselves do not lead to conflict. Conflict comes only when one value is seen as the negation of another value. Psychologists have identified a frame of mind which they call the *closed mind* which defines things in absolutist black/white terms.

(7) In studies of aggression among children, one of the most important common factors is the aggressive model. The inescapable conclusion is that the forms in which social conflict will manifest itself in the life of our children tomorrow depends upon our behaviour to-day.

(8) Allow me to conclude by alluding to what has been referred to in the literature as the positive value of social conflicts. The supposed positive effects of external conflict upon internal structure were referred to by Carter as not genuine effects. Social psychologists especially in the applied sphere, point out that conflict like high temperature in the human body, is an indicator of structural imbalances. Attempting to contain conflict without going to the root of the structured matter is an exercise in futility.

(9) This leads me to mention the view-point that conflict is seen under some conditions as pro-social aggression—as the group's energy, active in the service of its primary norms (Berkowitz, p. 273). It can be seen that the so-called positive fiction of conflict refers to the protective and defence mechanisms of the society and not to *intra* and *intergroup* hostility that we are concerned with.

The situation, of course may be very happy if we were in a position to identify and sort out the different sources of conflict. This it seems to me is the crux of the whole problem.

R. Sundara Rajan

FOR MARX

The present paper seeks to move on two levels: first, on the theoretical plane and second, on the interpretative level. In regard to the first, I wish to emphasize the structuralism of the Marxian theory of social change and conflict and in regard to the second, I would like to consider the applicability of such a Marxian structuralism to the analysis of social conflicts in Indian society. But, it is necessary, at the outset, to pave the way for a serious consideration of the Marxian theory as an analysis of social change. It seems to me that this can best be done by way of a critique of functionalism. It is a trite criticism of structural functionalism of the Parsonian variety to say that it is static, that it ignores change etc. Certainly such criticisms are theoretically naive for as Francesca Cancian has recently argued, functional analysis can easily treat of change and indeed the charge of static bias is misapplied when we remember that functionalism as Parsons applies it is specifically designed to explain processes. A functionalised theory, as Merton and Nagel have codified it, is concerned with showing how an end state or goal state G is maintained by compensatory changes in the co-ordinates of the system in response to certain environmental fluctuations. That is, a system S is a functional system if a certain state G is maintained by means of compensatory changes in certain other variables of S, which changes compensate for random fluctuations in the environment of S. This scheme at once brings out the processual character of functionalist theory and hence the gross charge that functionalism cannot deal with change is to that extent misapplied. However, the criticism may be reformulated so as to have greater pertinence. In replying to the charge of static bias, Parsons writes "Structure does not refer to any ontological stability, but only to a

relative stability in the results of underlying processes so that their constancy within certain limits is a pragmatic assumption." Parsons has also conceded that the next step in the analysis is the search for the dynamic elements in the social structure, but it is precisely here that there occurs the crucial mistake of functionalism. The dynamically variable elements are related to the structure by means of the concept of function. In effect this means that only those dynamic factors which serve to maintain the structure, only those elements of change and process which have a functional significance for the system are singled out. It is sometimes said Parsons neglects exogenous factors of change. But it seems to me that this is not the main issue. If we are to have a genuine sociological theory of change the impact of exogenous factors must be conceptualised in terms of factors within the system. Hence it is not as much the fact that Parsons' dynamic factors are endogenous as the fact that such factors are held to be functional in the maintenance of the system that is the crucial point. An adequate theory of social change must be a theory of structural change; this means, firstly, that the factors initiating change must be within the system, having a structural location and secondly, the endogenous factors must be capable of transforming the structure of the system, under certain given conditions. A theory of structural change is necessary for, as Radcliffe Brown once noted, social systems, unlike organisms have the capacity of changing their structural types: indeed, it is precisely this property of creating new structural forms, or what may be called morphogenesis, which Derrida and Godelier regard as the distinctive features of social systems. This suggests in passing, a certain line of criticism of Coser's conflict theory. From the structural point of view the crucial question is not whether a theory includes dissent and conflict but rather the analytical use of the concept of conflict. But in Simmel and much more so in Coser, conflict is itself regarded in functional terms as serving (under certain conditions) to maintain the integrity of the system. After all, we must remember that Simmel regards conflict as a form of socialization. Hence Coser's theory of function of social conflict is still well within the limits of structural functionalism; in no sense has it superseded the Parsonian model. Furthermore, no terms of the logic of functionalism, the goal state which is being maintained, need be a state of equilibrium or stability; it could as well be a condition of conflict and dissent. Thus, the genuine functional question would be how this state of conflict is being maintained. But the answer to such a question must inevitably transcend Coser's theory; indeed, such a question can be raised only within a Marxist perspective.

But functionalism has one very important contribution to make viz., the idea of structure. Functionalism, from its very inception, in

the works of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown has always insisted upon the systematic and structural character of societies, upon the fact that the parts of a social system are integrated and structured with the other parts. This insistence upon structures was opposed to the earlier emphasis upon diffusion and in anthropological theory especially there has been a futile debate over the diachronic perspective of evolutionism and the synchronic emphasis of functionalist theory. But this opposition between the diachronic and the synchronic is a false opposition for evolutionary or diachronic theory holds that a system S at time t_1, which was characterized by properties F_1, F_2 and F_3 evolves into a system S_1 at time t_2 with the properties F_4, F_5, and F_6. Implicitly, in this very scheme, an element of synchronic structuralism is contained for both at t_1 and t_2, the system S and S_1 are structures of properties F_1, F_2 and F_3 and F_4, F_5, and F_6 respectively. Conversely, a synchronic functionalism which holds that at time t_1, a system S_1 is an integrated set of properties F_1, F_2, and F_3 would imply that if F_1 were to change into F_4 at time t_2, a different system S_2 with a different structure would result, i.e., synchronic functionalism has an implicit diachronic system about it. Hence the two structures and change need not be opposed as antithetical; indeed they cannot be so opposed for neither structure without genesis nor genesis without structure are tenable. On the contrary, we require a theory of structural change or what Piaget has called "genetic structuralism". The theoretical and philosophical implications of genetic structuralism would be pointed out in what follows, but at present, I wish to consider the Marxist theory of social change from such a structuralist point of view.

It seems to me that such a structural theory has three main tasks: (1) it must indicate the services of strain and conflict located within the structures of the system undergoing change (2) it must further indicate the agents of the conflict situation and (3) it must describe the pattern of the conflict relationship and its possible terminal stage. As applied to Marxist theory, this means that we must emphasise the structural contradictions within the system, the theory of classes as conflict groups and the theory of the class war.

Regarding the structural sources of conflict, it may be noted that any theory of social conflict must locate the sources of strain within the system itself in the form of a structural antagonism and at the same time, must show how the structural strain is manifested at the level of conscious group action. This means that such a theory must be in general a two-level theory and from the point of view of the classic Marxist model of basic and super-structure, appears to be the

general form of any such theory. It is to be noted further that in this model, the source of conflict is located within the basis itself i.e., between the sources of production and the relations of production. At the same time, the concept of the relations of production has a social aspect. Marx's way of marking this is to hold that the property relations of a society are the legal expressions of the relations of production. This structural conflict is expressed at the superstructural level in the form of ideological clashes and rivalries ; these ideological forms or manifestations of conflict add the dimension of subjective meaning to the structural contradictions. In passing it may be noticed how neatly the Marxist theory assimilates Goser's much vaunted distinction between realistic and unrealistic conflicts and at the same time annuls the false opposition between them, for in Marx every conflict has a realistic (basic) and unrealistic (ideological) aspect. Of course, vulgar Marxism has often tended to belittle the superstructural elements, but this is not a theoretical necessity for the Marxian scheme. Marx and Engels themselves have recognised the kind of autonomy the superstructure has and in recent years, there have been a number of Marxist studies of the ideological elements. I need only mention here the linguistic studies of Vygotsky and Adam Schaff, the aesthetic analysis of Lukaes and the psycho-analytic studies of Fromm and Lacan. The superstructure is not an amorphous epiphenomenon but has its own peculiar structure and form and has a complex set of structural relations with the basis. Hence the Marxist pattern of analysis recognised this double orientation. But of course, this does not mean that there are no further problems and theoretical perplexities left. On the contrary, it is precisely here that we have some of the most serious difficulties of the Marxian theory. I said earlier that an adequate theory of structural change must also identify the agents of conflict and here the Marxian theory of class fulfills the requirement. But with regard to the notion of class in Marxist theory, we have to keep in mind three things : 1. As Ralph Dahrendarf points out, the notion of class within the Marxist scheme is a theoretical or analytical construct and hence should not be confused with the description of social strata. This distinction between the theoretical concept of class and the descriptive concept of social starta is important because stratification is a continuum, whereas in the theoretical scheme, there can be only two antagonistic classes. The Marxian two-class model is a theoretical postulate and not an empirical generalization. (2) Secondly, we must also distinguish between Marx's theoretical use of the notion of class and his own historical-descriptive use of the concept, as for instance, in " The Eighteenth Brummaire ", Several Marxist critics have pointed out that in his more purely historical writings, Marx distinguishes not

just between two classes, but at least four—the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the landed nobility and the small scale peasantry. But this is not a contradiction, for the two-class model is Marx's theory, while the 18th Brummaire is a historical account, and within the theory itself, there is a significant suggestion which explains the discrepancy between theory and empirical narrative. It is well known that Marx distinguishes between the class in itself and the class for itself, i.e., between an objective situationally determined class position and a subjective class-conscious identification of that position. This theory of class-consciousness is, of course, the major contribution of Lukacs. Now, the interesting point to note is that according to Marx, class-consciousness is not merely or mechanically determined by the objective situation. His example of the French peasantry is a case in point. Where there is a discrepancy between objective and subjective determinants there could well be many more classes subjectively considered than just two. Hence, the two-class model does not contradict the recognition of other classes, as the theory itself explains how this discrepancy comes about and no theory can be said to be simply rejected by a phenomenon which the theory itself explains. Hence, a whole host of conventional criticisms of Marx are beside the point. Thirdly, regarding the theory of class in Marx, we must analytically distinguish between the formal or structural and the substantive aspects of it. From a structural point of view, a conflict has to be conceptualized in terms of two antagonistic groups, but the substantive identification, i.e., the empirical determination of these contending groups is another matter. As is well known, Marx gives a substantive determination of a class in terms of the presence or absence of the ownership of the means of production. But this substantive identification is not tied up with the theoretical necessity of a two-class analysis. Indeed, as Dahrendarg suggests, the post-Marxian separation of ownership and control renders the property criticism inapplicable, but nevertheless the analysis of a conflict-situation still requires a two-class model. The importance of this major criticism of Dahrendarg lies in that by freeing class the theory from an overly restrictive property qualification we can actually sustain a class analysis for even post-modern social conflicts.

The third task, as I see it, of an adequate theory of structural change is to explain the patterns of such conflicts and here the Marxian theory of class war is the appropriate response to this need. As is well known, Marx postulated a progressive intensification of class-antagonism, ultimately leading to an all-out class war out of the holocaust of which a new structure will emerge. The theory of linearor progressive intensification or explanation of class conflicts, it seems to me, will have to be refined in certain important ways.

Usually the theory of escalation is understood as the theory of the increasing misery of the proletariat. But understood in this simple-minded manner, the thesis has turned out to be false, as Bernstein and the other early revisionists long ago pointed out. But recently Godelier and Wilden have remarked that in Marx's theoretical scheme, there are two types of contradictions of that principles of the antagonism. The first is the class opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Very often this alone is considered to be the dynamic element in Marx but as Godelier argues. this is not the most fundamental in Marx's theory of conflict, for the principles of class antagonism or opposition is a principle of negative feed-back ; left to itself, this could act as a stabilising force. The same remarks could be made regarding the Marxian theory of economic crises also. Very often crises are regarded as the ultimate sources of change and transformation in the Marxian theory. But I wish to show by way of a brief analysis that contrary to appearances, economic crises, function as a regulating device. A crisis is simply an expansion of production beyond what the market can absorb and still return an adequate rate of profit. Once over-production occurs even in only one segment of the economy, it can set into motion a vicious circle of reactions. As the rate of profit falls, investments decline, part of the labour force has to be laid off which further diminishes consumer purchasing power, producing another decline in the rate of profit and so on. The spiral continues until unemployment has increased to such a degree and the wages of those still in work have been forced down to such a level that there exist new conditions for the creation of an increased rate of surplus value and thereby a stimulus to the resumption of investment. During the crisis, some of the less efficient enterprises will have to go out of business; those remaining can therefore take over their share of the market and are in a position to begin a new period of expansion. Thus, the cycle is renewed and another upward phase gets under way. Crises, therefore, do not represent the 'breakdown' of the capitalist system, but on the contrary form the regulating mechanism which enables the system to survive the periodic fluctuations to which the system is subject. The effect of a crisis is to restore equilibrium and to make further growth possible.

The real source of the constant or perpetual drive is to be located in deeper layers. In *The Capital,* Marx uses the principle of the falling rate of profit to elevate the exponential theorem regarding the rate of exploitation. The derivation may be explained as below : According to the labour theory of value labour is the only force capable of creating surplus value. Surplus value is the source of profit ;

it is so to speak, the visible or surface manifestation of surplus value. The amount which the capitalist has to spend on hiring labour is only one part of his capital outlay. The other part consists in the machinery, raw materials, maintenance of factory fittings, etc., necessary for production. That segment of capital laid out on such matters is *constant capital* while that spent on wages is *variable capital.* Only *variable capital* creates *surplus value.* Now, the rate of surplus value is the ratio of surplus value to variable capital : S/v ; As against this the rate of profit can be calculated only with regard to both constant and variable capital, i.e., the rate of profit $P = \frac{S}{C} + V$. The ratio of constant to variable capital constitutes the organic composition of capital and since the rate of profit depends upon the organic composition of the capital, it is lower than the rate of surplus value. Its formula is therefore $P = \frac{S}{C} + V$. From this it follows that if the expenditures on constant capital were to increase, if C were to rise, the rate of profit would fall, and Marx held that capitalist expansion has a tendency to raise C. He therefore believed that as capitalism advances, the rate of profit tends to fall and this leads to increasing exploitation of labour in order to offset the falling rate of profit. For our present purposes, we note how Marx connects the sociological thesis of escalation of class-conflict with the economic law of the falling rate of profit. But unfortunately the theory of the falling rate of profit, Mrs.Robenson has argued, is not tenable as a principle of economic analysis. Hence, we must give this a more general or abstract expression and I venture to suggest that in *Grundrisse* 94-95 and 121 we do in fact have such a more general formal principle of perpetual transformation. In these sections, Marx speaks of the irrelevant tendency of capitalism to expand, the structural capacity of explosive growth in the capitalist mode of production. It may be observed that this principle of explosive growth is not tied to the economic doctrine of the falling rate of profit. Rather, the principle is expressed in purely structural terms. Understood in contemporary terminology, this second contradiction which Godelier points out, acts as a positive feedback and it is this which accounts for the thesis of linear escalation, in such a manner that we can theoretical by rescue the model of the binear pattern of conflict development. It may be noticed that such a structural modification of the Marxist scheme saves it from at least one criticism urged by Dahrendarg—namely, that the thesis of increasing immiserisation is the weakest link in the Marxist theory of social conflict. If what I have suggested is acceptable, then it is not necessary to hold on to the thesis of immiserisation. The thesis of increasing misery and the associated idea of absolute deprivation are actually inconsistent with a theory of revolution,

for a revolution breaks out not in a condition of absolute deprivation, but periodically, only when this native point has been passed and things are beginning to improve. This is indeed the fundamental insight of Alexis de Tocqueville. I suggest, therefore, that the concept of relative deprivation, rather than absolute deprivation, is more useful for a radical theory and in the concluding section I shall suggest certain possible lines along which the concept of relative deprivation can be used. But at present I merely wish to point out that the Marxian pattern of development of conflicts can be freed from overtly restrictive and possibly false empirical assumptions.

II

In the above section I have attempted to look at the Marxist scheme of social change from a structuralist point of view and have hence emphasized three aspects of the theory, namely, the theory of structural contradiction, the theory of classes and the theory of the linear development of class antagonism. For, any theory of structural change must specify the source of conflict, the agencies of conflict and the pattern of conflict development. But in considering these three aspects of the Marxian theory, we have encountered various difficulties at each one of these stages and I have also made a few suggestions as to how these difficulties can be met. In effect, what I have tried to do is to free the Marxian structural postulates from their overtly restrictive empirical specification. To illustrate, I have suggested that we can free the two-class model from the empirical specification of classes in terms of possession or non-possession of the means of production and similarly I have suggested that we can free the theory of linear development of conflict from the empirical thesis of the falling rate of profit. In effect, this procedure involves making the theory more abstract and more formal. To view the Marxist theory as a structural theory therefore involves the readiness to formalize it. But now against any such attempt, the charge of revisionism may be levelled. The accusation of revisionism has been an endemic source of embarassment in the history of the development of Marxism and the charge has meant many things to many people. But the core of the revisionist charge, I think, amounts to this : With regard to any proposed modification of the original classical Marxist theory, it is said that such a proposal tends to deradicalize the theory. In contemporary Marxist debates, the charge of revisionism is usually brought forward against attempts to introduce a humanistic dimension to Marx. For instance, both Althuser and Adam Schaff, in different ways, have accused the revival of the early Marx as a symptom of a new revisionism. But in our case, there is a peculiar dilemma, for the above attempt is an attempt not to introduce the early Marx's problematic but an attempt to pre-

sent Marxist theory as a general theory of structural change and my embarassment consists in having to face up to the charge of revisionism precisely in this attempt to "sociologize" Marx. In other words, it is not so much the philosophical-humanistic dimension of Marx that tends to deradicalize him but rather the sociological dimension.

I first wish to make this suggestion somewhat more acceptable by way of a brief consideration of some recent attempts at Marxian interpretation. Herbert Marcuse, for example, at one level has been quite explicit about the dangers of deradicalizing Marx; in his *One Dimensional Man,* for instance, he has stressed the deradicalization of labour in contemporary affluent societies. But within his own theory, there are seeds of such a deradicalization. For instance, the addition of the Freudian theory of the *super ego* results precisely in the one dimensionality that he has warned us about and indeed Marcuse himself is aware of this, for, in the new preface to his *Eros and Civilization*. the hope of radical freedom becomes a murlenial hope of desublimation, It seems to me that there is a certain theoretical tension between the use of the *super ego* theory and the prospects for desublimation. If there is any substance in the suspicion, then I suggest that in Marcuse himself there is the theoretical possibility of deradicalization. Similarly, Robert Tucker's attempt to separate the implicit sociological elements in Marx, as witnessed in his earlier *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* results in his later work *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* in the thesis that the Marxian revolutionary idea is itself a mythical element in his theory. Again Henri Lefebure in his *The Sociology of Marx* has shown how an emphasis on the purely sociological aspects of Marx seriously impairs the Marxian idea of Praxis. The height of this tendency is revealed in Atkinson's study of Marx in his *Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative*. One of the depressing lessons so clearly demonstrated by Atkinson is that there is a surprising convergence between Marx and Parsons; for Atkinson, this convergence is the inevitable consequence of the use of the sociological concept of *role* in both Parsons and Marx.

But for our present purposes, Ralph Dahrendarg's class and class conflict in industrial society is the most significant case to consider, for Dahrendarg makes it a sustained attempt to consider Marxist theory from a purely sociological point of view and hence his works would be the test hypothesis case for the hypothesis that a purely scientific or sociological analysis of Marx tends to deradicalize him. Dahrendarg corrects Marx on the following major issues: (1) the overriding importance which Marx attaches to class conflict as the source of structural change cannot be sustained; class-conflict is only one

type of restricted analysis of social change; (2) the Marxist idea that class antagonisms are the potential sources of revolution is mistaken, for-class conflict itself, can be institutionalized and hence regulated, (3) furthermore the opposition between the classes need not even be a struggle ; here Dahrendarg introduces the distinction between manifest and latent interests and argues that opposition between latent interests need not take the form of struggle; (4) Marx's identification of classes in terms of possession or non-possession of property is mistaken ; it is authority rather than property which is the more important concept for the analysis of conflict; (5) and finally, according to Dahrendarg, in post modern societies, there is a separation of industry from the wider society and hence industrial conflicts need not necessarily involve wider social upheavals also. As a result of modifications, it is easy to see how in Dahrendarg's ands, the Marxian theory undergoes a process of taming.

A consideration of such attempts at a purely sociological analysis of Marx is important for our porposes for they clearly reveal that there is a danger of derachcalization and ratification involved in the attempt. Marxist theory itself becomes an oppressive structure which can be used for the purposes of repression of human interests. In response to the charges of such reification, several Marxist students have sought to add an ethical or moral overlay to the theory; for example Kamenka has attempted to work out a humanistic ideology as a kind of superstructure to the Marxist scheme and in a different manner, Sarks also presents a kind of humanistic ideology of Marxism. But such attempts at best only add an ornamental touch to a theory otherwise understood in starkly positivist terms; they moralize the theory and hence debase. It seems to me that the need is not merely to rank a philosophy of humanism on the scaffoldings of Marxian theory understood in the conventional materialist sense. Raya Dunayeskaya has shown in her *Marxism and Humanism*, the futility of such efforts and it is indeed against the kind of moralistic veneer that Marx had such great scorn. I believe that what it needed is a far more difficult and more profound philosophical critique and interpretation. I believe, for this task, we must come to realize that there is at this level, a subtle difference between Marx and Engels themselves as Habermas and other thinkers of the Frankfort school have recently argued and as Zordon has amply documented. While Engel's views in the *Anti-Duhring* and *The Dialectics of Nature* could well be described as objective materialism, Marx's own philosophical presuppositions, both in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and in the *Theses on Fuerbach* are to be described as a kind of radical humanism Habermas indeed has shown the importance of this humanistic praxis, the idea that human practical

activity is a humanization of nature for Marx, it is indeed, according to Habermas, the a *priori* structure of the Marxist scheme. This means that the commitment to humanism is contained in the very notion of praxis in that sense, the humanism of Marx is to be understood as part of the substructure itself and not as ideology of an otherwise materialist theory. This has however philosophical importance for us for it shows that it is this commitment to humanism, it is this core affirmation of a philosophical thesis that preserves the spirit of the theory ; in that sense the philosophical dimension is not an expoundable luxury but the necessary condition of preserving the theory itself. And it further shows that when this radical commitment to human existence is suppressed, every activity, practical as well as intellectual becomes alienated. Marx has distinguished a form of alienation where the activity of man is estranged from himself; this kind of alienation affects not merely labour but thought also. In that sense any attempt at a purely objectified cognition would be a form of alienation and its products reified modes of oppression. Hence only the basic commitment to human existence can be truly liberalizing. This is not merely adding a psychological dimension to Marx, for psychology as a mode of scientific cognition itself requires this principle of vitalization and humanization. I would suggest that it is a question of the ultimate radicalization of a genuine philosophy. In the inaugural function yesterday Dr. Herring spoke of the extralogical dimension of Marx as consequent upon his image of man ; this needs to be stressed, for cut off from this root, the image of a future society of freedom becomes a mere myth, a fancy of a naive technological imagination. But the eschatology of Marx, I would suggest is the dramatisation of his vision of human freedom ; it is a metaphor in time of a timeless vision of the possibilities of human existence. Dr. Mahadevan briefly hinted at this commitment of philosophic thinking and also suggested that outward social conflicts and alienations register themselves at their deepest level as inner discord In this idea is contained also the complementary idea that a condition of genuine freedom would also reflect itself in a certain order of a new mode of life. This new order of human existence, the possibility of a genuinely free existence is fleetingly described by Marx in a few but famous lines of the German Ideology. Marx here is speaking of the new form of a free society where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can be accomplished in any branch he wishes ; society regulates the general production and this makes it possible for one to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter,

fisherman, shepherd or critic". Here in this brief vision, the multi-family, the inner abundance of freedom expresses itself in an abundance of activities, such that labour, actively itself becomes an expression of freedom rather than a fetter upon it. Here is no denial, no withdrawal from life and society; every activity becomes a symbol and token of the self's victory. If I may for the moment borrow the language of another wisdom, here is existence, consciousness and bliss.

A. Ramamurthy

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA

If human thinking, in general, is a creative response to a challenging situation which man faces from time to time, philosophy cannot be an exception to it. It is a creative response on the part of man to some of the challenges he faces. However, philosophy differs from other creative responses of man in that it is not a type of response to this or that specific challenge, but represents a basic "reaction" to a challenge which is generated by the total situation in which man finds himself. The nature of response, depending upon the nature of challenge, may be specific and aim at immediate solutions or it may consist of an understanding of the basic structure of the challenge in all its dimensions, so that a relatively lasting and comprehensive solution may be found out. Philosophical response is of the latter type. Philosophical understanding of society and its various problems are not separated from the understanding of the basic structure of the universe and the ultimate nature of man. As such, its approach to social challenge is comprehensive and deep ; hence its response may appear to have no direct relevance to the challenge. Philosophical understanding helps man in formulating a world-view or gives him an integrated view of the things experienced which will help him to see things in their proper perspective and will render significance to humanexperience and creative meaningto the life of man. Suchan understanding and perspective may help man to understand and solve his various problems, both individual and social.

The chief aim of this paper is to discuss how philosophical activity in India has been responsive to social challenges from its beginning, or how the problems of man—both individual and social inspired

and also influenced its origin and growth, and how in its turn it has influenced social change and progress by resolving various conflicts.

If philosophy is not born in a vacuum, but in the context of a concrete social situation, the latter in a way influences the former. And as a creative response, philosophy tries to understand comprehensively the challenge posed by a social situation, before it tries to face it successfully. The fact that certain of the philosophical ideas are born and proved to be powerful at a particular time, but not at other times, indicates the intimate relationship between a given social situation and the type of philosophy that is born out of it. However, some of the philosophical insights, in so far as they transcend the limitations of historical conditions, may remain valid and significant beyond those conditions. These insights are related more to the ultimate nature of man than to the nature of the environment, which not only goes on changing, but of which human understanding goes on accumulating, bringing with it new insights. This does not however mean that human nature remains static. While that aspect of man which is the result of interaction between himself and environment goes on changing, something in him because of which he does not cease to be a human being abides unchanging. The claim of Indian philosophers that the highest end of man or *mokṣa*—which has more to do with the realisation of man's real nature than with an understanding of the outer environment—transcends and at the same time comprehends the social ends of man, shows that the validity of *mokṣa* goes beyond the consideration of his historical and social existence. On the other hand, the significance and validity of the social ends of man are not so. Since *artha* and *kāma* should be regulated or governed by *dharma*, and as all these three should subserve or lead one to the realisation of *mokṣa*, *mokṣa* not only becomes the guiding principle in formulating the social ends of man, but it becomes their very basis.

The achievement of Indian philosophers lies not only in their creative understanding of the basic problems of philosophy but also in their practical ability to organise the life of man, both individual and social, on the basis of such an understanding. Understanding human life in its totality, they tried to organise it in accordance with the values they cherished, so that not only social harmony could be achieved, but through it the highest end of man as well. Thus attempting to harmonise the ideal and the actual, so characteristic of "philosophic activity" in ancient India, has been indeed laudable and has been responsible for their concern for social reality. It is only when both interact and influence each other that philosophical wisdom gains its ultimate validity and significance, and society becomes dynamic, harmonious and purposeful.

The traditional Hindu belief that their social order in all its aspects is derived from the Vedas shows the inter-relationship between philosophical understanding and social reality in India. The Vedic thinkers have tried to establish a social order in tune with their philosophical understanding of the nature of man and the universe. Much of Vedic thought clearly reflects the full awareness of the social challenges which those thinkers faced and responded to creatively. Manu was both a philosopher and a social scientist. A particular type of philosophy is at the basis of the social order as envisaged by him. The social order as envisaged by him is an attempt to work out a social system based on the values of the Vedāntic philosophy. In it the problems of man, both individual and social, are viewed comprehensively and are sought to be tackled on the basis of a wider philosophical understanding, so that a harmonious and meaningful social order is established. Thus all the thinkers of ancient India who were are fully aware of the conflict between what is actual and what is ideal, tried to resolve it through the medium of ordered social life. They showed full awareness of the actual social situation before they tried to transform it into an ideal state free from conflict and tension. The various treatises on *Dharma* clearly reflect the interrelatedness of philosophy and society, and the place of philosophical understanding in establishing a harmonious social order in which all its constituents can live well-adjusted and strive towards the highest human goal. Of course, the basic conviction of Hindu thinkers is that the true nature of man cannot be grasped by observing him in his social context, or that the social goals of man cannot exhaust his ultimate aspirations, and hence social adjustment, however perfect it may be, cannot be the highest ideal of man. The Hindu ideal in this regard is to transcend, but not to avoid, the social situation. In realising the highest end of life, man transcends but not avoids social life. Without achieving the highest possible harmony with his society man cannot progress spiritually. The supreme ideal of man which is to realise the Self, means seeing the same Self in all and all in the Self. Without realising the truth that all is Brahman, one cannot realise the truth that one is Brahman. Ultimately they refer to one and the same realisation. According to Manu, this should be the ideal as well as the basis of social order.

Siddhārtha's awakening came as a response to a challenge which he had felt directly, and even after his enlightenment he felt the same concern for man and his problems. The ideal of Buddhist *Saṁgha* is to organise society on the basis of the Buddha's philosophy. The context in which the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgītā* was born was to resolve a conflict, a conflict which is basic and deep, on the basis of a philosophy which is primarily interested in resolving conflicts and contradictions experienced at various levels in the life of man and society. The *Gītā*

not only presents a philosophy that is capable of resolving various types of conflict, but provides a model...or models...which is essential if what is possible is to catch the imagination of man to become actual. By formulating a philosophy which comprehends various ideals without creating any conflict between them, it tries to face a challenge which is universal. As it is the Indian approach to resolve conflicts, not by ignoring or suppressing their causes, but by transcending the conflict-situation, what the *Gītā* presents is a philosophical basis for resolving various types of conflict which man experiences in his individual and social life. The various philosophers that appeared on the Indian scene from time to time, becoming fully aware of the social situation of their times, responded to the challenges thrown by it creatively, either by way of offering new values or by way of interpreting the traditional values creatively to suit the challenge. Śaṅkara established the four seats in the four corners of the country for this purpose. Rāmānuja presented a philosophy that was a creative and appropriate response to the challenge of his times. After him, generally we find a gradual decline of social awareness on the part of philosophers many among whom simply indulged in the logical analysis of a particular philosophical problem instead of seeing its relevance in the context of human life. Here it may be pointed out that corresponding to change and progress in philosophical understanding there has not been significant social changes in India. Naturally people think of the caste system which has been the dominant social institution of India from the beginning. However, we find some significant changes within it also. In the course of its history, it has been altered, modified and even rejected at times, by some of the philosophers. Thus we can say that corresponding to creative thinking society too has achieved a significant measure of progress and harmony, and whenever creative thinking declined, society too lost its dynamism and purpose.

Coming to the contemporary philosophical scene of India we find a different picture. Here we have to make a distinction between academic and non-academic philosophers. In the case of non-academic philosophers like Rammohan Roy, Dayananda, Vivekananda, Gandhi, Tagore and Aurobindo, we see the continuation of the ancient tradition. All these have shown utmost concern for society and its problems. Their philosophies are attuned to the social situation, such that they helped society in facing its challenges successfully. We find in their thinking a creative response to the challenges posed by society. They were not intellectually removed from the social situation in which they lived. In general, as their thinking was a creative response to an actual challenge of which they were fully aware, it had its impact on society. The case with academic philosophers and their philosophical activity has been different. Before we discuss the state of academic philosophy in relation to

society and its challenges we have to remember the fact that every philosophy, in so far as it is a creative response to a challenge, is born in a particular social situation. Though philosophy is based on reason, in so far as reason cannot operate meaningfully independent of human experience, philosophy becomes conditioned by the peculiar experiences of its author. As the experience of one philosopher differs from that of others, depending upon the tradition he inherits and the social situation in which he finds him self, the philosophy of one differs from that of others. In this context it may be appropriate to cite the observation of Karl Marx : " It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but ont he contrary, itis their social existence which determines their consciousness." We may not completely accept his observation, but the fact remains that to a large extent our thinking is conditioned by the historical conditions in which we live and think. If there are no innate ideas and if the ideas are not born in a vacuum, but in a concrete social situation, they are not only influenced by it, but their ultimate validity and significance become dependent on it. For example, existentialism which came into existence as a reaction to extreme rationalism and reflects the post-war social situation of the West, is a philosophical response appropriate to a challenge which the Western man faced; hence its relevance and significance in the context of that particular social situation. Or only in such a social situation such a system of philosophy could be born and again in such a social situation it could acquire its relevance and help to resolve conflicts. Thus the structure of a particular social situation and the peculiar challenges it generates determine the rise and development of a particular type of philosophy. A thinker is born into and influenced by a particular social situation and faces a challenge which is peculiar to that situation. This process may be conscious or unconscious. As such, a particular type of philosophy may not be found relevant to all men and at all times. A specific challenge which evokes a specific response may not be present everywhere. And unless one directly confronts the challenge one cannot respond to it creatively; and in its absence, the response, even if it is evoked, may not prove to be creative and fruitful. Such a response cannot influence either the thinker or the society. Commitment follows when the response is genuine and this is possible only when one is actually gripped by the challenge.

Even when the challenge is felt by all, the response may not be and need not be the same in all cases. Let us consider, for instance, the challenge-response situation with regard to social exploitation. The challenge of social exploitation may be present in all societies, but the response to it, if it is to be creative and successful, may not be the same. What proves to be a successful response in a particular type

of social situation may not prove to be so in another type of social situation, although a particular challenge may be common to both. This may be the reason why we find different types of response in different societies to the same challenge.

So when we think in terms of certain ideas, evolved in an altogether different social situation, we may not be feeling any challenge either to ourselves or to our society. Since our social situation is not the same as that of others, we may not have the same challenge as they have. On the other hand, if we accept those ideas, without being aware of the challenges which are responsible for their origin and growth, our thinking in terms of those ideas becomes unproductive and sterile. The fact that in contemporary India there is not much of original and creative thinking among academic philosophers, may be due to the absence of awareness of a real challenge on their part. Consequently, what we do fails to have any impact either on us or on our society. As it was pointed out earlier, this is not the case with non-academic philosophers. They felt the challenge and their thinking was a significant response to it. That is the reason why we find the impact of their thinking both on themselves and on society. The absence of creative response on our part may be due to our apathy to the real challenge which we face and our acceptance of a challenge which we are not directly confronted with. At times we feel that there is no real challenge before us as we are away from the challenge-situation. Similarly when we study the traditional philosophies of India we fail to discern the nature of the challenges which gave rise to them, and even when we are able to do so we fail to respond to it in our own way. Their challenge in some respects may be our challenge also, but what makes for the difference is the way we respond to it, and a creative response is possible only when we ourselves directly face the challenge. In its absence our understanding even of our tradition becomes pedantic. Except in positive sciences and in formal disciplines, the validity of what one thinks depends on the life of the thinker. Ideas are not objective facts; their meaning and validity are not independent of the place of their origin. Moreover, ideas gain their validity in the life of an individual or a society only when they are found to be relevant and fruitful. Otherwise, instead of solving certain problems they themselves may create certain conflicts. Thus the basic problem is to become alive to the challenge for oneself and then only a creativer esponse to it is possible, a response which can prove to be successful and be able to transform the life of the thinker, and through him, the society. In the absence of such a conscious process certain ideas or ideals may be accepted by and enforced in society through coercive methods which in the long run may create rather than resolve social conflicts.

C. T. K. Chari

IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Joan Vincent remarks, in her essay contributed to the symposium *Politics and Change in the Developing Countries* (ed. Colin Leys, Cambridge, 1969), that there is an increasing emphasis on the ideological factor in the study of the nations, at least as a method of distinguishing the ambitions of the leaders from the instruments by which their ends are sought. J. P. Nettl, in the same symposium, observes that the very concept of the 'Third World' (*le tiers monde*), as distinguished from the 'first' or the Western World and the 'second' or the Soviet World, has lost its importance since the 'Third World' has ceased to be an operational bloc in international politics. The notion is tending to be replaced by a number of detailed analyses in which the value of the linear socio-political and technological occidental model, which assign 'degrees of development' to the new nations, has declined. My purpose in this paper is to argue that 'ideology' cannot be used as a tool for analysing social conflict in the new nations, the *nations trouvèe,* unless the ambiguity of the 'ideologies', especially those of 'welfare', is recognized.

The requirements of an ideology may perhaps be stated briefly. First, an ideology may be either a national myth or the value-goals preferred by an elite. In this sense, ideology both reveals and cloaks an existential situation, the prevailing attitudes in a pluralis ic society. Second, ideologies are beliefs having implications for a wide range of conduct; they tell us not what human actions are but rather what they *should* be. Ideologies are not necessarily secular; a certain kind of ideology, as David Apter has explained in his *Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization* (*1968*), can function as a 'political religion'. Third, ideologies contain programmes of action for the attainment of the ends in which the proponents of the ideologies believe. Ideologies are at once a source of consent and of obedience. Lastly, political ideologies enter into complex relations with the organs and instruments of political power. The kind and

degree of political consent, whether rational, traditional, manipulative or forced, is important for deciding whether we are dealing with a *laissez faire* state, a liberal state, a service state, a welfare state, or a totalitarian state.

In many emerging Afro-Asian nations, party conflicts involve a division between 'modernizing' and 'traditional' elites instead of the typical left-right stratification of the West. None the less, there is in these nations the lure of an enhanced leftism associated symbolically with independence, economic development and modernization while capitalism is linked to foreign influences. Myron Weiner distinguishes genuine mass participation from mobilization by the elite for their own purposes. I should suppose that this roughly corresponds to J. P. Nettl's distinction between 'stalagmite' and 'stalactite' mobilization proceeding from below or from above.

The ambiguity of the new ideologies is evident from the classification of the political systems in the developing areas offered by experts in comparative politics. Ghana is regarded as a 'collective democracy' by P. R. Van der Mehden; it is looked upon as a 'tutelary democracy' by Almond and Coleman on the ground that the premium is put on the executive and the bureaucracy. Apter declares that the ideology of Ghana is a kind of 'political religion'. Saudi Arabia is an 'elite democracy' for Van der Mehden and a 'traditional oligarchy' for Almond and Coleman. The legitimacy problem is said to be so urgent for the new nations that they tend to fall back on charismatic rather than on traditional or legal-rational authority. The charismatic leader, be it Sèkou Tourè in Guinea, Castro in Cuba, Nasser in Egypt, Ne Win in Burma, Mao in China, is identified as the source and the agent of authority. But the ambiguity of the elite ideology and the clash of social interests can lead to a sudden brittleness of charismatic leadership in the new nations, not paralleled, I believe, anywhere in Weber's classical studies. Syngman Rhee loses power in South Korea; Nkrumah is ousted in Ghana; Ayub Khan steps down in Pakistan; U Nu is deposed by Ne Win in Burma; and Sukarno in Indonesia is displaced by Suharto. I suspect that the kind of political ritualization which makes for charismatic leadership in the new nations (Nkrumah was the 'Military Saviour' or *Osogyefo* and Sukarno was the 'Beloved Immortal') can also undermine it. Nkrumah was a clever constitutional lawyer who tried to crush all opposition from the Ashanti. The developing areas cannot be regarded simply as new loci for the traditional industrial struggles of the West or as new versions of the orthodox communist proletarian revolution. Socialism in African Mali is a special Mali version of Marxism used to smooth out cultural

discontinuities. In Algeria or Nigeria no single ideology may suffice to define political orthodoxy. Sèkou Tourè, once the exponent of a militant left-wing was subsequently regarded as a 'right-wing deviant' by a federation of African students. The tribal heterogeneity of Africa makes the territorial nation-state unstable. We have the Ashanti in Ghana, the Kikuyu in Kenya, the Baganda in Uganda, the Barotse in North Rhodesia. The same tribe on the River Congo may be distributed between two states. Uganda builds up its Ntu-ism from the Bantu root, *Ntu*. Tanzania under Julius Nyerere exploits the single-party state as the integration of political and national loyalties. An eclectic Marxism and a vaguely conceived freedom culminate in the cry of *Uhuru* or *la libertè*. An ethno-centric symbol like *nègritude* compromises between traditional African practices and modernizing values.

Let us consider the proletarian Cultural Revolution of not long ago in China. How shall we interpret it? It is most disconcerting to find that the experts is *China Quarterly* are unable to achieve even a modicum of unanimity. The differences, I believe, are not only those of translating the more reliable Chinese news items. While one school of thought traces the Chinese social conflict to an ideological intra-party struggle, a second school attributes it to non-ideological factors like leadership, prestige, status, charisma and its delayed routinization. Examples of the first view are the alleged clash of political obligation and economic necessities proposed by Blum and Paul Harper, Schurman's mass action versus the managerial elite, ideology and reality, name and verity, *ming* and *shih*, at variance, as conceived by R. H. Soloman and Tang T'sou, a one-party rule inevitably and fatally sowing the seeds of continued instability according to Oksenberg, Ito and Shibate. Examples of the second view are Mao's alleged need to recover prestige after the fiasco of the 'Great Leap' and the wilting of the 'Hundred Flowers' according to Bridgham, the 'totalitarian leader in his dotage' as conceived by L. Schapiro and J. W. Lewis destroying the 'monolith party'. A recent symposium, *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power* edited by J. Wilson, dwells on the disruption of the party. Guru Dutt and Gargi Dutt in India favour the second approach. Gargi Dutt, in *China Today*, September 1971, blames Mao for packing the meeting of the Central Communist Party in 1966 with 'irregular' revolutionary Red Guards to provide a majority. The Red Guards were 'of' the party but not quite 'in, it. Is it clear, I must ask, that Chinese communism in operation is simply one application of international communism, as maintained by writers like Peter Tang and Jerome Ch'ên? It can be one application of international Communism in Nettl's paradoxical sense that the relation between a deve-

loped and a developing communist country is itself a modern version of Marxist struggle. China is in what Dr. S. Chandrasekhar calls the 'high stationary phase' of the demographic cycle while the Soviet Union is in the late expanding phase with falling birth and death rates. Han Suyin's view that the Chinese Cultural Revolution is 'many-levelled' seems to me the most plausible. Culture *(ying)* and its tools (*T'i*) may be at odds. 'Redness' and 'expertness' may not coincide. It is useful to remind ourselves here that while the People's Communes of China are an ideological thrust against the Soviet Collective or *Kolkhoz*, they are also a covert ideological attack on traditional Confucian family ties. Wages in the Communes are paid to the individual worker and not to the head of the family. Women are emancipated.

The Directive Principles of the Burmese Constitution committed the country to the ideal of *pyidawtha,* literally the "happy-pleasant-country'. Maung Maung, an authority on the Burmese constitution-interprets the word as 'welfare' minus its ideological and political connotation. But Hugh Tinker, who is no less an authority, sees here the subtle Buddhist ideology of accumulation of merit by disinterested acts. The fact remains that neither U Nu's constitutional government nor Ne Win's revolutionary government has quite solved the problem of the indigenous minorities : the Karens, the Mons, the Arkanese, the Kachins and the Chins. In 1961 U Nu by a constitutional amendment of sections 20–21 made Buddhism the state religion. The Revolutionary Government has not repealed the amendment. It took good care to remove the Arkanese and the Mons from the previous cabinet. U Raschid, a Moslem, never fully accepted by the Burmese community, was arrested and removed after the fall of U Nu. The attempts of the Revolutionary Government to replace traditional rural leadership (provided by the Buddhist monks and elders) by elected councils have not been quite successful. An inefficient bureaucracy has been made more inefficient by an influx of military officials. According to Guy Wint's *Asia Handbook*, the GNP *per capita* of Burma is one of the lowest in Asia.

It is instructive to study social conflicts in Pakistan and Indonesia against the general ideological background of Islam. Successive constitutions of Pakistan have proclaimed it an Islamic Republic. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone; people's government is a trust. Set against these oracular assurances, the decline of the original Muslim League in Pakistan is surprising. The League was older than Pakistan; nevertheless it had to be trimmed down. Ironically enough, it regarded Pakistan as a 'one-party state' and opposed attempts at social reform as 'un-Islamic'. Keith Callard points out

that Pakistan has neither a two-party nor a multi-party system with clear-cut social programmes. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was a test case for the 'national solidarity', 'basic democracy' and 'freedom of religion' promised by the Ayub Constitution (Arts. 10–12). Callard suspects that the East-West cleavage was always there in Pakistan, although hidden. East Pakistan had one qualified doctor to cater to every 18,000 people. Karl Von Vorys, in his *Political Developments in Pakistan*, remarks that certain rural areas in East Pakistan were never visited by administrative officials. There were bitter controversies over the rival claims of Urdu and Bengali as national languages. Bengali culture was suspected to be quasi-Hindu by the rulers of West Pakistan. Ayub Khan even hinted at a change of script. It is small wonder that Mujibur Rehman challenged Jinnah's 'Two-nation' theory with a 'Three-nation' theory. The professed overall unity of Pakistan collapsed in the face of the cultural, linguistic and geographical heterogeneity.

In Indonesia the slogan of revolution combined with the themes of Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and Indonesian identity (written in Indonesian, of course) yielded the ideology of MANIPOL-USDEK. Sukarno's *Nasokom* was a blending of nationalism, religion and communism. Some forty-two political parties jostled against one another of which the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the Musjumi Party with Islamic leanings, the Nationalist Party (PNI), and the socialist party were the most important. Democracy ceased to be a workable formula amidst the bickerings. Kahim argues that the PNI never had a comprehensive socio-economic policy. The party's official credo *Marhaenism* ('Proletarianism') was borrowed from Sukarno. Guillaume points out in his book *Islam* that the Shāfi'ite school of jurisprudence was influential in Indonesia. Sukarno wanted to revive the dream of a Javanese empire or *Majapahit* ; but this was actually older than Islam. The attempt by the PKI to seize power in 1965 led to the downfall of Sukarno. He was divested of his charisma. There was no question (*pace* Weberians) of 'routinizing' it.

Does the democratic set-up in India mitigate, if not abolish, social conflicts ? D. K. Sen, in his monumental study of the Indian constitution, calls it a 'hybrid pattern', a 'curious medley' of 'responsible and presidential government', a 'synthetic democracy' and a 'pseudo-republicanism' uniting the *elettorato attiva* and the *elettorato passiva* of the Italian constitution of 1948. One has only to read two recent books like *Unity and Diversity*, edited by Philip Mason (1967) and *Caste in Indian Politics* edited by Rajni Kothari (1970) to realise that our professed secular ideology of socialist democracy and welfare is ambigu-

ous and even precarious. M. N. Srinivas's *Sanskritization* is at best an ambivalent reaction to traditional values, status symbols and alleged Hindu loyalties. The Black Panther movement in USA developed outside the two major political parties. The mobilization of caste in India is not confined to any one party. Caste provides a convenient substructure to all political parties which on the surface look like electoral federations. The Dalid Panther movement of Bombay is a caste revolt against major groups.

I wish to emphasize in conclusion the inadequacy of proposed general models of social conflict in the developing countries so long as the cultural, linguistic, demographic, economic, religious, and communal variables are not spelt out explicitly. The sociograms of Moreno and Sherif represent subgroups centred round dominant individuals who can stand in various relationships of indifference, co-operation and hostility. Dr. Avtar Singh of East California University has recently used the method in studying the leadership patterns of six North Indian villages. I fear that caste and communal influences tend to drop out of the abstract networks H. A. Simon, in his *Models of Man*, tries to extract semi-quantitative variables from the Homans model. For instance, a high morale is said to be a consequence of a strong feedback from friendliness to interaction to friendliness. In this model, as in Cartwright's generalization of Heider's P - O - X 'triangle' of likes and dislikes, with transitivity or intransitivity of likes and dislikes, L of ∽ L, and in Schachter's equation connecting communication, dependence and the pressure for change, the grounds of perceived social diferences, of subjective expectations and subjective utilities, have to be explicated before the curve of social change can be extrapolated Joan Vincent refers to two antithetical current models for plural societies. The 'Equilibrium' model of Kornhauser, Aron and Shils relies on consensus and cross-cutting ties and represents social forces as counteracting cultural pluralism. The 'Conflict' model of Furnivall, Smith and Young makes cultural pluralism the major determinant of social structure in a plural society. I maintain that unless the terms of cultural pluralism are set forth explicitly in each case, Apter's disjunction: 'either national integration or anarchy' is no more clear than the viability of the territorial nation-state. The significance which various groups in Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia attach to perceived cultural differences depends on other variables, some of which are cultural as well as structural and functional.

R. Balasubramanian

THE SARTREAN IDEOLOGY, PRAXIS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

I should like to make a few preliminary observations before presenting my paper.

First of all, I shall refer to Hamlet's observation about man and Sartre's characterisation of human nature, as they provide the background for this paper. Hamlet observes: " What a piece of work is a man ! How noble in reason ! How infinite in faculty ! In form, in moving, how express and admirable ! In action how like an angel ! In apprehension how like a god ! The beauty of the world ! The paragon of animals ! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust ?" Commenting on man's place in this universe Sartre remarks : " But within this living universe, man occupies, for us, a privileged place. First, because he is able to be historical ; that is, he can continually define himself by his own *praxis* by means of changes suffered or provoked and their internalization, and then by the very surpassing of the internalized relations. Second, he is characterized "*as the existent which we are*." Highlighting man's nature and destiny, Sartre says : " Man is a useless passion."

Secondly, the area which I shall cover in this paper is doubly sensitive because it involves both Marx and Sartre.

Thirdly, I always feel uneasy when I read Sartre. I do not claim to *know* Sartre in the strong sense of the term " knowing ", because Sartre says that to know is to change.

Social conflict presupposes interaction between individuals. Interaction between individuals is of two kinds. It may be in the form of opposition or in the form of cooperation. Opposition between indi-

viduals may take either the form of competition or the form of conflict. Social conflict may be defined as a state of existence in which a person or persons perceive another person or persons as a threat to the successful achievement of an end or a project. Social conflict may be between two individuals, or between two groups, or between two classes. Sociologists and social philosophers have viewed social conflict in two different ways, negatively as well as positively. Parsons, Sorokin and others hold the view that social conflict is a disease, a sickness, which affects both the individual and the group. It is dysfunctional. It is disruptive of the healthy development of the group or the class and therefore of the individuals. The earlier it is tackled and removed, the better for the group. According to the other view held by Simmel, Coser and others, conflict which is a form of socialization must be viewed positively as an important factor which contributes to the cohesion of a group or a class.

My interest in the negative-positive antithesis with regard to the nature of conflict is quite different. Whether we view conflict negatively as dysfunctional or positively as cohesive, the important factor to be reckoned with is the individual *praxis* which provides the personal dimension to the problem. That all social problems are in the final analysis individual problems is a truism. Nevertheless, the individual factor, without being kept as the focal point, is relegated to the background in the analysis of social problems. In the place of the individual, classes or groups or systems which are only abstractions are brought in, and conflict comes to be viewed as taking place between two classes or groups or systems. It is no doubt true that if the conflict is at the ideological level and not at the survival level of biological existence, it becomes symbolic in character, and a conflict at this level is a conflict between two groups or classes or systems for a certain ideal or a symbol. Though we do speak of conflict between groups or classes or systems, it is really conflict between one group or class of individuals and another group or class of individuals. Individuals are involved in, and feel the consequences, of a conflict, even though we say that the conflict in question is between two groups or classes or systems. No matter what the conflict is, it becomes a personal matter. It becomes one of personal survival for the individuals whose collection constitutes the group or the class or the system as the case may be.

Let us consider the negative as well as the positive views of conflict to bring out the importance of the individual *praxis*. Sorokin who holds the negative view with regard to conflict argues that we do not have a satisfactory solution to the problem of conflict at the political or economic or scientific or religious level. According to his

analysis, there are three aspects, cultural, social and personal, involved in any social problem. This is as much true of social conflict as it is of any other social problem. All these three aspects, Sorokin says, must be taken together as they constitute an indivisible whole. Consider the case of a functional group. Its *culture* is constituted by the sumtotal of values for whose realization, use and enjoyment the group is organized and functions. The *social* aspect of the group is constituted by the social relationship among the members in terms of their functions and positions, duties and privileges. Finally, the group comes into existence as a result of the association of *persons* who cherish certain values which they pursue jointly as members of a group. Though for the purpose of analysis we speak of cultural, social, and personal aspects of a group, what is really basic here is the last one. It is the individual who, by his purposeful activity, by his commitment, defines and gives meaning to both the cultural and social aspects. The existence and integrity of both the cultural and social aspects of a group depend upon the crucial factor of individual commitment—whether the individual commits himself totally or segmentally as a member.

The same is true when conflict is considered positively as a cohesive factor of a group. The Simmel-Coser thesis is based on the following views: (1) No group is entirely harmonious. (2) A group which is entirely harmonious will be without process and structure. (3) Group formation is the result of both harmony and disharmony. (4) And finally conflict, like cooperation, has social function. The ultimate factor which has to be taken into consideration here also is the individual *praxis,* its commitment and the manner of its involvement in the group.

The effective role of conflict both in its group-binding and group-preserving aspects ultimately depends upon the individual *praxis.* The importance of the individual *praxis* to be understood as dialectical totalization in the context of its "social field" has been very much emphasized by Sartre. The role of the individual *praxis* will be considered here in the context of Sartre's views on philosophy and Marxism.

Sartre is of the view that philosophy, even the one which appears to be the most contemplative, is practical. According to him, philosophy is unification of theory and practice. Sartre says that at a time there is only one living philosophy, and that such a philosophy

gives expression to the general movement of society. A philosophy which is alive is a totalization of knowledge. It is also at the same time a regulative idea, and a social and political weapon. A philosophy remains effective only so long as the *praxis* which produced it remains alive, the *praxis* which maintains it and which it in turn illuminates. Speaking of modern Western society, Sartre says that between the 17th century and the 20th century there have been only three periods of philosophical creation. Descartes and Locke are associated with the first, Kant and Hegel with the second, and Marx, with the third of the periods of philosophical creation. Sartre says that there is no going beyond Marxism today as we have not gone beyond the historical moment which Marxism expresses. Sartre says: "As soon as there will exist for *every one* a margin of real freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have lived out its span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place. But we have no means, no intellectual instrument, no concrete experience, which allows us to conceive of this freedom or of this philosophy." According to Sartre, those intellectuals who follow the philosophical movement and who give practical application to the theories are ideologists. An ideology is nourished by the great philosophical system which is creative. Existentialism, according to Sartre, is only an ideology, a parasitic system which functions within the framework of Marxism.

Sartre's conception of philosophy has a direct bearing on the nature of value in terms of which we have to understand the conflict between two individuals or groups. There are two points which deserve careful consideration here. First of all, the philosophy of a person can be found out from his practice. What a person practises is his philosophy and not what he just proclaims to others without practising it. If a person professes a particular philosophy, and if he does not practise it, he is, according to Sartre, in bad faith. The philosophy which he professes is not his philosophy, because it does not have any impact on him in his conduct. It has not changed him. To understand a philosophy and to accept it is to change oneself, to go beyond in the process of understanding. It may be relevant here to refer to Sartre's own case. Sartre says that when, as a student, he read Marx's *Das Capital* and the *German Ideology*, the ideas which Marx wanted to convey through these works were clear to him. Nevertheless, he did not *understand* them; for, "to understand is to change, to go beyond oneself." In other words, the Marxian philosophy at that time did not have any impact on him so far as his

conduct was concerned, because he did not practise it. And so it was not his philosophy. What changed him was, to quote his own words, "the heavy presence on my horizon of the masses of workers, an enormous somber body which lived Marxism, which practised it and which at a distance exercised an irresistible attraction on petit, bourgeois intellectuals." It was the reality of Marxism as it was practised by the proletariat that attracted Sartre and changed him. Marxism was his philosophy only from the moment he practised it.

Let me now come to the second point. If philosophy is action-oriented, it is also value-oriented. According to Sartre, the individual *praxis*, *i.e.*, the purposeful action of our individual must be understood in relation to (1) the given situation which conditions it, and (2) the project *or* the end *or* the value which it is trying to bring into being by transcending the given situation. To accept something as a value commits a person to a judgment that some action is to be performed, and through that judgment, to the actual performance of that action in the event he finds himself in the situation to which it is declared to be appropriate. In the pursuit of value or project the individual has to face the threat from the "other". Human nature, according to Sartre, is such that it has to be in conflict with others.

Before we take up the nature of the human reality in its concrete relations with others as understood by Sartre, it is necessary to indicate why Sartre is critical of the dogmatic dialectics of Marxism and the difference between Marxism and Sartre in respect of their concepts of social class.

Sartre accepts without reservation the Marxian thesis, as formulated by Engels, " Men themselves make their history, but in a given environment which conditions them." Sartre says that the structures created by human work define for each man an objective situation as the starting point. The individual *praxis* tries to surpass the given situation, the practico-inert, with a view to realizing its project. Sartre thinks of the dialectical movement in terms of totalization, detotalization, a further totalization, and so on. A totalization, let us say, holds the field. It is challenged by another totalization. The first totalization then loses its absolute validity and becomes absorbed in the second. The second totalization in its turn is transcended by a third and so on. The totalization, says Sartre, will be different in terms of whether I and you constitute ourselves as *we*, or whether I constitute

you and him as *them*, or whether it is he who constitutes me and you as them-for-him. The important point here is that (1) the bialectical totalization must take into consideration not only the given situation but also the human *praxis*, and (2) that the human *praxis* must be understood heuristically and by the progressive-regressive method which pays due attention to horizontal synthesis and vertical synthesis. Sartre remarks that unfortunately the heuristic principle has become the terrorist practice of liquidating the particular. Sartre criticises the Marxian dialectic as the dialectic without men. Instead of being a working hypothesis for historical studies, it becomes a rigid, final logic in the hands of the Marxists. Whereas to the Marxist, the absolute in history is the economic base, to Sartre, it is the individual *praxis*. Marxism has reabsorbed man into the logic, into the idea, but Sartre seeks him everywhere-where *he* is at his work, in his home, in the street. In short, Sartre accuses the Marxist of the dogma of the serious, because the Marxist asserts the priority of the object over the subject and thereby dissolves the subject. Brunet in the *Roads to Freedom* is a good example for a Marxist who is a revolutionary in bad faith, whereas Hoederer in *Dirty Hands* is a good illustration of an authentic man.

Sartre agrees with Marx that social classes exist, that human nature is related to class membership, and that ideology which we find at the superstructure is the outgrowth of the class structure. Nevertheless, there are differences between Marxian and the Sartrean views of the social class. Unlike Marxism, Sartre views society as broken down into individuals rather than classes, and the conflict that we find in society is basically the conflict between individuals rather than classes. Sartre explains the conflict-situation between individuals as follows: "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the other, the Other seeks to enslave me...Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others."

If this is accepted as an accurate description of social relation, ship, antagonism between classes because of conflicting economic interests would simply be a special instance, and not the universal form of social conflict. Two consequences follow from Sartre's concept of class: (1) classes would lose their homogeneous quality; and (2) conflict would have to be expected in different forms' even in a classless society. It must be emphasized here that Sartre's view, while it alters the perspective of the class-struggle, does not

abolish it. Class-conflict is the result of a will on the part of an underprivileged class to change the existing social situation which is ordered according to the preconceptions of the privileged class. This will to change, according to Sartre, is a *subjective* movement within the individual members of the underprivileged class. Consider the following example given by Sartre. A member of the ground crew at an air base in London flew a plane. He is coloured; he is prevented from becoming a member of the flying personnel. This prohibition becomes for him a subjective impoverishment, but he immediately goes beyond the subjective to the objective by performing this act. Sartre says that the *general* revolt on the part of coloured men against colonialists is expressed *in him* by his particular refusal of this prohibition This act of the young rebel affirms that *a future which is possible* for whites, is possible for everyone. Analysing this act of the rebel in a given situation, Sartre observes that it contains the internalization of a double future - that of the whites and that of his brothers.

It is necessary at this stage to make a brief reference to the inter-personal relations for the purpose of explaining Sartre's theory of class - consciousness. There are two steps in Sartre's argument. First, Sartre makes use of the concept of *look* to explain the relation between any two individuals. Just as I look at the other person and makes him an object for me, so also he looks at me and makes me an object of his. To look at me means to annihi late "me as a subject" and to reduce me to the rank of an object. Consider this illustration which is provided by Sartre. Suppose I am looking through a keyhole and that at a certain moment some body arrives and sees me in this position. what happens then? I am ashamed. It means that I am conscious of being looked at, conscious of the other looking at me and of myself hanging, so to speak, at the end of his look. Shame is possible only through the *other*. Shame implies that I am ashamed of myself *before* the other. The other is thus a real existent being, and shame is the irrefutable revelation of the existence of the other. Why is there the *other*? Sartre's answer to this question is at once simple and straight-forward : "It is so." As soon as I am, I face the other. "The other," declares Sartre, "is my original sin." Any kind of relation with the other is a failure, because the other is a subject, and I always try to convert a subject into an object. Every act on my part towards the other is a conflict.

Let us now move to the second step in the Sartrean analysis to account for the rise of class consciousness or group consciousness. Making use of the grammatical distinction between "we" and "us", Sartre speaks about the "we-subject" and the "us-object". When I and the other person come under the look or gaze of the Third man, we two become us-objects. The us-form is very humiliating. To the workers, the capitalist is the Third person. As soon as the Third man emerges, the shame of being an "oppressed class" arises in us. The liberation from the us-object situation begins when the us-object transforms itself into a we-subject, inevitably to the detriment of the oppressing class. The we-subject relation is purely *psychological*, a subjective *erlebnis*, which arises only when there is the Third man looking at us; there is no *ontological link* between two or more individuals when they form a group. The relation between two individuals is not *mitsein*, but a conflict.

Considering the nature of the human reality and its relation to others, Sartre wants man to realize his ambiguity which is multiple. We can spell out man's ambiguity as follows:

(1) Man is as he behaves, yet he can never be reduced to what he has done, except when he is dead. So man is a mystery.

(2) The situation makes him; yet he is responsible for what he is and for his environment.

(3) Man's fundamental relation with others is conflict; yet he can find himself only by committing himself to others. If the world is not better than it is, the fault is on the individual. A person who recognizes his freedom and his responsibility and who acts in this way has, to quote Sartre, "neither regret, nor hate, nor excuse... He is free. He is freedom".

I shall now state my personal reaction to the problems raised and discussed from the Sartrean standpoint.

First of all, Sartre's theory of social relations, his analysis of conflict situation, his conception of social change, and the making of history—all these are based on his conception of human consciousness, what he calls the For-itself. One may disagree with the Sartrean theory of consciousness which is similar to the Humean theory; nevertheless one may agree with his humanism.

Secondly, Sartre's concept of look which is crucial to his theory of interpersonal relations is an exaggeration. It is possible to develop the I-thou relationship on the basis of "look" without however arriving at the same conclusion drawn by Sartre. There is no evidence to show that every case of *look* results in shame and humiliation.

Thirdly, Sartre's theory of man as *freedom-in-situation,* committed and yet free, is, it seems to me, a very substantial contribution made by Sartre to social ethics, though he has not yet fully developed his theory of ethics, as promised by him at the conclusion of his *Being and Nothingness*.

Fourthly, there are three important elements in Sartre's theory of man, *viz*., individualism, rationalism and a measured optimism ; and his theory of man may be considered to be a bridge between Marxism and liberalism.

Fifthly, social life, no doubt involves conflict. The term "conflict" carries with it a very wide range of connotations—from disagreement at one stage to violence at the other. Sartre does not portray social conflict in terms of violence. Though a conflict-free society is not possible, a violence-free society is possible and should be achieved.

Sixthly, Sartre's conception of philosophy not merely as theory but as practice as well deserves serious attention.

Lastly, the central point in Sartre's theory of ambiguity of man is "Man is not what he is, and is what he is not." Man is neither good nor bad, but is ambiguous. Realizing his ambiguity, he must commit himself and lead an authentic life. "The man who makes such a discovery has neither regret, nor hate, nor excuse... He is free. He is freedom." I wonder whether Sartre's theory of ambiguity is a different version of the Advaitin's theory of *anirvacanīya,* though Sartre does not have the same metaphysical basis of Advaita. It seems to me that the fully authentic man of the Sartrean conception, who has neither regret nor hate nor excuse, may, indeed, be a very rare phenomenon. A person who realizes this ambiguity must be one who has transcended this ambiguity. How we call such a

person does not matter. To Sartre, he is freedom. To the Advaitin, he is the liberated-in-life. It seems to me that the phenomenological ontology of Sartre can be fitted into a different framework—and not necessarily, as Sartre does, into the Marxian framework.

PART THREE

SPECIAL ARTICLES

S. Gopalan

CONCEPT OF PERSON AND THE INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

The aim of the paper is to clarify the notion of personality-development by reflecting about the *institutional situation* of man. Even at the outset it should be conceded that the concept of personality is as complex as the concept of institution and as such circumscription is called for both while defining our concepts and while exploring the possibilities of finding suggestive ideas which may be helpful in making our task less difficult. Various are the definitions we find of both the terms and we do not propose to make even passing references to them for, we hold that a mention of the definitions does not yield the dividends we expect unless we make use of the accumulated capital (definitions that are already available) diligently, 'calculating' our interests scrupulously and investing in shares (fresh lines of thinking we propose in this paper) which will help revaluing rather than devaluing our currency (ideas actually present the import of which we have yet to grasp fully). All the same the scope of this paper does not exclude an abstraction of leading ideas from certain definitions (of both the concepts) with a view to opening new avenues towards a better understanding and appreciation of the import of the terms in our endeavour to explicate the deeper significance of the concept of *person*.

We deem it important to consider wishes, desires, motives and interests and the factors which contribute to their harmonization as offering us an insight into human personality. These wishes and reasonings are symptomatic of certain kinds of awareness, consciousness or experiences resulting in social interaction. The latter has its own effect, on the individual's tendencies—innate and acquired—, and potentialities which try to find expression in individuals. Awareness, reflective consciousness and the consequential changes that occur, thanks

to these are *processes* which create and recreate situations which by their very nature cannot be the same or identical either to the same person at different times or to different individuals at the same time. The complexity of social analysis thus stems from the fact that it is not merely concerned with reflecting about the individual and society as two entities or products but in considering them as much more dynamic. This is a leading idea to be pursued in the paper and will be dealt with after we analyse certain major difficulties in our ordinary understanding of the mechanism of personality-development.

Whenever the relationship between the individual and society is discussed, their intimate and reciprocal relationship is pointed out as extremely significant and in terms of personality-development the role of society is described as helping the individual in its attainment. Society's role is thus considered more and more in terms of its shaping the individual's personality. The important assumption here is that society is only a means-value and not an end-value. Though on the face of it the individual's active role is not quite apparent, this line of thinking contains in it positive suggestions towards a dynamic conception of not merely society but of the individual as well. But paradoxically the importance accorded to society as being due to its shaping the individual's personality is itself responsible for disregarding the role of the individual. This has resulted in considering the dynamics of society in its ability to cater to the most important 'need' of the individual, viz., 'personality development'. Although the role of society considered in such terms is not contended in the paper, we deem it necessary to point out that such a description overlooks the active role of the individual himself. That is, we are not denying the significance of society as is traditionally conceived but are only affirming the dynamism of the individual to offset the effects of getting a purely one-sided picture in according exclusive importance to the role of society.

The dynamism of the individual consists firstly in his consciously desiring, aiming at and achieving personality-growth, and secondly (and more subtly)—in his preparing the ground for such individual development by contributing to society. In the first aspect we are pointing to the fact that nothing worthwhile at the human level can be achieved without a subjective appropriation of the value to be realized. We also note that the individual's relationship to society is *not merely* determined by his being a social animal but also by all the other aspects of his personality. An overemphasis on the social nature of man fails to take note of the fact that certain aspects of man's personality— also contribute to the anti-social activities he indulges in and leads to the situation where they are merely explained away, not properly explained. In addition to the social and anti-social attitudes which

point to certain aspects of man's personality—broadly indicating the *objective* aspects of his being we have to recognize the individualistic moods in which the individual finds himself and the consequent inwardization (which in turn has its own impact on the personality as a whole). This is to concede the *subjective* aspects of his being. This largely supplies the justification for treating the individual both as a subject and as an object even while looking at him not as an isolated entity but as an unit in an integral whole, viz., society and suggests that the individual-society relationship is not as simple as it is normally considered to be by dwelling on the social nature of man. The complexity of the analysis of the *roles* is thus dictated by the complex structure and diverse aspects of the human personality.

The second sense in which we are interpreting the dynamism of the individual now becomes apparent. The subjective being that man is, while reflecting about the conditions conducive to his development, he appreciates that he cannot really *grow* outside his society. This aspect is generally not overlooked when listing the conditions of individual development. But the deeper reflections that man is capable of impress upon him that his realizing the necessity of society *alone* does not pave the way for his own development, for it is only an obvious fact—a fact dictated to him by his social nature. That is, the various obstructions to personality-development inherent in society (thanks to the diversified form of expression individuals bring to bear) are given due recognition but the explicit statement of the significance inherent in it has been deemed necessary to point precisely to the fact that society or the institutions as having this functioning means simply that the individuals who are aiming at personality-development also contribute to these positive and negative roles of the institutions. In more precise terms: the individual, concerned as he is with personality-growth, has all the while to combat against forces which may smother it. These 'forces' are not merely external in that they emanate from the 'others' but also internal in so far as they emanate from the 'growing individual'. The individual is thus to curb his own tendency to prove an obstacle to his own as well as others' development.

We are suggesting thus that in the context of our discussion of the concept of *person* the ordinary notions of society as shaping the individual's personality need clarification. In the absence of it society is likely to be considered responsible for the individual's personality-development. As a concrete discussion of the whole question can best be made in terms of the institutions into which the individual enters and of which he is an integral aspect, it is said that the function of the institutions is to restructure the personality of the individuals. While accepting the role of the institutions in this regard we are only object-

ing to the consequential overlooking of the individual's own role in personality-growth.

We may employ the terms *individual* and *person* to study the notion of personality-development in depth by considering the institutional situation of man. By the institutional situation of man we understand the reciprocal involvement-relationship that holds good between man and society, the relationship which does not merely point to the *structure* of society, viz., its being constituted of a number of individuals intimately related to each other but also to the *function* it has.

The significance of the reciprocal-involvement-relationship between the individual and society can thus be fully appreciated only by considering the implications of the impact of society on the individual. It is not always the case that society completely determines the individual. Not all social patterns are social imperatives, for very often society presents alternative lines of action that are equally acceptable, the various alternatives being accepted sometimes only successively and not simultaneously and sometimes accepted simultaneously but by different individuals. Moreover when society is looked upon only as a determinant of individuals' personality, the tendency to regard society and individuals as two separate entities arises. We tend to see society on the one side and the individual on the other and our inquiries are directed to find what effect one has upon the other. The method of approaching the whole question is erroneous as well as artificial, because on the one side we have a concrete entity, the individual and on the other an abstraction, society. So the question how an abstract entity acts (or interacts) on a concrete entity is not quite meaningful. Meaningfulness can be introduced into the problem by reducing both to one level, more preferably by dissolving the abstract society into its concrete details by emphasizing that the impact of society on the individual can be studied as a *process* of individuals in interaction.

Thus the institutional situation of man we are emphasizing is not just the situation of the individual being helplessly thrown into a monolithic finished structure which tosses the individual about, moulds and remoulds him into a personality but one in which initiative, inventiveness, originality and adaptability on the part of the individual are called for,—to start with for mere survival and later on for the development of the individual into a person, i.e., for personality-development.

The question whether man by nature is good or bad is not crucial in our context, for the rejection of neither of the theories does not damage our own standpoint here. Irrespective of the theory of human

nature we contribute to, we can still maintain that the study of man — the study of his personality - growth in our context — requires that he be studied not in isolation or apart from the situation in which he finds himself. It is not meant here that the differences in the presuppositional starting points of either of the analyses do not make for any difference in the attitudes of the individuals towards their situation. We are not denying the obvious and the basic facts concerning the complexion the situation assumes, — the fact that the assumption of man as being good and social results in a situation where society is looked upon as a natural corollary to the spontaneous character of the positive and kindly attitude of the individual towards social participation and the more obvious fact that considering man to be utterly bad and egoistic suggests that the situation (of inter - personal relationships having to be established) is a contrived one, necessitated because of the non-availability of other alternatives to the individual. What we do deny is that the first assumption alone warrants the truth in the institutional situation whereas the second, far from pointing to the existence of a situation, is positively suggestive of the impossibility of its origin and continuance.

In the first theory we have the concrete and detailed exemplification of the social nature of man — his going out into the world of men with the attitude of give - and - take, the attitude naturally arising out of the appreciation of the common basic requirement of life in society — a more or less predictable, uniform, stable life. Expecting the same attitude from the others make, for social uniformmities in the form of rules, laws and regulations. In the second theory the necessity of getting over uncertainties is equally well accepted but it is pointed out to be born out of self-interest, — out of the fear that the individual himself may be the loser in view of the more or less equal endowment of physical and mental capacities of the 'others'. The 'pre-social stage' could thus be got over only by the individuals subjecting themselves to the institutional situation. Thus both the theories admit that the process of institutionalization is basically rooted in man's wanting a coherent society in which he could pursue his avocation peacefully and purposefully.

The process of institutionalization is thus helpful in appreciating personality-development better, for we are then forced to reckon with the fact that institutions are not just products, ready-made and given to the individuals from without but are always in the process of making. Whatever might be the ideal behind the processes of development of society, — unity, integration or coherence — from the point of view of the individual we may say that these conduce to personality-development, but in so saying we do not any longer have the idea

that there is only a one-way action-pattern by which there is social determinism — the individual always being controlled by society but at pattern of action which is characterized by the action-reaction — chain — the individual and society being the 'participants' in the chain. Furthermore, since personality-development is a process and institutions have been shown to be *processes* rather than products, it is easier to appreciate that there is an important subjective element as well for personality-development.

When the objective aspect alone is emphasized we are considering the end-products of the processes of institutionalization and, this by and large accounts for the general tendency to treat institutions as products and not also as processes. Concentrating on the subjective aspect results in 'finding' the connecting link which is 'already there' between the objective aspects or effects and subjective rootings. When attention is confined to the subjective aspect alone, we are in effect considering the value to be achieved as personality-development.

The concept of person thus becomes meaningful when we consider that personality-growth is a *process* and that the process itself cannot be understood unless we grant the subjective element to it, in addition, of course to the role of the institutions (as products) in this regard. It is from this point of view that McIver's definition of institution as "an established form or condition of procedure, characteristic of group activity" is significant. The functional significance of an institution is made clear by him by contrasting it with an association which is an organized group. Parsons' view that an "institution should be considered to be a higher order unit of social structure than the *role* and...is made up of a plurality of interdependent role patterns or components of them"[1] is equally significant. His example of the institution of property is especially significant and revealing in our context. He writes: "When we speak of the 'institution of property' in a social system we bring together those aspects of the roles of the component factors which have to do with action-expectations with the value-patterns governing the definition of 'rights' in 'possessions' and obligations relative to them."[2]

The subjective significance of the institutions thus consists in making possible the socialization-process. From the point of view of the requirements of personality-growth, it should be admitted that the significance of society (or institutions) does not consist merely in providing an environment (the implication of the institution as a product-idea) but in being the objectivization of the processes of institutionalization resulting from the value attached by the individual to them (and hence being pursued).

A slightly different approach to our understanding of the process of institutionalization also yields the same conclusion we have derived in regard to the concept of person. To assert that man has never been free from the socialization-process is tantamount to holding the view that an analysis of institutionalization as a phenomenon in social life should not be interpreted to mean that the process itself began sometime, somewhere. Furthermore, man's capacity to deliberately plan out his pattern of living makes the already 'prevalent processes' more formalized and effective with the result that a formal coming into existence of an institution does not *materially* make a difference to the social interaction process that is already at work, determining inter-personal relationships. Institutions can thus be looked upon as processes of objectivization of man's inherent longing for realizing certain values and this may be understood by referring, as Robert Bierstedt does, to certain institutionalized 'end-products'. He writes: "Government ..is the institutionalized end-product of a process as old as history, as old in fact as society itself. Wherever there is society, there is order, and when the processes of sustaining this order become institutionalized as they do in all societies of any size, government is the result. Just as the dissemination of news precedes the institution of journalism, just as barter and trade precede the institution of business, and just as wonder and worship, the institution of religion, so order precedes the institution of government. The norms come first, the institutions follow. But the institution in effect is already contained in the norms, and needs only specific functionaries, specific statuses and a specific association in order to become explicit."[3]

This way of analysing the process of institutionalization helps us in fusing the subjective aspects of the whole process and, in the context of our discussion points to the fact that personality-development - the *process* of becoming a person—is equally well to be considered in terms of the subjective as well as the objective aspects.

Ideas, ideals and the institutions through which they are expressed can thus be considered as a system of inter - dependent variables and, the institutional situation itself can be reasserted as not warranting a compartmentalized treatment of either of the pattern-variables. Their interacting with each other points to their reciprocally determining each other and makes a hard and fast distinction between them too artificial to be of any value either in recasting our ideas on the concept of person or in understanding the popular idea that society shapes personality. No wonder, therefore, we find a contemporary sociologist explicitly stating that neither social nor any other science can live in a philosophical vaccum.[4] Since, however, sociology and philosophy are two different disciplines very often we find them being treated as if they

are completely autonomous. The dichotomous analysis itself need not be looked at with disfavour provided it is not forgotten that the abstraction of the two is aimed at illuminating the significance of each for the other, and for detecting more specifically the points of impact of each on the other.

We thus maintain that more attention deserves to be bestowed on the process-idea in so far as it is ultimately responsible for the product-idea—both in regard to the concept of personality and in regard to the concept of an institution. Persons *are* in the *process* of 'being made' just as institutions *are* processes which contribute to the 'making'—the contribution being intelligible by considering them as emanating from the individuals themselves. The term individual would thus stand for potential persons, and the term *person* would indicate actualization of the potentiality,—hower incomplete the actualization itself may be.

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1 *The Social System,* (New York : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) p. 39.

2 *Ibid*

3 *The Social Order* (New York : Mc Graw Hill Co., Inc., 1963), p. 504.

4 T. Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York : The Free Press, 1965. p. 16.

Bhaswati Bhattacharya

ON ANUPALABDHI

One of the specific questions that the problem of *abhāva* (non-existence) comprises is how to cognise the absence of something. In other words, what is the means of cognising the absence of something? It is in connection with this question that the problem of *anupalabdhi* arises. The systems of Indian philosophy that accept *abhāva* as an object of knowledge recognise the causality of *anupalabdhi* towards the cognition of *abhāva*. But they differ in their opinion regarding the state of *anupalabdhi*. Some systems, e.g., the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta, accord an independent status to *anupalabdhi*, whereas other systems, such as the Nyāya, give it a subordinate status, grouping it under either perception or inference.

The Bhātta Mīmāṁsaka holds that to know that something is absent, one needs a means of knowledge. And this means is not provided by any other 'source of knowledge' like perception and inference. Hence is the necessity of an independent means, viz., *abhāva-pramāṇa*, for getting a knowledge of absence.

The Nyāya does not accept *anupalabdhi* as an independent means of knowledge. Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjari* rejects the Bhātta view. Udayana in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* adduces several proofs to maintain that *anupalabdhi* is an auxiliary cause for the perceptual knowledge of *abhāva*.

This paper attempts to present the proofs set forth by Udayaṇa to prove that *anupalabdhi is kāraṇa* (cause), and not *karaṇa* (instrument) for the knowledge of *abhāva*. In other words, it is not an independent means of knowledge.

It may be noted here that Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍana–Khaṇḍa-khādya* denies the very possibility of *anupalabdhi* as a means of knowledge. His denial is based on the ground that no logical explanation is possible for the consideration of *anupalabdhi* as a means of cognition. He analyses the definition of *abhāva pramāṇa* offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and shows how every clause in the definition is riddled with contradiction.

Coming to Udayaṇa, his denial of *anupalabdhi* as an independent means of knowledge, is based on his account of the nature of the knowledge of *abhāva*. The knowledge of *abhāva,* for him, is mostly perceptual, sometimes inferential, in character; and hence *anupalabdhi* which assists in the generation of that knowledge, must fall under either perception or inference.

The concept of *anupalabdhi* is brought in with the purpose of accounting for the knowledge of *abhāva*. Hence to establish the claim that *anupalabdhi* falls under perception, it is necessary to prove the following facts:

1) The cognition of *abhāva* is perception, and (2) the sense-organ is the *kāraṇa* for the cognition of *abhāva.*

To establish the position that the cognition of *abhāva* is perception Udayaṇa adduces four reasons.

Arguments for the perceptivity of the cognition of *abhāva* :

1) *Pratipatteḥ apārokṣyāt* [1] *Pratipatteḥ* stands for the knowledge of *abhāva,* and *apārokṣya,* for its direct nature. The cognition of *abhāva* is perceptual in character, because it is immediate. The distinctive factor between mediate and immediate knowledge consists in the fact that while mediate knowledge is produced by the knowledge of *karaṇa,* immediate knowledge is produced by the *karaṇa* itself, and not by its knowledge. For example, the inferential and verbal knowledge are mediate, because they are produced by the knowledge of *liṅga* and that of *śabda* respectively, whereas perceptual knowledge is immediate, because it is produced by the *karaṇa,* viz., the sense-organ itself and not by the knowledge of the sense-organ.

The cognition of *abhāva,* viz., that there is no jar on the floor, is immediate, because it is produced by the non-cognition of jar without the mediation of its knowledge. Since the knowledge of the absence of a jar is generated directly by the non-cognition of the jar, it is perception. For perceptionis that for which knowledge is not the instrument. The cognition of *abhāva* being perception must have sense-organ as its *karaṇa,* because perception arises through the instrumentality of the

sense-organ. Non-cognition assists the sense-organ in producing the cognition of *abhāva*. Hence it is the auxiliary cause for the knowledge of *abhāva*.

Examples may be cited to illustrate the fact that sometimes knowledge of *abhāva* arises through knowledge of non-cognition. A man's knowledge of the absence of a particular man at a particular place may arise through the information given to him by another man who posseses the direct knowledge of the absence of that man at that particular place. Again, the same man may arrive at the knowledge of the absence of a particular person at a particular place because of his knowledge of the previous non-cognition of that person at that place. Both these kinds of knowledge of *abhāva*, according to Udayaṇa, come under inference, as knowledge of absence here is generated through the mediation of another knowledge, either one's own or that possessed by others.

2) The second reason that has been offered to prove the perceptual character of the cognition of *abhāva* is *indriyasya anupakṣayāt*.[2] Knowledge that arises after the sense-contact owing to the latter's inability to come in contact with further object is perception. For example, when the visual sense-organ comes into contact with colour, owing to the former's inability to come into contact with any object other than colour, there arises the perception of colour. Similarly, the cognition of the absence of a jar on the floor that arises after visual sense-contact, is perception.

(3) *Ajñāta karaṇa atvāt* is the third reason for the inclusion of knowledge of *abhāva* in perception. The knowledge which is not produced by a cognised *karaṇa* (instrument), is directly produced by the sense-organ.[3] For example, the perception of colour is directly produced by the visual sense-organ which itself is not cognised. Similarly, the cognition of the absence of a jar on the floor arises through the uncognised *karaṇa*, hence it must be produced by the sense-organ. The expression *ajñāta-karaṇatva* stands for uncognised instrumental cause. This argument aims at establishing a *vyāpti* that the knowledge that is produced by uncognised *karaṇa* is produced by the sense-organ.

Against the *vyāpti* one counter-*vyāyti* may be offered in the following manner :

The knowledge that has positive entity as its object and is produced by uncognised *karaṇa*, arises a through the sense-organ. The cognition of *abhāva* does not have any positive entity as its object. Hence it is not produced by the sense-organ. This *vyāpti* narrows down the scope of the previous *vyāpti*, viz., that knowledge that is produced by uncognised *karaṇa*, is because of the sense-organ. Hence the previous one stands rejected.

In support of the previous *vyāpti* it may be argued that as there is no argument to invalidate it, it does not stand rejected. It is rejected for the reason mentioned by the counter *vyāpti*, then it may equally well argued that inference is possible only about positive entities and not be about absence. Thus no inferential knowledge of *abhāva* would be possible.

One may argue that the knowledge of *abhāva* may be produced by an uncognised *karaṇa*, but that it may not be produced by the sense-organ. There is no invalidating argument against the absence of causality of the sense-organ towards the knowledge of *abhāva*.

This argument cannot be substantitated. Observation testifies to the fact that wherever knowledge is generated by an uncognised *karaṇa* it is produced by the sense-organ. If this is not admitted in the case of the knowledge of *abhāva*, there is no reason why this should be admitted in other cases. There is an established causal relation between the knowledge produced by an uncognised *karaṇa* and the causality of the sense organ. The denial of this fact would mean the production of the effect even in the absence of its cause. Like the knowledge of *abhāva*, the knowledge of colour too then would not be produced by the sense-organ.

The causal relationship between the knowledge produced by an uncognised *karāṇa* and the causality of the sense-organ is established thus. Observation goes to show that in the case of inferential, knowledge verbal knowledge, etc., knowledge arises through the knowledge of the probans and that of words, etc., which are the *karaṇa*. The knowledge of colour arises without the knowledge of *karaṇa*. Thus the knowledge of colour is produced by uncognised *karaṇa* and this *karaṇa* is the sense-organ. Following this, a general rule is formulated that the sense-organ is the cause of the knowledge in general which is produced by the uncognised *karaṇa*, that is, without the knowledge of *karaṇa*. Since the knowledge of *abhāva* arises without the knowledge of *karaṇa*, it must be produced by the sense-organ. And the knowledge that is produced by the sense-organ is perception.

(4) The last reason that is offered in support of the fact that the knowledge of *abhāva* is perception, is *bhāvāveśat ca cetasaḥ*. It is an acknowledged fact that the mind produces the knowledge of external objects with the help of a positive *pramāṇa*.[4] For example, the mind produces the knowledge of fire with the help of a *liṅga* which is a positive *pramāṇa*. Similarly, to produce the knowledge of *abhāva* which is an external entity, the mind depends on the assistance of a positive *pramāṇa*. This *pramāṇa* is the sense-organ, and not the non-

cognition which is not a positive entity. The expression *bhāvāveśāt ca cetasaḥ* points to the mind's dependence on a positive *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of external objects. For generating the knowledge of *abhāva* the sense-organ assists the mind as a positive *pramāṇa* whereas non-cognition assists the sense--organ as an accessory cause. Since the mind gives rise to the knowledge of *abhāva* with the help of the sense-organ which is the *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa,* the knowledge of *ābhāva* is perception.

The upshot of all the four reasons discussed may be expressed in the following two propositions: (1) The knowledge of *abhāva* is perception and, (2) non-cognition which is one of the causes of the knowledge of *abhāva* is not a distinct *pramāṇa,* it only assists the sense-organ which is the *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa.*

The sense-organ is the instrument (*karaṇa*) for perception ; if the cognition of *abhāva* were perception, the sense-organ must be its instrument. Four reasons are advanced to establish that the sense-organ is the instrument of the knowledge of *abhāva.*[5]

Arguments for the instrumentality of the sense-organ :

(1) *Pratiyogini sāmarthyāt* is the first reason. The general rule is that the knowledge of the absence of a thing is produced by the same *pramāṇa* that produces the knowledge of its counter-positive. The visual sense-organ that perceives the jar, the counter-positive of the absence of jar, perceives the absence of jar also. Therefore, the cognition, viz., that there is no jar on the floor, is produced by the sense-organ. This is what is expressed by *pratiyogini sāmarthyāt.*

(2) The second reason is *vyāpāra-avyavadhānataḥ.* This may be explained thus. The knowledge of the absence of jar that arises after the generation of the knowledge of the substratum 'floor' by the sense-organ, is produced by the sense-organ. For, the knowledge of the substratum is the *vyāpāra* (intermediary function) of the sense-organ which is followed by the generation of knowledge. An example may be cited to explain this fact. The stick is the cause for the operation of the wheel in the production of a jar. But it is the cause of the jar also which is produced after the operation of the wheel, because the operation of wheel is its *vyāpāra.* In this instance the stick becomes the cause of the jar through the *vyāpāra* of the operation of the wheel. Similarly, the sense-organ becomes the cause of the knowledge of *abhāva* through the *vyāpāra* in the form of the knowledge of the substratum.

If the cause of a *vyāpāra* is not admitted as the cause of the effect produced after the *vyāpāra*, the *savikalpaka* (determinate) knowledge would not be produced by the sense-organ. First there arises the *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) knowledge through the sense-organ, and after that arises the *savikalpaka* one. If the sense-organ that gives rise to *nirvikalpaka* does not produce the *savikalpaka*, the latter cannot be perception. For it is not produced by the sense-organ.

It may be objected that if the cause of a *vyāpāra* becomes the cause of the effect that follows the *vyāpāra*, then inference too may turn out to be perception. The knowledge of fire in the hill arises after smoke is perceived by the sense-organ. The sense-organ may cause the knowledge of fire through the *vyāpāra* in the form of the perception of smoke. The knowledge of fire then would be perception and not inference.

This objection arises due to a mistaken idea regarding *vyāpāra*. When a thing cannot be *karaṇa* without giving rise to a particular action, that action is the *vyāpāra* of the *karaṇa.*[6] A stick cannot be the *karaṇa* towards a jar without being an operating cause of the wheel. Operation of the wheel is the *vyāpāra* of the stick which is the *karaṇa* of the jar. If the visual sense-organ cannot produce the knowledge of fire without producing the knowledge of smoke, then the knowledge of smoke can be the *vyāpāra* towards the knowledge of fire. But the knowledge of fire does arise sometimes by the visual sense-contact without the knowledge of smoke. Hence the knowledge of smoke is not the *vyāpāra* of the visual sense-organ. The knowledge of fire which arises after the perception of smoke is not, therefore, produced by the sense-organ.

(3) *Akṣāśrayatvāt doṣāṇām* is the third reason that points to the fact that the sense-organ is the *karaṇa* for the knowledge of *abhāva*. Experience tells us that defective sense-organs generate erroneous cognitions. Defective eyes perceive a shell to be yellow, this is erroneous. But the eyes free from defects perceive the shell as white, this is vaild. From this it is established that the same instrument (*karaṇa*) that generates erroneous cognition owing to its defects, generates also valid cognition, i.e., cognition which is defect-free. The cognition of *abhāva* may sometimes be erroneous. The perception of absence of white colour in a shell is erroneous. The cause of this error cannot be traced to any of the following facts, viz., the cognition of the substratum, the remembrance of the counter-positive and the non-cognition of the counter-positive. For all these three are by nature free from defects. It is therefore the defect of the sense-organ which is the cause of the erroneous cognition of *abhāva*. A defective

sense-organ is the instrumental cause for this erroneous cognition. Since the erroneous cognition of *abhāva* arises due to some defect in the instrumental causality of the sense-organ, the valid cognition of *abhāva* should arise through the defectlesss instrumental causality of the sense-orgn. This establishes the fact that the sense-organ is the *karaṇa* of the knowledge of *abhāva.* This is supported by an inference too. The inference runs thus :

Sense-organ is the *karaṇa* for the valid cognition of *abhāva,* because it is the *karaṇa* for the erroneous cognition of *abhāva,* that which is the *karaṇa* for the erroneous cognition, is the *karaṇa* for the valid cognition too, e.g., the visual sense-organ which is the *karaṇa* for the valid cognition of colour.

(4) The last reason in support of the instrumental causality of the sense-organ for the knowledge of *abhāva* is *vikalpanāt. Vikalpanāt* stands for *savikalpaka* knowledge. The cognition 'the floor has absence of jar' is *savikalpaka,* hence it must be produced by the sense-organ. The cognition of the absence of jar on the floor arises after the sense-contact. Here the floor is the substratum of the absence of jar.

The opponent may argue that the sense-organ does not apprehend 'absence' because its capacity gets diminished as soon as it perceives the 'floor'. Were it so, it might be counter-argued that the capacity of non-cognition too wanes away after apprehending 'absence' hence it does not perceive the 'floor'. Consequently, the sense-organ would produce only the knowledge of the floor and the non-cognition, only the knowledge of the absence of jar. The knowledge of the absence of jar on the floor that comprises both the floor as well as the absence of jar, would not be produced either by the sense-organ or by the non-cognition. In that case, the opponent has to formulate one more *pramāṇa* apart from the six to give rise to this knowledge.

It is not proper to hold that the sense-organ and the non-cognition generate the knowledge of floor; similarly that the knowledge of the absence of jar individually and the knowledge comprising both arise by the combination of the sense-organ with the non-cognition. No such combination is feasible owing to their different subject-matters. Just as a potter, the agent of a jar, cannot be combined with a weaver, the agent of a cloth, or a stick, wheel, etc. that produce a jar, cannot be combined with yarn, shuttle, etc. that produce a cloth, so also the sense-organ that generates the knowledge of floor, cannot be combined with the non-cognition that produces the knowledge of the absence of jar.

We anticipate a rejoinder that a potter cannot be combined with a weaver because no effect is seen to be produced by such a combination. But the sense-organ can be combined with the non-cognition because the knowledge of the absence of jar on the floor arises from such a combination.

This rejoinder is not sound. The knowledge of the floor is immediate perception, because it is produced by the sense-organ; whereas the knowledge of the absence of jar is mediate as it is produced by the non-cognition. If the knowledge of the absence of jar on the floor arises from the combination of the sense-organ with the non-cognition, the same knowledge would then entail two different kinds of knowledge. This is not accepted.

Udayaṇa is of the view that the knowledge of the absence of jar arises in the same way as the knowledge of fragrant sandalwood. In the latter case, the visual sense-organ that has the capacity to perceive only the sandalwood, produces the knowledge of fragrant sandalwood with the help of the remembrance of fragrance which was perceived before by the organ of smell. Similarly, the sense-organ with the help of the non-cognition of jar produces the knowledge of the absence of jar, the floor. As in the former case knowledge does not arise through the combination of two sense-organs, so also in the latter case no such combination of the sense-organ with non-cognition takes place.

The opponent may argue that non-cognition must be admitted as a separate *pramāṇa* for the following reasons:

(1) Qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) does not arise in the absence of the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier.) Prior to the generation of the qualificative cognition, viz., the cognition of absence of jar on the floor, the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa*, viz., knowledge of the absence of jar, is required. The knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* arises from the non-cognition. The knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* arises from the non-coguition. The visual sense-organ may give rise to the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, but it cannot produce the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa*. Just as the visual sense-organ cannot produce the knowledge of fragrance (*viśeṣaṇa*), even though it procuces the knowledge of fragrant sandalwood (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*), so also the sense-organ cannot produce the knowledge of *abhāva*. i.e., the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa*. Therefore, non-cognition must be admitted as a distinct *pramāṇa* with a view to generating the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* in the form of *abhāva*.

(2) Further, the sense-organ produces the *savikalpaka* knowledge of an object only when that object is known earlier by *nirvikalpaka*

perception. *Abhāva* is not known earlier by *nirvikalpaka* perception, so *savikalpaka* knowledge of an object qualified by that *abhāva* is not possible. A separate *pramāṇa* in the form of non-cognition must, therefore, be admitted in order to produce that knowledge. Just as inference produces the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* of an object even in the absence of the *nirvikalpaka* knowledge of that object, so also is produced the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* of *abhāva* by the non-cognition even in the absence of the *nirvikalpaka* knowledge of that *abhāva*.

(3) Again, as the sense-organ has no contact with the *abhāva*, the knowledge of *abhāva*, cannot be produced by the sense-organ. The contact between the sense-organ and the *abhāva* cannot be conjunction, because the sense-organ is not directly conjoined with the *abhāva*. It is not the contact of *viśeṣaṇatva* also. The relation of *viśeṣaṇatva* (qualifier-ness) is preceded by another relation. For example, the jar on a floor is the *viśeṣaṇa* of the floor, but this relation of *viśeṣaṇata* is preceded by the relation of conjunction (*saṁyoga*) as the jar is conjoined with the floor. The absence of jar is not conjoined with the floor, hence the relation between the absence of jar and the floor cannot be *viśeṣaṇatva*. Therefore, as the sense-organ cannot produce the knowledge of *abhāva* due to lack of contact with the *abhāva*, non-cognition must be held as the *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of *abhāva*.

(4) Lastly, those who advocate that the knowledge of *abhāva* is produced by the sense-organ, must admit the non-cognition. Surely, the sense-organ that produces the knowledge of jar, does not produce the knowledge of the absence of jar.

All these four reasons supporting the non-cognition as a distinct *pramāṇa* stand rejected.

In reply to the first argument it may be said that the *viśiṣṭa-jṇāna*, viz., that the floor qualified by the absence of jar, need not be preceded by the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa*, viz., the absence of jar. [7] Therefore, there is no necessity to postulate non-cognition to explain the production of the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa*.

Secondly, as the knowledge of *abhāva* alone does not arise without its substratum and the counter-positive, *abhāva* cannot be known by *nirvikalpaka* perception. But the general rule that the *savikalpaka* knowledge of an object is possible only when that object is known by *nirvikalpaka* perception, applies only to positive entities and not to negative. Therefore, the second argument that as the *savikalpaka* knowledge of *abhāva* is not possible without the *nirvikalpaka* knowledge

of *abhāva* non-cognition should be admitted as a *pramāṇa* to produce the knowledge of *abhāva*, stands rejected.

Thirdly, the contact between the sense-organ and the *abhāva* is that of *viśeṣaṇatva* which is a *svarūpa-saṁbandha* (self-linking relation). *Abhāva* abides in the substratum by the *svarūpa-saṁbandha* which is not preceded by any other relation. The sense-organ comes into contact with *abhāva* through the contact with the substratum, viz. the floor, and the *viśeṣaṇa* of the substratum, viz., absence of jar. Hence, the third argument that the sense-organ does not produce the knowledge of *abhāva* because it has no contact with *abhāva*, is rejected.

Lastly, it is futile to argue that non-cognition must be admitted as a distinct *pramāṇa*, because it is necessary for the generation of the knowledge of *abhāva*. The necessity of non-cognition may consist in its being a *kāraṇa* (cause), but not as a *karaṇa* (instrument). Only the sense-organ can be the *karaṇa* for the knowledge of *abhāva*. The sense-organ is accepted by all as the *karaṇa* for the perception of positive entities. So it must be the *karaṇa* for the perception of negative entities too. Non-cognition is only an nacessory cause.

If this is not accepted, then like the knowledge of negative entity, the knowledge of a positive entity also may as well be produced by the non-cognition. The knowledge of jar may be produced by the non-cognition of the absence of jar, as the knowledge of jar may arise only when there is non-cognition of the absence of jar. Thus, the non-cognition of *abhāva* may be the *pramāṇa* of the knowledge of positive entity and the non-cognition of *abhāva*, for the knowledge of negative entity. In that case, the sense-organ would not be a *pramāṇa*, and the *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* itself would be abolished.

To avoid this position, the sense-organ which is an established *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of the positive entity, must be admitted as the *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of the negative entity too.

To sum up the two-fold purpose of the various proofs discussed above is to establish the congition of *abhāva* as perception and the sense-organ as the instrument for the organition of *abhāva*. In this scheme of logicthe non-cognition is just one of the causes for the knowledge of *abhāva*, and not the principal cause or *karaṇa*. Therefore, the logician concludes that *anupalabdhi* is not an independent means of knowledge. With the logicians the simplicity of assumptions (*Kalpanālāghava*) is the decisive factor in favour of a theory as against manifoldness of assumpt tions (*Kalpanā-gauvara*). Since the knowledge of *abhāva* can be explained by the *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* itself, it is unnecessary for them to postulate one more *pramāṇa* for that purpose.

NOTES

1. *Nyāyakusumāñjalı* (Kusmāṇjali Samiti, Tirupati, 1940), III *stabakaḥ*, p., 48.
2. *Ibid.*
3. "*Vadajñāyamānakaraṇajam jñānam tat sākṣāt indriyajam*" *Ibid.*, p. 52.
4. "*Sarvatra hi bāhyārthānubkave janayitavye bhāvabhūta-pramāṇāviṣṭameva cet upayujyate.*" *Ibid.*, p., 54.
5. "*Pratiyogini sāmarthyāt vyāpāra-avyavadhānataḥ, akṣāśrayatvāt doṣāṇām indriyāni vikalpanāt.*" *Ibid.*
6. "*yayā kriyayā vinā yasya yat kāraṇatvaṁ na ntrvahati, tam prati tasyā eva vyāpāratvāt,*" *Ibid.*, p., 55.
7. "*viśiṣṭajñānamātrasya viśeṣaṇajñāuajanyatva niyamo nāsti.. Āmoda*, (Comm. on *Nyāyakuswmāñjali*, Tirupati, 1940), III *stabakaḥ*, p., 57.

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